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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses transmigration policy in 
Indonesia within the context of centre and regional 
relationships. The evidence from Riau and South 
Kalimantan suggests that as a consequence of the unequal 
relationship between the centre and the regions, the 
implementation of transmigration policy has suffered from 
a lack of both coordination and feedback that could 
enhance an appropriate policy.
At the regional level, the ambiguous national goals 
of transmigration policy have been simply translated into 
physical and quantifiable targets, which, in turn, have 
resulted in the neglect of transmigration policy as an 
integrated and complementary effort between the different 
sectors and ministries. The prevailing problems of 
implementation, such as the unsuitability of land for 
agricultural settlements, the various forms of 
mismanagement within the implementing agencies, and the 
hidden conflicts with the local population, have only had 
limited feedback effect on the policy making process in 
the central government. After the budget was drastically 
cut back in the mid-1980s, however, transmigration policy 
started to confront new dimensions of these problems.
At this time, the implementation of transmigration 
policy was forced to change direction toward, among other 
things, maintaining the existing settlements and 
bolstering the cash-crops scheme. The spontaneous 
transmigration scheme, which became government rhetoric 
during the previous period, seems also to be receiving 
serious attention by the government. Yet, as the 
prevailing economic and political structure of the 
country is unchanged, the myth of transmigration policy 
as a panacea is unlikely to vanish.
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1Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
For researchers in universities or other 
institutions who have not been directly 
involved in the process of policy making during 
the Repelita periods, studying the complexity 
of transmigration has been a challenge. The 
question they face is whether or not to seek 
narrow views or through extending the existing 
terms of reference on the basis that the 
solution is most likely to be found within a 
wider perspective (Sayogyo, 1985: 42-43)
The United Nations' surveys among developing 
countries indicated that the most widely perceived 
population problems were population distribution and 
internal migration, and, surprisingly, not population 
growth as had been widely suggested by most population 
experts, international organizations and many leaders in 
Western industrialized countries.1 The explanation of 
this contradiction lies within different perceptions of 
the population problem. The survey results showed clearly 
that internal migration and population distribution were 
more frequently perceived as problems requiring 
intervention than was the case with either fertility or 
mortality. Unfortunately, the survey did not further 
investigate why most developing countries considered
In the 1979 survey, among the 116 developing countries 
only six reported the over-all spatial distribution of 
their population as entirely acceptable. Of the remaining 
110 countries, 42 regarded the spatial distribution of 
their populations as unacceptable to some extent and 68 
found it to be highly unacceptable (United Nations, 1980: 
40-50).
2population distribution and internal migration to be 
their primary population problems.
Myron Weiner, a political scientist who has written 
widely in the area of population, argued that:
Many governments believe that some of the 
problems intensified by rapid population growth 
can be eased by policies directed at the 
dispersal of populations - partly because they 
consider population distribution more easily 
influenced by government policies than 
fertility, and partly because they may advocate 
population increases for the country as a whole 
and view a redistribution policy as a means of 
reducing some of the costs (Weiner, 1975: 66).
As with other population-related issues, population 
distribution policy has become an area that increasingly 
involves scholars from different disciplines. As a 
result, the literature on population distribution 
reflects a variety of interests and different approaches 
and perspectives. As noted by Richardson:
From the point of view of population policy, 
there are grounds for suggesting that 
population distribution is the main current and 
future population issue. There is a substantial 
degree of argument about what should be done to 
reduce fertility and mortality, and there have 
been some notable successes. With respect to 
population distribution policy, however, there 
is no consensus and there are no unambiguous 
successes. The field is riddled with extreme 
value judgements, ideological stances, and 
unsubstantiated assertions, many of them myths 
(1984: 263) .
The view of population policy described by 
Richardson closely approximates the reality in Indonesia. 
Compared to family planning policy, which has almost no
3historical precedent, transmigration policies dealing 
with sponsored population movement from Java to other 
islands have been in existence for almost a century. Yet, 
the relative outcomes of the two policies confirm 
Richardson's judgement. The success story of family 
planning in Indonesia has been almost without rival in 
the context of Third World countries. By contrast, 
transmigration policy is admitted to be less successful 
population policy, confronted by formidable problems of 
implementation.2
A general aim of this study is to assess why 
transmigration policy formulation and implementation have 
experienced such difficulties and failures. The factors 
that have led transmigration policy to its current state 
will be identified and discussed, and the policy 
implications and prospects considered. In comparison with 
other Indonesian development programs, transmigration has 
been given high priority, receives a significant 
allocation in the national budget and is directed towards 
ambitious and multi-focused goals. As stated by President
2 President Suharto in December 1988 was honoured by the 
Population Council as the first national leader to 
receive its "Population Award". In June 1989 he also 
received a World Population Award from the United Nations 
for Indonesia's achievement in reducing population growth 
through the family planning program. By contrast, the 
failure of the transmigration program reached a climax 
when Martono, Minister for Transmigration, declared 
16,000 houses that had been built for transmigrants to be 
uninhabitable (see Kompas, 25 November 1987). (Unofficial 
sources reported that the actual number was about 
40,000). This large number of inhabitable houses reflects 
the failure of the department of Transmigration in 
recruiting and resettling transmigrants according to 
their planning schedules.
4Suharto in an interview with Hopper (c.1987: 26),
Transmigration is one of the absolute 
necessities if we are to achieve our national 
goals - a higher living standard for our 
people, economic growth and national stability.
Yet, a comprehensive analysis of transmigration 
policy is long overdue. As Babcock observed:
Indeed, so entrenched, even 'sacred', a part of 
national policy and consciousness is 
transmigration that it has rarely been subject 
to probing criticism. The media, as well as 
various research reports, do indeed criticise 
certain aspects of the programme, and more 
commonly the failure of particular projects, 
but they attempt no overall evaluation (1986: 
160) .
In Indonesia, development policy has always been 
influenced by the dynamic relations between the centre 
(Java or Jakarta) and the periphery (the regions or Outer 
Islands). This is partly because Indonesia is a 
fragmented nation of islands, with Java the most 
populous, and because it is characterized by marked 
cultural diversity. In addition to their larger numbers, 
the Javanese have always been the dominant cultural group 
and the most influential ethnic group; consequently, as 
noted by Bruner (1974: 252), 'most other Indonesians see 
themselves as engaged in a more or less continual 
struggle to keep from being Javanized'.
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6Since Independence in 1945, Indonesia's development 
has been full of conflict and consensus between the
interests of the region (non-Javanese peoples) and the 
centre (mostly dominated by the Javanese). Transmigration 
policy has thus been conditioned to a very large extent 
by the dynamic relations between central and regional 
governments and between Java and the Outer Islands. Jones 
(1979: 220) argued that the implementation of the 
transmigration program had been affected by the state of 
centre-regional relationships within the country :
The degree to which people in the outer islands 
will be willing to accept the continued 
organized influx of rural Javans will no doubt 
depend largely on the broader political 
situation, the extent to which the programme is 
perceived as benefiting Java or Indonesia, and 
the sensitivity with which the transmigration 
program is administered.
In this study, transmigration policy will be 
analysed within the context of the centre-regional 
relationships that have to a certain extent shaped the 
Indonesian identity. In particular, this study will focus 
on two aspects: first, the policy formulation and changes 
that have taken place at the national level from the 
First Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita I) in 1969 to 
the end of the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan 
(Repelita IV) in 1989; and second, the implications of 
policy formulation and changes at the national level for 
policy implementation in transmigration receiving areas. 
Case studies on transmigration implementation in Riau and 
South Kalimantan will be presented to explore these
7Oissues at the regional level. Riau and South Kalimantan 
have been selected, partly because they have similar 
physical and geographical characteristics, yet display 
many differences of economy and culture. As this study 
shows, both similarities and differences have 
characterized the implementation of transmigration policy 
in these two provinces.* 4
More specifically, the objectives of the study are 
as follows:
1. To describe the demographic and socio-
historical contexts that have shaped 
transmigration policy.
2. To analyse in detail the policy processes 
related to transmigration during the New Order 
period, specifically from Repelita I to IV 
(1969-1989) .
3. To assess the implementation of the
transmigration program in the province of Riau and South Kalimantan within the context of 
centre-regional relationships.
In order to achieve those objectives, two 
levels of analysis have been conducted. The first is an 
analysis of transmigration policy within the framework of 
policy cycles at the national level. The nature of 
transmigration policy, particularly during the New Order, 
has been analysed, taking into consideration the socio­
demographic and politico-historical backgrounds that have
J The term 'region' in this study is equivalent to a 
province, the first level of the Indonesian
administrative structure. Except where stated otherwise,
this meaning will be used throughout this thesis.
4 In this study the terms 'policy' and 'program', 
especially in connection with transmigration, are often 
used interchangeably. This is in line with common usage 
in Indonesia.
8formed the context of transmigration policy in Indonesia. 
The second is an analysis of the implementation of the 
transmigration program in Riau and South Kalimantan, in 
order to understand the processes and institutional 
context of policy implementation in more detail.
It should be made clear at the outset that there are 
several categories of transmigrant, as well as different 
policies dealing with each category. In the past, 
according to Hardjono (1977: 28-30), it was customary to 
classify transmigration undertakings and migrants 
according to the organization responsible for 
implementing the program and the type of financing 
provided. The major category has always been General 
Transmigration (Transmigrasi Umum), which comprises fully 
sponsored migrants and is undertaken by the government 
transmigration agency, using its own funds and 
facilities. The second category in the past was Special 
Transmigration (Transmigrasi Khusus), which involved the 
movement of people for some special purpose or reason, 
such as transmigration undertaken by Department of Social 
Welfare for the victims of natural disasters, the 
squatters and unemployed people from urban areas, as well 
as private transmigration sponsored by non-government 
bodies. The third category was Local Transmigration or 
Transmigrasi Lokal, which involved the resettlement of 
people within the same island or, more commonly, within 
the same province, under government guidance. In a sense, 
these migrants were not "transmigrants" since they did
9not move "across" from Java or Bali, but because in their 
new settlement they were treated similarly as general 
transmigrants they were basically can be seen as 
transmigrants. The fourth category of Independent 
Transmigration (Transmigrasi Spontan) includes two 
completely different kinds of migrants: those who are 
described as spontan dengan bantuan biaya (Spontan 
D.B.B.), which means that some financial assistance is 
given in the form of transportation and housing 
materials; and those who are described as spontan tanpa 
bantuan biaya (Spontan T.B.B.), which means that nothing 
is given other than uncleared land in the transmigration 
project. People who moved in this way, either with or 
without assistance but theoretically under the 
sponsorship of the transmigration agency, are counted in 
government statistics as independent or spontan migrants.
In the New Order period, the above mentioned 
transmigrant categories are basically retained with only 
a few additional changes. Transmigran Lokal or Local 
Transmigrant, for example, has been given more attention 
and renamed APPDT (Alokasi Pemukiman Penduduk Daerah 
Transmigrasi or Settlement Allocation for People of the 
Transmigration Area) Transmigrant; also, Transmigran 
Spontan has been officially renamed Transmigran Swakarsa, 
which literally means transmigrants under their own 
initiative. A slightly new category was introduced: 
Transmigran Sisipan, which means the migrants who 
"slipped in" to the existing settlement, usually because
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some transmigrants left the settlement and their places 
therefore could be filled by this type of migrants. In 
many cases these migrants are actually spontaneous 
transmigrants, and therefore often confused the official 
statistics on spontaneous transmigrants. The important 
new category of transmigrants was the PIR-Trans or 
transmigrants who are employed as plantation labourers in 
the PIR (Perkebunan Inti Rakyat or Nucleus Estate Holder 
Scheme) projects. These migrants could be the indigenous 
people, usually the previous owners of land which was 
designated by the government for the project, or migrants 
who were recruited by transmigration offices in Java or 
Bali. The PIR-Trans projects are implemented by PTP 
(Perseroan Terbatas Perkebunan) a state enterprise on 
plantation and Dinas Perkebunan (District Technical 
Office on Plantation), whereas the Transmigration 
Department only provides the migrants.
However, since this study essentially examines the 
government policy on transmigration, it is logical that 
the discussion and analysis will inevitably concentrate 
on the implementation of General or Umum Transmigration 
which receives full support from the government, whereas 
other types of transmigration and the migrant itself will 
be discussed mainly in relation to General 
Transmigration.
The data used to accomplish these objectives are of 
two types: primary and secondary data. The primary data
11
for this study have been collected intermittently during 
field work in 1986, 1987 and 1988 in Jakarta, Riau and 
South Kalimantan. These data mainly consist of 
information about the processes of policy formulation and 
implementation at the national and regional levels. 
Interviews were conducted with the various government 
officers who were dealing with transmigration 
implementation, including officers in the Departments of 
Transmigration, Home Affairs and Public Works, and the 
National and Regional Planning Boards. Other interviews 
were also conducted with academics in universities, and 
with transmigrants and the indigenous people in Riau and 
South Kalimantan.5 The secondary data for this study are 
mainly demographic information from censuses and surveys, 
statistics on transmigration from central and regional 
government offices, and other social and economic 
information related to transmigration.
The primary data are of a qualitative nature and 
share many of the limitations of other qualitative data. 
One limitation of the data collected through interviews 
during field work resulted partly from the use of 
unstructured interviews. During interviews, particularly
^ In 1986 field work was conducted twice, each time for 
approximately three weeks each in Riau and in South 
Kalimantan. This field work was conducted in conjunction 
with an Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) project on 
the relationships between transmigration and regional 
development in those provinces, funded by UNFPA. From 
early December 1987 to the end of February 1988, field 
work was funded by AIDAB, although for practical reasons 
(for instance, to obtain an official research permit) 
field work continued to operate under the name of the 
LIPI-UNFPA project.
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those with government officials, the main questions were 
often asked in an indirect manner in order to avoid
rejection. This was necessary because the subject was 
sometimes considered to be sensitive or confidential. In 
some instances, taking notes or tape recording was not 
desirable. As a consequence, the information could only 
be recorded afterward. In these circumstances, the 
researcher's memory and personal views could, to some 
extent, have distorted the information.
Another limitation is related to the question of 
representativeness. This issue is particularly relevant 
for information that was collected from interviews with 
transmigrants or local people. The transmigrants and 
local people interviewed cannot be regarded as 
representative of all transmigrants or indigenous people. 
They were drawn from different locations, social and 
economic classes, as well as ethnic backgrounds, and (in 
the case of transmigrants) had resided in the area for 
different periods. In this analysis, the information 
obtained from interviews with transmigrants and local 
people is therefore treated primarily as supplementary, 
rather than primary data. In the case of government 
officials who had been interviewed, the selection was 
based on their involvement in a particular aspect of the 
transmigration program. In these circumstances, their 
views are treated as a representation of the facts or 
realities regarding the practices or policy processes of 
which those officials were aware, or in many instances in
13
flwhich they were personally involved.
The structure of this thesis is straight-forward. 
Chapter II locates this study within the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature on population 
distribution policy in the Third World. The historical 
contexts of transmigration policy are presented in
chapter III. Chapter IV focuses on the New Order period 
and elaborates the process of national development 
policy-making during that time. Transmigration is
examined closely as a government population distribution 
policy, although it is explicitly recognized that it also 
has other objectives. In Chapter V a description of the 
setting of Riau and South Kalimantan provinces is
presented, with special reference to their relationships 
with the central government. Chapter VI then investigates 
the process of transmigration policy implementation in 
the two provinces. Chapter VII elaborates the analyses of 
transmigration policy within the context of centre and 
regional relationships. Finally, a summary and conclusion 
as well as the prospect of transmigration policy are
presented in chapter VIII.
In a case of conflicting views between different 
informants, or a view considered as unclear or vague, 
rechecking was conducted by asking a third or fourth 
informant the same question. Another very important 
source of information used in this study is press 
reports, which complement material from interviews. In 
the references, the full title of the report is presented 
to give the reader a gist of the information.
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Chapter II
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD AND 
TRANSMIGRATION IN INDONESIA
This chapter consists of two interrelated parts. The 
first is a review of the literature on population 
distribution policies in the Third World, based on the 
principle that population policies can be properly 
understood only if placed in Third World political 
contexts. The second part examines transmigration policy 
in Indonesia as a unique case for such analysis. It 
suggests that a centre-regional context provides an 
appropriate perspective from which to view transmigration 
policy.
2.1. Population Distribution Policies in the Third World
Since the Bucharest Population Conference in 1974, 
in which population distribution began to be considered 
as a major population problem in the Third World, studies 
on population distribution policy have flourished. Yet, 
systematic reviews of this topic have remained few and 
exploratory in character (Fuchs and Demko, 1981: 70) .
Jones and Richter (1981: 2) noted that, despite the 
concern and, indeed, obsession of Third World leaders 
with problems of population distribution, the state of 
regional development and migration theory is
unsatisfactory. There are no clear guide-lines even
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regarding the appropriateness of many widely-accepted 
goals. Part of the problem is the plethora of frameworks 
of analysis, many of which are primarily descriptive 
rather than policy-directed. Another limitation of 
existing studies is the fact that, given the specificity 
of each country's experience, generalizations or a 
'cookbook approach', is of no great help and could be a 
dangerous undertaking (Whitney, 1980? Desbarats, 1988). 
The most substantial limitation of existing studies on 
population distribution policies, however, is their 
isolation from Third World political contexts, as 
correctly identified by Migdal :
Analyses of policies in the Third World, in 
particular, have often ignored the political 
context within which policies are formulated 
and put into action (1977: 242).
Although several studies have shown the need to 
incorporate socio-political factors into the analysis of 
population distribution policy, few have been conducted 
on an empirical basis.1 Among the studies that analyse 
population distribution policy within country specific 
political contexts are studies by Chambers (1969) on 
settlement schemes in Tropical Africa, Farmer (1974) on 
agricultural colonization in India, Bunker (1979) and 
Sawyer (1981) on colonization and frontier expansion in 
Brazil, and Dunham (1982) on land settlement in Sri
^ Pryor is among the few population distribution policy 
analysts who have suggested an analysis that is more 
country-specific (See his contribution in United Nations, 
Population Distribution Policy and Development Planning 
in Developing Countries, 1981).
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Langka. The lack of analyses that place population 
distribution policy in a Third World political context 
has resulted in a growing distance between the 
accumulation of existing knowledge on the subject and 
realistic interpretation of that knowledge.
An approach that is able to disentangle the 
complexities of population distribution policy from its 
implementation in a specific country context is needed. 
Population distribution policy is essentially an outcome 
of a policy-making process that operates within the 
political realm, especially in the Third World. An 
analytical attitude towards development issues, which has 
been described by Goldsworthy (1988: 507) as 'political 
mindedness', is perhaps a good starting point for such an 
endeavour:
In essence, political-mindedness means a 
sensitivity to the phenomena of values, 
interests and power in human affairs,...
Furthermore,
One of the attributes of political-mindedness, 
then, is a concern to elucidate the 
relationships between values and policy 
preferences in terms like these. To grasp these 
relationships is to be better able to uncover 
unspoken assumptions and to see through 
pretensions of value neutrality...(as claimed 
for example by development technocrats). 
(Goldsworthy, 1988: 509).
Population policy has been variously defined by 
many, but few have agreed on its precise meaning or 
constituent parts. Recent statements have identified many
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of the difficulties of defining and identifying policy as 
it relates to population issues (Jones and Richter, 1981; 
Fuchs, 1983; Desbarats, 1988). In its most inclusive 
sense, population policy is a set of actions - stated or 
unstated, intended or unintended by a national 
government or local government, organization or interest 
group that affects population size, growth rate, 
composition or distribution.
In addition to the recent attention given to 
population distribution issues, little agreement has 
emerged so far concerning the specific aims of 
redistribution policies. Attempts to define goals with 
operational precision have commonly floundered on value 
judgements, ideological biases, and unsubstantiated 
assertions (Desbarats, 1988: 2). However, three major 
objectives have been identified as dominating population 
distribution policies adopted among the Asia-Pacific 
countries (Fuchs, 1983): the deceleration or reversal of 
rural-to-urban migration trends; alteration of rural 
population distribution, in many cases through 
colonization or resettlement schemes; and alteration of 
urban configuration, usually through controls on primate 
city growth and development of small and intermediate- 
size cities.
Desbarats (1988: 3) argued that population 
distribution policies should not be viewed for their own 
sake but as a means to achieve broader goals. In other
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words, they cannot be considered in isolation. Fuchs 
(1983), among others, broadly distinguished two 
categories of government policies on population 
distribution: explicit and implicit policies. Explicit 
policies are those that have explicit intentions to 
distribute or direct population movements. Such actions 
are intended and deliberate, whereas implicit population 
distribution policies are any policies which have an 
indirect impact on population distribution within the 
country. Pryor (1976: 22) , on the other hand, viewed 
population distribution policy somewhat more narrowly as:
responding to the effects of a population 
distribution which is viewed as undesirable on 
some specified or unspecified criteria, or as 
positively influencing the choice of 
destination of migrants...
A broad review of studies on population distribution 
policies in developing countries shows that most have 
been based on secondary data. Most studies include 
detailed descriptions of migration patterns, typologies 
of population distribution, discussions of the 
constraints faced by such policies and, finally, 
suggestions for improving or overcoming problems caused 
by, or resulting from, population distribution in 
developing countries. Usually, options have been provided 
to Third World planners to enhance their capacity to 
integrate population distribution and internal migration 
with national development. Further data needed for this 
purpose have been identified and future research areas 
also recommended. Many studies, although comprehensive in
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their approach, attempt to cover very wide areas; some 
even cover all developing countries (Findley, 1977; UN, 
1981; Oberai, 1983; Fuchs, 1983; van der Wijst, 1984). 
Analysis has typically become too general and its 
applicability can be questioned, given the uniqueness of 
each developing country. The recommendations that flow 
from the analysis have usually been too abstract and 
difficult to implement.
Population distribution policy analysts have failed 
to adequately understand policies in developing 
countries, among other reasons because they have, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, attempted to apply a 
•developed-nations' conceptual framework when analysing 
the problems of Third World countries. With such a bias, 
population distribution policies in developing countries 
will always be viewed as imperfect or failing to reach 
the objectives.
Fuchs (1983: 6) provided a typical example of such 
views:
The vagueness of population distribution policy 
goals within national development plans is 
often matched by a failure to make explicit the 
connections between those goals and other 
aspects of the development plan.
Fuchs elaborated:
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Vertical linkages 'upward' to development goals 
and 'downward' to programs and projects are not 
clearly specified, nor are the horizontal 
linkages with economic, welfare, political, or 
other goals. Population distribution and 
redistribution objectives sometimes appear to 
have been prepared in isolation from other 
parts of the development plan and therefore 
seem abstract and unintegrated (1983: 6).
This suggests that everything seems to go wrong in 
developing countries' population distribution policies. 
Although from some perspectives the criticisms may be 
accurate, the analysis does not offer any clues as to why 
population distribution policy in developing countries 
has taken this form and what should be done about it. Why 
do most population distribution policies in developing 
countries display such characteristics? It is essential 
to answer this question if we want to devise alternative 
ways to solve population distribution problems in Third 
World countries.
2.2. The Context of Policy Processes in the Third World
If we consider population distribution policy in 
Third World countries from the point of view of public 
policy, we must place it within the context of policy 
processes in Third World nations. Since the early 1970s, 
such processes have been recognized as different from 
those in the developed or first world nations. This 
recognition, arises partly because the process of 
development or modernization which has flourished and has
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been adopted by many Third World leaders since the early 
1960s has largely failed to achieve its objectives. 
Modernization theory in general, and political 
development theory in particular, have been criticized 
for their ideological and ethnocentric character. Higgot 
(1988: 31) wrote:
Modernization theory came to be characterized 
as ideologically tainted, methodologically 
inadequate, and perhaps most important, 
ineffective as a policy tool.
Public policy analysts have found that in many 
cases, even though a policy has been neatly formulated at 
the national or central level, it cannot be easily 
implemented (Riggs, 1964; Smith, 1973a; 1973b and 1985; 
Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974; Grindle, 1980; Rondinelli, 
1983; Higgot, 1988). Quick, for example, argued that 
public policies often do not get implemented at all, and 
those that do manage to get through the tortuous process 
of implementation often look very different from what 
their framers originally intended. He explained that:
Policy implementation in the Third World bears 
little resemblance to the classical 
understanding of implementation as a process of 
rationally linking broad goals to specific 
programatic decisions (1980: 40).
On the assumption that policy processes in Third 
World countries are different from those in developed 
nations, appropriate methods for evaluating development 
activities in the Third World must also be different from 
those that have been developed to evaluate government
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public policies in developed nations. However, just as 
the ideas of development or modernisation have been 
largely imported from developed nations, so the approach 
to policy evaluation also has been based essentially on 
the experience of developed countries. It assumes, for 
example, that interest groups and political parties are 
well-established institutions. In the countries of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America, as argued by Grindle (1980: 
15) , to a much greater extent than in the political 
systems of the United States and Western Europe, the 
process of implementing public policies is a focus of 
political participation and competition. This arises from 
the characteristics of the political systems themselves, 
such as the remoteness and inaccessibility of the policy­
making process from most individuals, and the extensive 
competition engendered by widespread need and very scarce 
resources.
Grindle further explained that:
Thus, while in the United States and Western 
Europe much political activity is focused on 
the input stage of the policy process, in the 
Third World a large portion of individual and 
collective demand making, the representation of 
interests, and the emergence and resolution of 
conflict occurs at the output stage (1980: 15).
Hoole also argued that in Third World countries:
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Development activities frequently take place in 
an unstable and highly political setting. This 
will result in changing programs and priorities 
and in problems in implementing and evaluating 
development activities. Factors such as high 
turnover of office holders and bureaucrats, 
domestic conflict and strife, an inflationary 
economy, uncertain findings for the budget, 
changes in the international economic order, 
famines, and unemployment may mean that 
development planning is not meaningful, that 
development activities are not implemented as 
planned, that changes are made as the activity 
is implemented, or that the activity never 
occurs (1978: 126).
Smith (1985: 142), reviewing the literature on 
development policy evaluation in Third World Countries, 
suggested that the type of evaluation that best fits the 
Third World context would be one that is able to identify 
problems in the nature of the policy and in the program 
execution process. That form of evaluation, according to 
Smith, is implementation analysis. The implementation of 
policy is the crucial phase of the policy process in most 
Third World Countries. According to Smith :
When a Western political system makes a policy, 
it is assumed that the policy will be 
implemented and the results will be somewhere 
near those expected. This is not the case in 
many non-Western nations for two reasons. 
First, there tends to be a great deal of 
symbolic policy making. Governments formulate 
policies that are never fully implemented or 
may not be intended for implementation. Just 
because a developing nation makes a 'policy' is 
not an indication that it is a policy in the 
Western sense of concept. As Fred Riggs points 
out, in developing nations it is wise to 
distinguished between goals (which are not 
usually implemented) and policies (which the 
government will try to implement). Secondly, 
even if a government decides to implement a 
policy with some degree of vigour, the end 
results of the policy often are not very 
satisfactory in terms of the goals of the 
policy (1973a: 246).
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Given the concentration of political elements on the 
implementation process, it is likely that policies and 
programs will be even more difficult to manage and 
predict and even more subject to alteration in the Third 
World than elsewhere. This means that the implementation 
process may be the major arena in which individuals and 
groups are able to pursue conflicting interests and 
compete for access to scarce resources. It may even be 
the principal nexus of the interaction between the 
government and the citizenry, between public officials 
and their constituents. Moreover, the outcome of this 
competition and interaction can determine both the 
content and the impact of programs established by 
governments elites, and thus influence the course of a 
country's development.
In the population policy literature, implementation 
analysis is essentially in accordance with the so-called 
'comprehensive country-specific' analysis introduced by 
Korten (1975). Like other policy analysts with extensive 
Third World experience, Korten aimed to fill the gaps and 
deficiencies encountered by most studies in their attempt 
to understand population policies in developing 
countries. He argued that to comprehend a population 
policy within a Third World context required an insight 
into three crucial elements of the policy process: first, 
the process through which political support or 
acquiescence is developed for population policies;
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second, the dynamic decision making processes through 
which specific policy choices are made and their 
programmes designed; and third, the contextual aspects of 
the implementation processes that are central to the 
success or failure of a given policy.
Hugo (1985: 6) noted that government policy on 
population distribution must take full account of the 
nature of the state in which the policy is to be 
initiated:
It is not just the contemporary politico- 
economic context that should be considered but 
also the historical context. For example, it 
should be borne in mind that most of the Third 
World countries we are dealing with here have 
been subjected for much of their recent history 
to fundamentally exploitative colonial system 
designed to expedite the extraction of raw 
materials and control the local population in 
the most cost efficient way.
Similarly, Weiner argued that neither can migration 
policies be considered without recognizing the variety of 
political interest groups that are affected and the 
politically charged atmosphere within which policy 
decisions are often made. He also argued that migration 
policies can best be understood in the context of the 
political process:
To consider policy choices only in the context 
of the quest for more accelerated development, 
a more satisfactory dispersal of population, or 
greater equity or any one of a number of 
desirable objectives is to overlook the hard 
realities of politics (Weiner, 1975: 69).
26
According to Korten (1975: 14 6) , one of the great
values of intensive observation and analysis of policy 
processes on a country specific basis is the opportunity 
to work from the policy maker's perspective and to study 
the policy in context, exploring in all their rich 
variety the broad range of variables that may influence 
the policy outcome. Analysing policy choices and
processes in a specific country context can demonstrate 
the implications of the diverse range of situations in 
which actions must be undertaken (Korten, 1975: 140) .
Through the study of actual decisions, it becomes 
possible to identify the types of choices open to 
consideration and the wide range of contextual issues to 
be addressed. These include, among others, relevant 
political pressures and, relative to the state, the 
readiness of the politically-relevant public, unigue 
considerations of objectives and strategy, the strength 
and weaknesses of the local institutional infrastructure, 
and other specific situational requirements relating to 
such factors as culture, local politics or religion.
2.3. Policy Implementation Analysis
The policy process is complex and implementation is 
but one part of this process. Implementation is 
inextricably related to, and interdependent with, the 
other parts. Thus, a conceptual overview of the entire 
policy process is required in order to provide an
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adequate understanding. Smith (1973b) sees policy 
implementation as a tension-generating process in 
society. Implementation, in this context, is the creation 
and management of tensions and the use of power and 
resources to achieve policy ends. Policy formulation and 
implementation take place within a social, economic and 
political environment that is in a state of constant 
change. Discrepancies and tensions are a normal part of 
implementation, as they are the essence of politics, and 
implementation of public policies is merely an extension 
of politics into a different arena. Once public policies 
are regarded as tension-generating forces in society, it 
is necessary to consider the context of the 
implementation of policies - the policy relevant 
components that form the tension-generating matrix. Smith 
(1973b: 202) identifies four such components that are 
important in the policy implementation process: (1) the 
idealized policy, (2) the implementing organization, (3) 
the target group, and (4) environmental factors.
In order to analyse dynamic policy processes, Smith 
(1973b: 203) developed the framework shown schematically 
in Figure 1.1:
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Figure: 2.1
Model of Policy Implementation Analysis
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Source : Smith (1973b: 203)
The components of the model are as follows:
1• The Policy-Making Process
The policy making process is defined as a process 
through which a particular policy or program has been 
formulated. Several important elements to be considered 
in analysing the policy-making process are:
a. Consultation: Were there any consultations with and 
active participation during the policy formulation from 
both the target groups affected by the policy and from 
the implementing organization? Was participation 
encouraged or blocked?
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b. Time: Was the policy formed in a time of crisis and 
thus done quickly, or was the policy developed in a slow 
and deliberative process?
c. Source of the policy: Was the policy an indigenously- 
derived and funded endeavour or were its origins well 
outside the community or country of its application?
d. Expediency or Analysis: Was there analysis of the 
problem and consideration of alternatives when the policy 
was formulated. Or, was the policy formed to pacify group 
interest or for other expedient reasons?
2. The Idealized Policy
The idealized policy is defined as the idealized 
patterns of interaction that the policy makers are 
attempting to induce. There are four relevant categories 
of variables of idealized policy:
a. The Formal Policy: This is the formal decisional
statement, law, or program that the government is 
attempting to implement. In short, what form does the 
policy take?
b. The Type of Policy. There can be three types of 
policy. First, policies may be complex or they may be 
simple in nature. This distinction is similar to that 
between broad, non-incremental policies and small-scale 
incremental ones. Second, policies may be categorized as 
organizational or non-organizational. An organizational
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policy requires the modification, or the establishment, 
of a formal organization. Non-organizational policies, by 
contrast, call for the establishment of patterns of 
interaction outside the formal organizational context. 
Third, policies also may be classified as distributive 
(to provide services, such as housing and welfare), 
redistributive (to re-allocate the resources within a 
society), regulatory (to coordinate individuals and 
groups in order to achieve objectives), or emotive- 
symbolic (statement of very desirable goals but never 
expected to be implemented, such as "land to the 
landless" or "universal literacy") (Smith, c.1987, 
unpub.).
c. The Program. There are three aspects of the policy 
program. First, intensity of support, which is the degree 
to which the government is committed to the 
implementation of the policy. Second, the source of the 
policy: is the policy required to satisfy needs and 
demands in the society or was it formulated with little 
demand or support? Third, the scope of the policy: is the 
policy broad in nature and universal in scope or is it a 
concentration upon a small geographic or subject area?
d. Images of the Policy. It is essential to consider the 
images that a policy evokes in the society. The images of 
those affected by the policy and those who implement the 
policy are most important.
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3. The Target Group
The target group is defined as those who are
reguired to adapt to the new patterns of interaction 
created by the policy. They are the people within
organizations or groups who are most affected by the
policy. They may be recipients, beneficiaries, clients or 
even victims of the policy. Included within the target 
group are the ' interested others * , who have a stake in 
the outcome of the policy and who join the implementation 
process either in support or in opposition to the target 
group or the policy. It is they who must change to meet 
the demands of the policy. Several factors are relevant 
here:
a. The degree of organization or institutionalization of 
the target group.
b. The leadership of the target group: leadership can be
aligned for or against the policy, or it may be
indifferent to the policy. The nature of the leadership 
is also important.
c. The prior policy experience of the target group: has
the group been affected by governmental policies in the 
past? What has been their experience and response to 
governmental policy? Are they compliant, rebellious or
indifferent?
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4. The Implementing Organization
The implementing organization is responsible for the 
implementation of the policy. In most instances, the 
organization is a unit of the government bureaucracy. Of 
all the aspects of implementation, it is the implementing 
organization that has attracted most attention from 
implementation analysts. This may be due to the well- 
entrenched view that the bureaucrats are behind policy 
implementation failures and an understanding of, and 
ability to change, their behaviour is paramount to 
improving the standard of implementation.
Three key variables should be considered in the 
implementation of policy:
a. The structure and personnel: The stability of the
structure and the qualifications of the personnel who 
must implement the policy are important to understanding 
implementation. An unstable administrative organization 
and unqualified personnel may reduce the capacity to 
implement.
b. The leadership of the administrative organization:
This variable, like the leadership of the target group, 
refers to the style and nature of the leadership.
c. The implementing program capacity: The program and
capacity of the implementing organization refers to the 
intensity of and care taken in organizing for the 
implementation and to the general capacity of the
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organization to meet the objectives of program 
implementation.
5. The Environment
Environmental factors are the social, political, 
technological and natural context of society that impact 
upon government policy, either directly or through rapid 
change. Environmental factors can be thought of as a sort 
of constraining corridor, through which the 
implementation of policy must be forced. For differing 
kinds of policy, differing cultural, social, political 
and economic conditions may prevail. For example, in 
policies related to local self-government in Third World 
nations, the basic cultural and social life-styles at the 
village level may be an environmental constraint of great 
magnitude.
According to Smith (1973b), components 2 to 5 in his 
model of policy implementation analysis represent the 
'tension-generating matrix'. It is the interaction 
between them that is the essence of implementation. Each 
component may be composed of actors or groups, ideas or 
perceptions. From this 'matrix', patterns of action 
emerge that are called transactions. These can be, for 
example, target groups refusing to comply with the 
conditions of the policy, implementers exercising 
discretion that distorts the policy's intentions, the 
changing goals of a policy, or the changing nature of
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top-level support for the policy. Some of these 
transaction patterns become crystallized into 
institutions. Once transaction patterns emerge or 
institutionalization occurs, they can serve as tension­
generating entities that can, though do not always, 
provide feedback to either the policy-making process or 
to the implementing organization and environmental 
factors. Smith (1973b: 209) argued that, with the 
feedback process built into the model, it becomes 
difficult to speak of the 'end product' of a policy 
implementation process. The feedback phase is an 
important part of the model because it clearly indicates 
that the policy process is an on-going, continuous 
process that may never have a final and definite end. 
(The utilization of Smith's framework in analysing 
transmigration policy is specifically presented in 
Chapter VII)
2.4. Transmigration Policy in Indonesia
In Indonesia, the government has explicitly 
considered the transmigration program to be an instrument 
of population distribution policy (Department of Manpower 
and Transmigration, 1979, Appendix 3: 4). Transmigration 
has been defined as a government program that involves 
the clearing and opening of land that was previously 
uncultivated or only sporadically or illegally 
cultivated, and the deliberate movement and resettlement 
of people. The idea of population transfer from Java to
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other sparsely populated islands is far from new. This 
policy has been in force since the beginning of the 
twentieth century.
Java, at the start of the twentieth century, was 
beginning 'phenomenal' demographic and economic changes. 
These were in part a result of the rapid growth of 
population dating from the beginning of the 19th century, 
which coincided with increasing problems of poverty among 
Java's population. While the precise pace and primary 
causes of this rapid population growth are still a matter 
of academic debate, there is little doubt about the sad 
plight of the Javanese and the low level of their 
welfare.2 As shown in Table 2.1 the population in Java 
increased rapidly during the 'culture system' period 
(1830-1870). Wertheim (1959a: 93) , summarised the main
causes as follows:
The increase in population was largely the 
result of Western administrative measures 
reducing mortality: the construction of roads,
vaccination against the much-dreaded smallpox, 
greater security, provisions to meet the threat 
of famines.
However, the claim about the improvement of health
and welfare of the Javanese in general as the result of
Dutch policies was rejected by Nitisastro (1961: 39-40)
as lacking evidence. Other author, for example, Geertz,
(1971: 79-80) also tended to emphasise other causes,
See the polemic on the cause of rapid population 
growth during this period between White (1973 and 1974), 
van de Walle (1973) and Geertz (1974) . For a more recent 
and most comprehensive treatment on this issue, see Hugo, 
Hull, Hull and Jones (1987: Chapter II).
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especially the peace imposed by the Dutch authorities 
which prevented the failure of crops resulting in 
famines.
Table 2.1
Population Growth in Java and Madura: 1815-1940
Year Population Size ('000) Rate of Growth
1815 4,499
(Per cent)
1845 9,374 2.5
1860 12,514 1.9
1870 16,233 2.6
1880 19,541 1.9
1885 21,191 1.6
1890 23,609 2.2
1895 25,371 1.4
1900 28,386 2.3
1905 29,978 1.1
1920 34,429 0.9
1930 41,718 1.8
1940 48,416 1.6
Source: 
In
Swasono (1985: 74). 
1901, a Calvinist-Catholic coalition came to
power in the Netherlands and announced a new approach to
colonial management (Penders , 1977: 61). A new colonial
policy, usually called the Ethical Policy, was
introduced. The outstanding feature of this policy was
the official abandonment of exploitation and the
introduction of direct state intervention in the economic 
sphere in order to improve the economic position of the 
Javanese population. The seriousness of the situation 
among the people of Java had been highlighted in a number 
of government-sponsored reports; for example, the Mindere
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Welvaart Rapporten (Declining Welfare Inquiries) 1904- 
1905 reported that the rural poor in Java should be 
provided with more food and clothing, better health 
facilities and schooling in order to increase their 
general standard of living (Tjondronegoro, 1983:41). 
Three main programs were launched under the New Ethical 
Policy: namely, irrigation, emigration (colonization) and 
education. 'Colonization', the term that was used to 
refer to the assisted migration of Javanese farmers to 
other islands, was just one of the Dutch government's 
attempts to solve the problem of population pressure and 
to improve the welfare of the people.
Mohamad Hatta, the Vice President of the Republic of 
Indonesia, in his speech at the Economic Conference on 
February 3, 1946 in Yogyakarta, first used the term 
transmigrasi (Swasono and Singarimbun, 1985: vii). Since
then, 'transmigration' has replaced the word 
'colonization' and has become an important element of 
government policy in Indonesia.* 4 The transmigration 
program gained considerable momentum when the New Order 
government received a windfall from the oil price 
increases during the 1970s. In addition, funding from 
international, multinational and bilateral sources, such
A detailed historical account of the colonization 
policy has been given by, among others, Pelzer (1945),
Sjamsu (1960), Swasono (1969) and Heeren (1979). In this
study, the historical context of transmigration policy 
will be discuss in Chapter III.
4 There were only a few studies that focused on the 
implementation of transmigration program after 
Independence until 1965; for example: Sjamsu (1960),
Wertheim (1959b), Hardjosudarmo (1965), Heeren (1979) and 
Utomo (1975).
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as the World Bank, USAID, UNDP, FAO and ADB poured into 
the program. During this period, a huge allocation of 
funds was made to assist an impressive number of families 
to move from Java to Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and 
Irian Jaya.
Table 2.2
Number of Migrant Families Resettled under 
Colonization and Transmigration Programs (1905-1989)
Period No.of families Average no.of
families per year
1905 - 1941 144,000a 3,892
1950 - 1959 54,567b 546
1960 - 1968 44,216b 4,913
1969/70-1973/4 
(Repelita I)
45,169c 9,034
1974/5-1978/9 
(Repelita II)
56,272c 11,254
1979/80-1983/4 
(Repelita III)
535,474d 107,095
1984/5-1988/9 750,150e 150,030
(Repelita IV)
Sources: f* Swasono, 1985: 82. 
b Oey, 1982: 34 
^ Oey, 1982: 32
“ Hardjono, 1986: 29. The figure includes 
169,497 families (32 per cent of the total) 
of spontaneous transmigrants. 
e As stated in the Presidential Address, 
August 16, 1989 (Departemen Penerangan 
RI,1989: XII/695). This number includes 
521,728 families (70 per cent of the total) 
of spontaneous transmigrants.
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As shown in Table 2.2 the average number of families 
per year resettled under the transmigration policy 
increased dramatically between the period 1969-1978 
(Repelita I and II) and the period after 1978 (Repelita 
III and TV). However, the seemingly successful 
achievements during Repelita III and TV, as several 
studies have shown, was accompanied by formidable 
problems of implementation (Jones, 1979; Hanson, 1981; 
Arndt, 1983 and 1984; Hardjono, 1986; World Bank, 1988).
Studies on transmigration or colonization can be 
classified into three broad categories. The first 
includes those that described the program in terms of 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics (Pelzer, 
1945; Sjamsu, 1960; Hardjono, 1977). The second includes 
those that analyse the social and economic impacts of the 
program (Guinness, 1977; Oey and Astika, 1978; Arndt, 
1984; Hardjono, 1986; Babcock, 1986). The third category 
comprises critical studies that challenge the assumptions 
and implications of the program (Arndt and Sundrum, 1977; 
Suratman and Guinness, 1977; Hardjono, 1978a; Perez- 
Sainz, 1983; Budiardjo, 1986; Otten, 1986). Previous 
studies on transmigration have paid very little attention 
to the policy implementation processes of the program. 
Moreover, transmigration has usually been viewed as an 
isolated phenomenon, rarely related to broader social and 
political developments in Indonesia. The lack of studies 
analysing the policy process and its relation to wider
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contexts has resulted in an incomplete understanding of 
transmigration policy in general, an inadequate grasp of 
the problems of management and co-ordination among the 
implementing organizations, and, inevitably, the 
fragmented remedies for the pressing problems of the 
transmigration program.
The island of Java has become renowned as one of the 
most densely populated areas in the world. The problem of 
population, particularly its high growth rate and its 
large size, has become more pressing as it has coincided 
with the problem of poverty among a large part of the 
population. From the beginning, transmigration (and 
before it, colonization) has been perceived as a policy 
to solve simultaneously the population problems, and the 
welfare problem of the population of Java. Observing the 
demographic dimension alone, it is clear that 
transmigration policy has had little impact on the 
reduction of population in Java. Assuming, for example, 
that the government target to resettle 150,000 families a 
year had been realized, and assuming that every family 
consisted of 5 persons (2 parents and 3 children), only 
750,000 persons a year would have been moved. This 
number, taking the 1980 annual growth rate of 2 per cent, 
and the size of population of Java and Bali as 
approximately 100 million, suggests that a successful 
transmigration policy could only remove just over one- 
third of Java's annual growth rate and would not prevent 
the total population from continuing to increase. It also
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is evident that the unbalanced population distribution 
between Java and the other islands could only be 
marginally altered by transmigration. As indicated by 
Arndt (1983: 51):
The population imbalance in Indonesia is an 
irremediable fact of life. The question is only 
whether whatever economic or other 
disadvantages it may entail can be remedied 
within Java.
While in the long term transmigration has only had a 
marginal effect on population growth in Java and little 
influence on population distribution in the archipelago, 
it has had a tremendous demographic impact on the 
receiving areas. Lampung and South Sumatra have been 
classic examples of the remarkable contribution of 
transmigration in accelerating regional population 
growth. In other provinces, although the overall 
demographic impact of transmigration has been less 
remarkable by comparison, it has been very significant 
for some regencies. In 1985, for example, 25 per cent of 
the population in the regency of Kampar in the province 
of Riau, were transmigrants. In the regency of Kotabaru 
in the province of South Kalimantan, more than 4 0 per 
cent of the population were transmigrants (World Bank, 
1988: 211).
In the early 1980s, the results of the 1980 
population census apparently boosted the belief among 
policy makers that transmigration was needed to solve a 
deteriorating population problem. The census revealed an
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annual rate of population growth between 1971-1980 of 
2.34 per cent. This was considered 'still high', 
especially since the government had made an extensive 
effort to control population growth through family 
planning policy after 1970. The press coverage on the 
failure of government policies dealing with population 
problems, in particular family planning and 
transmigration, was another factor that stimulated the 
debate about population issues at that time.5
From the policy makers' point of view, the wide 
publicity received by population issues in the mass-media 
had stimulated the perception that population problems in 
Java had become more alarming. Extensive documentation 
from the period after 1980 indicates that various means 
were used by the government to speed-up the 
implementation of the transmigration program (Arndt, 1983 
and 1984; Hardjono, 1986; World Bank, 1988). For example, 
the Department of Public Works, which was responsible for 
transmigration site preparation, accelerated its 
activities by adopting the so-called 'plan as you 
proceed' (PAYP) approach. This approach, as many studies 
and press reports have shown, resulted in the selection 
of large areas of unsuitable land for agricultural 
settlement. However, the fact that extensive problems of 
implementation were encountered during the realization of
Tempo magazine in its 24 January 1981 issue, for 
example, widely reported the controversies surrounding 
the failures of family planning and transmigration 
programs with the cover story provocatively entitled: 'KB 
Gagal? Transmigrasi Gagal?' (Family Planning Failed? 
Transmigration Failed?).
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the Repelita III target, apparently had little impact on 
the continuing demographic orientation of the policy 
makers. In 1983, for instance, a more ambitious target of 
750.000 families was set for Repelita XV'.6
From previous studies, there seems little doubt that 
demographic considerations, particularly in response to 
increased population pressure in Java, became the basic 
underlying drive for the transmigration policy. 
Population growth which resulted in increasing population 
pressure in Java, therefore, has always been a 
justification of the program, even though other implicit 
or explicit aims, such as regional development and 
national integration, have also been given priority in 
specific periods.
2.5. The Significance of the Centre-Regional Context in 
Analysing Transmigration Policy
Since Independence, the relationship between the 
central and regional governments has been a crucial 
aspect of national integration and development (Maryanov, 
1958; Legge, 1961; Nawawi, 1968; Bachtiar, 1974; Mackie, 
1980; Morfit, 1984, MacAndrews, 1986a; Achmad, 1984).
° Realization of the transmigration target, especially 
during Repelita IV, deserves critical analysis because, 
as shown in Table 2.2, the actual number of families that 
resettled under the full support of the transmigration 
program comprised only 30 per cent of the realized 
target, while 70 per cent moved as spontaneous 
transmigrants. Hardjono (1986: 29) reported that, in many 
cases, spontaneous transmigrants (transmigran swakarsa) 
moved without any government assistance.
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Since the New Order, the Indonesian state can be 
described as strongly centralist in character. For 
example, nearly 80 per cent of total public expenditure 
is planned and disbursed through the national budget, 
with only approximately 2 0 per cent controlled by 
regional governments. The power of the central government 
tends to be unlimited, whereas regional governments are 
less autonomous.
Mackie (1980: 667) has indicated several important
changes since about 1970 that have greatly enhanced the 
central government's capacity to exercise control over 
the regions. First, the tightening of central authority 
within the army has significantly reduced the power of 
regional commanders over their territories. Second, the 
process of depoliticization has eliminated the 
possibility of a political party stirring up mass 
grievances against the central government. Finally, the 
improvement of inter-island shipping and airline 
services, as well as the telecommunications, commercial 
and banking networks, have played an important role in 
integrating the regions into a single national economy. 
Social and political, as well as economic and structural 
changes since the New Order have contributed to the 
strengthening of the centralist character of the
Indonesian government. This, in turn, has become a 
crucial factor in the implementation of government 
policies in the regions.
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Compared with other development issues, 
transmigration is perhaps the government policy that most 
reflects the strength of the central government in 
Indonesia in determining affairs in the regions. The 
transmigration program has been almost totally formulated 
by the central government in Jakarta. The regional 
governments, whose lands were designated as receiving 
areas for settlers from Java and Bali, were merely 
passive participant in the process.
Following Smith's (1973b) implementation analysis 
framework, 'the policy' revealed by 'the policy making 
process' will inevitably enter the 'implementation 
process' matrix. It is within this implementation process 
matrix that the various components, such as the 
implementation organization, 'target group', 'idealized 
policy' and 'environmental factors', will interact. In 
the case of transmigration, the process of policy 
implementation has certainly occurred in circumstances 
whereby central decisions will confront regional 
responses. Through 'tensions', the outcomes of this 
process will form what Smith has called a 'transaction'. 
These transactions, which are the result of the policy 
implementation process, will eventually form either a 
feedback to policy makers in the central government or to 
components in the implementation process, such as the 
implementing organization or the target groups. Another 
form of 'transaction' might be institutionalised to 
produce 'institutions'. In turn, such 'institutions'
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would also provide feedback to the policy-making or 
policy-implementation process (see Figure 2.1)-
Examination of the implementation process in 
general, and in regard to particular policies, provides 
insights to and explanations about public processes and 
problem resolution. Only by understanding these processes 
can effective solutions be formulated to improve the 
policy or implementation processes, and to address the 
problem to be resolved (Smith, c. 1987, unpub.). In 
examining what happened during implementation, the key 
problems involved and how they influenced the impact of 
the policies, an analyst should not be myopic and see 
only the particular policy at hand. For example, the 
general environment and policy-making process may be such 
that any policies or programs would experience 
difficulties. Without this overall view, it would be easy 
to be excessively critical of any failures that do occur 
and perhaps overlook the successes and achievements, 
however small. With a focus upon goal attainment, the 
analyst must be aware of changing goals and objectives of 
policies as they are being implemented - and certainly 
take into account any divergence in views among actors 
about policy objectives. Smith (c. 1987, unpub.) argued 
that the question of how implementation can be improved 
is the difficult one to answer, for some parameters are 
not amenable to change or improvement except in the very 
long term.
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As correctly argued by Korten (1975: 140), it is in
dealing with the contextual richness of the policy 
processes that country-specific analysis can make a 
unique and important contribution to an understanding of 
population policy in the Third World. This kind of 
analysis offers the opportunity to draw together 
quantitative data, where it is available, with more 
informal data and observation where it is not or where 
the variables themselves do not readily yield to 
quantification.
2.6. Conclusion
As has been argued, population distribution policy 
will be properly understood only if placed in the 
political context of the individual country. Particularly 
in Third World countries, in which development activities 
often take place in an unstable and highly political 
setting, an adequate knowledge of the political contexts 
is therefore vital for the analysis of population 
distribution policy. A review of literature on population 
distribution policy in the Third World has suggested that 
the studies have mostly resulted in broad 
generalisations, and tended to overlook the political 
context of the country.
In the Third World, population distribution policy, 
like other public policies, is an outcome of policy­
making processes that occur with only limited
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participation or 'inputs' from the society. By contrast, 
the process of policy implementation has become a major 
arena in which various components, such as the target 
group, the implementing agencies and the environment, 
have interacted and influenced the implementation of 
government policy.
Transmigration policy in Indonesia has been the 
subject of many studies. Yet, an adequate review of 
transmigration as a population distribution policy is 
still lacking. It is argued that this is mainly because 
existing studies have viewed transmigration in isolation 
from policy processes in Indonesia. It is suggested that 
policy implementation analysis would be a useful approach 
for an examination of transmigration policy in Indonesia. 
The centre-regional relationship has always been a 
crucial factor in the country's development, particularly 
during the New Order period. Transmigration policy, which 
has involved the central government sponsored population 
movement from the 'Inner' to the 'Outer' Islands, is 
inevitably conditioned by the degree and character of 
central and regional relationships in Indonesia.
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Chapter III
PROM EMIGRATIE TO TRANSMIGRASIS
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN MIGRATION POLICIES
This chapter provides an historical account of 
transmigration policy in Indonesia. The aim is to 
analyse significant continuities and changes occurring 
between the turn of the century and the mid 1960s, just 
prior to the New Order, in the government's migration 
policy. To what extent have events of the colonial 
period influenced, or even been replicated in, 
transmigration policy after Independence? Was the idea 
of 'inner' and 'outer' Indonesia a prominent issue 
during the Dutch period and before the New Order 
period? Which period has been more significant in 
forming the role of transmigration as a vehicle for, on 
the one hand, centralisation and on the other, regional 
development? Were there significant international 
influences before the New Order period? Who were the 
proponents of the policy during the Dutch period and 
who took up the case for transmigration after 
Independence?
As several scholars have written in detail of the 
history of colonisation and transmigration (Pelzer, 
1945; Sjamsu, 1960; Hardjosudarmo, 1965; Hardjono, 
1977; Heeren, 1979), this chapter will not emphasize 
the chronology of events but, rather, draw on existing 
studies to focus on the various forces and factors that
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led to the development of emigration and transmigration 
policies. This appraisal will concentrate on the 
formative periods and periods when significant policy 
changes occurred.
3.1. The Formation of An Emigration Policy
The end of the nineteenth century, and the 
beginning of the twentieth, was marked by several 
important social changes, the impact of which 
significantly altered the course of history in 
Indonesia. Although each can be considered as a single 
event, they can be more usefully regarded as complexes 
of interconnected events.
Ten years after the Dutch had recovered from the 
Diponegoro War (1825-1830), they began to pay attention 
to territories outside Java (the Outer Islands). From 
about 1840 onwards, Dutch involvement expanded 
throughout the Outer Islands. According to Ricklefs 
(1981: 125) , there were many reasons for this 
expansion? however, two general considerations applied 
everywhere:
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First, to protect the security of areas they 
already held, the Dutch felt compelled to 
subdue other regions which might support or 
inspire resistance movements. Second, as the 
European scramble for colonies reached its 
height in the later nineteenth century, the 
Dutch felt obliged to establish their claims 
to the outer islands of the archipelago in 
order to prevent some other Western power 
from intervening there, even where the Dutch 
initially had no great interest themselves.
Ricklefs (1981: 138) noted further:
By about 1910, the boundaries of the present 
state of Indonesia had been roughly drawn by 
colonial armed forces, at a great cost of 
lives, money, devastation, social cohesion 
and human dignity and freedom.
At the dawn of the twentieth century, Dutch 
colonial policy showed a significant change in 
direction. Its jurisdiction was expanding as the 
invasion of the entire archipelago neared completion. 
It also took on a new mission: the direct exploitation 
of Indonesia which culminated during the Culture System 
(1830-1870) began to weaken as the main motivation for 
Dutch rule, and was replaced by concern for the welfare 
of Indonesians. One important element of the new policy 
was the introduction of a native welfare program, the 
nature of which is well illustrated by the slogan of 
the prominent colonial reformer van Deventer: 
'irrigation, emigration and education' (Penders, 1969: 
27). This policy has become well-known as the 'Ethical 
Policy'.
52
The genesis of the Ethical Policy, as elucidated 
by Ricklefs (1981: 143), was an outcome of the 
simultaneous social, political and economic 
transformation experienced by Dutch society in the 
Netherlands:
The Ethical policy had roots both in 
humanitarian concern and economic advantage. 
The denunciation of Dutch rule presented in 
the novel Max Havelaar (1860) and in other 
exposes began to bear fruit. Voices were 
raised in favour of relief for the oppressed 
peoples of Java, and by the late nineteenth 
century new colonial administrators were on 
their way to Indonesia with Max Havelaar in 
their baggage and its message in their minds. 
During the 'liberal* period (c.1870-1900) 
private capitalism came to exert a 
preponderant influence upon colonial policy. 
Dutch industry began to see Indonesia as a 
potential market, which required a rising of 
living standards there. Capital, both Dutch 
and international, sought new opportunities 
for investment and extraction of raw 
materials, especially in the outer islands. A 
need for Indonesian labour in modern enterprises was felt. Business interests 
therefore supported more intensive colonial 
involvement in the causes of peace, justice, 
modernity and welfare. The humanitarians 
justified what the businessmen expected to be 
profitable, and the Ethical Policy was born.
Java's rapid population growth after the middle of 
the nineteenth century was one of the dominant facts of 
the colonial age. Java, especially in its central and 
eastern parts, was becoming seriously over-populated, 
while in the Outer Islands there were still vast areas 
of unpopulated or underpopulated land. Java's growing 
population was considered by the Dutch government to be 
the underlying cause of the decline of its people's 
welfare. The Dutch, however, had no policy that could
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directly solve the problem of population growth. The 
only answer they offered was emigration from Java to 
the outer islands. As Ricklefs (1981: 154) correctly
argued:
There was no real attack on population 
growth. The nation's wealth was used for the 
interests of foreign enterprises and 
indigenous industries were not developed. The 
main economic development took place in the 
outer islands, while the main welfare 
problems grew in Java. Education was to be 
the key to a new age, but the number of 
school places provided was small when set 
against the size of the population.
In a similar vein, van der Kroef (1956: 743) noted 
that the schemes devised by the colonial government to 
cope with the dangerous economic effects of population 
pressure, curiously enough, rarely concerned themselves 
with the structural transformation of agricultural 
production:
Many officials of the colonial and the 
present national government as well as some 
scholars have based their hopes on emigration 
as a solution of the problem. Professor 
Pelzer has even gone so far as to maintain 
that emigration from Java to less densely 
populated islands will be able to take care 
of the population increase for many decades, 
and that emigration rather than 
industrialisation will provide the necessary 
relief.
From a different perspective, Kartodirdjo (1973) 
perceived that the rural history of Java in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by 
sporadic movements of peasant unrest. Many of these 
climaxed in more or less violent clashes with the 
colonial authorities. Although a direct link between
54
social unrest in rural Java and the initiation of the 
emigration policy cannot be established, it is not 
implausible to posit a cause-effect relationship. A 
major complicating feature of agrarian unrest in Java, 
according to Kartodirdjo (1973: 1), has been its 
correlation with social change in general and with the 
colonial impact in particular. He explained that :
The social movements had as their background, 
the rapid penetration of a colonial economy 
whose impact on rural Java reached a climax 
during the course of the nineteenth century. 
The colonial rulers introduced a new legal 
and social relationship covering agrarian and 
labour matters. Excessive demands for 
services and the levying of new taxes 
exacerbated popular discontent. The turning 
over of some land to sugar cultivation and 
the exaction of a compulsory contribution of 
paddy had a direct bearing on some of the 
instances of social unrest.
According to Penders (1969: 28) the Ethical Policy 
of indigenous economic development was almost entirely 
concerned with raising agricultural productivity and 
the Dutch apparently had no serious intention to 
introduce drastic changes in the colonial economic 
structure by such means as large scale 
industrialisation. As Legge also argued, the measures 
taken by 'Ethical' colonial governments to improve the 
living standards of the indigenous population were:
...in the nature of palliatives. They 
provided some alleviation of particular areas 
of hardship, but they did not achieve - and 
they did not attempt to achieve - any 
thoroughgoing technological changes...(Legge, 
1964: 91 cited in Penders, 1969: 28).
55
Penders (1969:28) also noted that the importance 
of large scale industrialisation was actually stressed 
by a number of Ethical reformers, but until the world 
wide economic depression of the 1930s the various plans 
that were suggested were not implemented. The Calvinist 
Prime Minister Kuyper (cited in Penders,1969: 29) even 
stressed in 1901 that the only way to develop the 
Indies was :
...to lift the people of the Indies from the 
agricultural to the industrial state...
According to Penders (1969: 28), the Minister of 
Colonies, Idenburg, in fact strongly supported Kuyper 
and envisaged the establishment of indigenous 
industries owned by indigenous capital. On another 
occasion, the socialist van Kol dismissed van 
Deventer's view, and stated that :
The expectations of van Deventer that 
emigration is the proper means to create a 
balance between production and consumption 
are delusive and will never come true. I 
believe that his plan for salvation which 
indicated by the trilogy: 'education,
irrigation and emigration'...is inadequate 
because the distress has taken on too vast 
proportions. He believes that in particular 
indigenous education will have an enormous 
impact on the well-being of the Javanese. I 
am of the opinion that this is an illusion 
which is completely out of touch with 
reality. The only solution is a more 
intensified production and this is only 
possible with industry, preferably large- 
scale indigenous industry...(cited in 
Penders, 1969: 29)
Van Oorschot (cited in Penders, 1969: 29)
mentioned the following reasons for the lack of
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interest of the Dutch in industrialisation: first, the 
interior freight rates were too high; second, a wide­
spread distribution apparatus was missing; and third, 
import duties on industrial goods were too low to 
afford sufficient protection. Penders (1969: 29-30) 
argues, however, that Van Oorschot does not mention - 
or at least does not spell out fully - the fundamental 
reasons for the failure of the attempts at 
industrialisation:
One most important cause of this failure was 
the strong opposition of the politically 
powerful plantation combines. Large scale 
industrialisation would have tended to 
increase the demand for labour and therefore 
the price of labour. This would have been 
damaging to the plantation concern which - as 
was pointed above - were largely dependent 
for their profits on low wages. But also 
Dutch industrialists as well as Dutch labour 
were unwilling to be priced out of the 
Indonesian market which was one of the most important outlets for Dutch industrial 
produce. In the final analysis then the 
industrialisation of Indonesia militated 
against the interests of the imperial economy 
as a whole (Penders, 1969: 29-30).
In serving the interest of plantation companies to 
control their labour, in 1880 the Netherlands Indies' 
government issued the first Coolie Ordinance to 
regulate labour relations, particularly in East 
Sumatra. This ordinance was later expanded to other 
regions in the Outer Islands. It protected the 
interests of plantation companies in retaining the 
workers for the duration of the contract period. A 
'penal sanction' was imposed on workers who violated 
their labour contracts. The first Coolie Ordinance was
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followed by other ordinances in 1884 and 1893 which 
provided employers with effective legal control over 
their indentured workers. In addition to the penal 
sanction, employers resorted to other means to keep 
their workers. One favourite way was to provide 
gambling opportunities for the workers on pay day. 
Often workers become so deeply indebted that they had 
no other choice but to sign a new contract with their 
employers (Thee, 1969: 7-12)
According to Thompson (1947: 134), until 1909 the 
recruiting of Javanese estate labour likewise remained 
in the hands of professional agents, but in that year 
planters were encouraged by law to appoint their own 
agents who were often aided by worker-recruiters. The 
Deli Planters' Association, for example, led the way by 
setting up its own agency in Semarang, and direct 
recruiting by employers gradually became widespread. In 
1930, it was found that 84 per cent of the labour 
employed in plantations on the Outer Islands was 
Javanese. Of the remaining, 13 per cent was Chinese and 
3 per cent local people (Thompson, 1947: 134).
Following previous writers, such as Pelzer (1945), 
Heeren (1979:10-15) divided Dutch resettlement policy 
(1905-1941) into three broad phases. First, there was 
the Experimental Phase (1905-1911). The assumption 
adopted during this phase was that new settlements 
should, as far as possible, resemble villages in Java.
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Up to 1911, only about 4,818 Javanese had been moved to 
Lampung.
Second, came the period of the Credit Bank of 
Lampung (1911-1928). The government established a 
Credit Bank of Lampung in March 1911 to provide 22.5 
gulden as a migration premium to every migrant family, 
in addition to a maximum of 3 00 gulden, given as 
credit. This amount had to be repaid by the migrants 
after three years with 9 per cent per annum interest. 
Migrants could borrow additional money for the purchase 
of, for example, livestock, agricultural equipment or 
building materials. Since the majority of the migrants 
did not have any experience of banks, problems of 
repayment were inevitable. Many used the money for 
unproductive purposes, such as for clothing or 
festivities (slametan), or even for alcohol or drugs 
(candu). Another problem during this phase was internal 
mismanagement and corruption within the Bank. In 1926 
the bank was heavily in debt, and by 1928 the 
government had decided to close it.
In the second phase, the problems were also caused 
by the selection system which was based on a target 
system: the lurah (Village Head) was required to meet a 
designated target number of migrants each year. As a 
consequence, many migrants did not meet formal 
selection criteria; some were selected by the lurah 
merely because he wanted to remove them (for example,
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the old, the sick or landless labourers) from the 
village. The emigration policy during this period was 
also challenged by the plantation interests, 
particularly from the agency responsible for recruiting 
contract labour from Java. They spread rumours to 
discredit the settlement in Gedong Tataan, in order to 
attract migrants to work in their plantations, mostly 
in Deli (North Sumatra). Despite these many problems, a 
second settlement area, Wonosobo, was opened in Lampung 
in 1921 and by 1924 this village had a population of 
5,927. The population in Gedong Tataan had risen to 
25,000 by 1928.
According to Heeren (1979: 12), by the end of the 
'twenties the numerous problems that had been 
experienced caused the whole idea of the emigration 
policy to be questioned. Conditions in the settlements
were considered by many observers as far from
satisfactory. In addition, the impact of the 1930s
economic depression reduced the availability of
financial resources for the program. The thousands of 
returned migrants who were formerly employed in the 
plantations were seen to aggravate the already alarming 
population problem in Java.1 Thus, migration on a large 
scale to the Outer Islands was again favoured by the 
government (Perez-Sainz, 1983: 194).
1 Thousands of migrants returned to Java as many 
plantations had to reduce their production after the 
world economic crisis in 1930.
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In the mid-1930s, the plantation companies, most 
of which were located in East Sumatra, were 
experiencing many difficulties in recruiting labour, 
mainly because as a result of many pressures the 
government had abolished the penal sanction. With the 
abolition of the penal sanction, many Javanese workers 
who were dissatisfied with their jobs in the 
plantations had returned to Java. Thus, the gradual 
success of the agricultural colonies of Javanese 
settlers in the Outer Islands was seen by the planters 
to constitute an increasingly important source of 
labour (Thee, 1969: 78). The government's need to 
reduce the population growth in Java was compatible 
with the interest of the planters in recruiting cheap 
labour. Thompson (1947: 135) has argued that the 
official agricultural colonization program in the Outer 
Islands was designed primarily to help solve the labour 
shortage.
The government commenced the third phase of the 
emigration policy, known as the Bawon system. The Bawon 
system, was initially devised to meet the need of 
migrants in Lampung for labour to harvest their rice. 
Under the Bawon system, the government only provided 
land for the migrants. They were to pay their own fares 
within two or three years of settlement. The government 
usually moved them into Lampung from Java during 
harvest time, around February-March, so that they could 
be hired immediately by previous migrants. Their wages
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were paid in kind, in the form of rice. In Java their 
share of the harvest typically was one-tenth; in 
Lampung, they could earn as much as one-seventh or one- 
fifth of the harvest. From this they paid their debts 
and started a new life as colonists in Lampung.
The Bawon system was considered the most 
successful emigration program of the Dutch period, 
moving large numbers at relatively low cost. In 
addition to those settled under the Bawon System, 
between 1935 and 1940 the government also sent people 
to new settlements in other areas of Sumatra outside 
Lampung as well as to Kalimantan.2 As also noted by 
Nitisastro (1970: 90), after 1931 the government 
migration policy experienced a number of changes. In 
1937 a special commission in charge of the migration 
policy was established. According to Nitisastro (1970: 
90) after those policy improvements the annual number 
of migrants increased to 14,700 in 1935 and 52,800 in 
1940.
The Dutch's government migration policy 
(emigratie) , as one of the trilogy of Ethical Policy
2From 1933 to 1941, 222,586 migrants were resettled in 
Lampung and South Sumatra (Heeren, 1979: 14), and 
almost 2,500 migrants in Kalimantan (Pelzer, 1945: 223- 
225). During the Japanese occupation, the government's 
migration policy was practically halted. The economic 
situation in Indonesia also deteriorated. Population 
continued to increase but the rate of increase in 
economic productivity fell seriously behind that of 
population, owing to the destruction of the economic 
apparatus during the Japanese occupation and the 
revolution.
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objectives, was essentially formulated and maintained 
as a result of a combination of forces. First, were the 
political changes in the Netherlands which allowed the 
Calvinist-Catholic Coalition to come to power in 1901. 
The outstanding feature of the policy outcomes from 
this new coalition was the official abandonment of the 
goal of economic exploitation and the introduction of 
direct intervention in the economic sphere in order to 
improve the position of the indigenous population. The 
second factor was economic opportunity, particularly as 
seen by the Dutch capitalists after the Dutch had 
successfully conquered the whole archipelago. The vast 
land areas in the Outer Islands attracted private 
companies to open plantations. Given the scarcity of 
labour, Javanese were recruited as cheap labour for new 
economic activities. The third factor was social and 
political unrest in many parts of rural Java, resulting 
from simultaneous economic exploitation and population 
pressures. These in turn encouraged the colonial policy 
to attempt to deal with social unrest through 
population movement to Outer Islands. Emigration 
policy, as developed by the Dutch, was a useful 
instrument to serve many goals and interests.
3.2. Transmigration: Migration Policies after 
Independence
Among the new national leaders, Hatta (1954:169- 
170) argued most forcefully that emigration should be
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continued after Independence. However, the idea of 
'transmigration' as proposed by Hatta was somewhat 
different from the colonisation policy implemented by 
the Dutch. Transmigration was to be implemented in 
conjunction with the industrialisation of the Outer 
Islands. Hatta's ideas on transmigration were not 
surprising. The superiority of industrialisation over 
transmigration was an old idea among socialists in the 
Netherlands, who had strongly influenced his thinking. 
Hatta's political and economic ideas crystalised during 
his period as a student in the Netherlands, at a time 
when socialism was strong in Europe. The socialist 
politicians in the Netherlands, demanded a genuine 
process of industrialisation to improve the economic 
conditions of the indigenous people, rather than merely 
the emigration of Javanese to the Outer Islands:
Without industrialisation, transmigration 
will never solve the problems. Transmigration 
will only postpone the problems, that 
eventually will return sometime in the 
future. Transmigration settlements, 
therefore, should be formed simultaneously 
with industrial locations. (Hatta, 1954: 169, 
author's translation).
Hatta strongly criticised the colonial policy 
which had, basically, only shifted landless farmers 
from Java to become farmers in the Outer Islands. He
argued that:
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Transmigration, which had been conducted by 
the Dutch, only resulted in shifting peasants 
to be peasants. In new settlements, those 
peasants established their villages based on 
traditions in Java. Even their house 
construction is also a replication of their 
customs. Everything is done primitively. 
Their spirit is static. In their former 
villages their conditions were very bad; in 
the new villages, they continue their 
backward way of living. This way of life, 
which does not bring any progress, will 
continue in the new settlement. There is no 
fresh spirit. Their lives have only postponed 
the coming problems, until the time when 
their families are grown-up. Therefore, 
wherever they go they will be caught up by 
the misery which they left behind. (Hatta, 
1954: 170, author's translation).
Hatta (1954: 171) also suggested that:
'Emigratie' or 'transmigrasi' will achieve 
its goal in opening up prosperity if the 
people are given guidance and technical 
assistance in their new environment. If they 
are ignored and neglected, their life will 
never change. So far, all efforts have been 
made with a very narrow mind. Therefore, sooner or later, they will be people 'who eat 
land'. Their family members will grow up and 
the village, therefore, will need to be 
extended, and it is not surprising that they 
will encroach on every available piece of 
land (author's translation).
After Independence, the so-called Panitia Siasat 
Ekonomi (Committee for Economic Strategies), of which 
Hatta was one of the masterminds, formulated a plan in 
which industrialisation and population resettlement 
were the two major components. Thompson (1947: 179) 
who observed the first Indonesian government plan,
J The fact that industrialization and transmigration 
became an important part of the government plan 
immediately after Independence was, according to some 
observers, rather strange. Newly independent Indonesia 
had been born of a rhetoric that called for the rapid 
destruction of colonial and economic institutions 
(Paauw, 1963: 155).
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noted that:
The resettlement program, too, is an 
amplification of a prewar project - with 
certain essential differences. Sumatra, and 
eventually others of the underpopulated Outer 
Islands, is to receive immigrants from Java. 
Individuals, not entire villages, will be 
selected for their youthful vigor and 
initiative and will be transported in 
conjunction with the industrialisation 
schemes for the Outer Islands.
However, the idea of industrialisation as the 
backbone of Hatta's transmigration policy proved 
unattainable. As Wertheim observed in 1956, the 
difference between the Dutch and the Indonesian 
resettlement policy had nothing to do with 
industrialization:
Before the war Dutch resettlement policy was 
directed towards the creation of typical 
Javanese enclaves in a purely Sumatran 
environment. As the willingness to move to 'the land beyond' had not yet developed very 
greatly at that time, the Dutch tried to make 
the settlements attractive, by reshaping 
conditions as nearly as possible to resemble 
those in the homeland... After independence, 
the Indonesian government adopted a different 
view. The strict separation of Javanese and 
Lampongers was deemed out of date, as a relic 
of colonial policy. Such a system would not 
fit into the new ideology of Indonesia as a 
unitary state. Javanese and Sumatrans were 
egually Indonesians, who had to live together 
and mix on an egual footing. Both population 
groups would have to develop into modern 
Indonesians, and work together in building a 
new society in the melting pot of Sumatra, 
the Land of Promise (Wertheim, 1959b: 149).
It is striking that the office in charge of 
implementing resettlement policy after Independence has 
itself constantly 'migrated' from one ministry to
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another. The unsettled political climate following 
Independence, as the Dutch attempted to regain their 
former colony, as well as an unpreparedness of the
Indonesian leaders to lead the country, were
contributing factors in the failure to establish a
single solid implementing agency for transmigration.4
The first transmigration office came under the Ministry 
for Labour and Social Affairs. In 1948 it was shifted 
to the Ministry for Development and Youth Affairs. 
Later in that year the ministry was abolished, and 
transmigration was transferred to the Ministry of 
Interior. In January 1950 the government established a 
separate office for transmigration (Kantor
Transmigrasi), which in October was placed under the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. It was under the auspices 
of this ministry that the first group of transmigrants 
was resettled in Lampung.
In 1951, the Head of the Transmigration Office,
Ir. A. H. 0. Tamboenan, formulated a plan to resettle
10,000 families in each year to South Sumatra and
Sulawesi. Because of financial stringency, only 653
families were moved, and most of these were resettled
in areas adjacent to the former Dutch colonisation
sites (Sjamsu, 1960: 80) . Approximately 26 families
were resettled in Sulawesi, also close to a former area
of colonisation. These transmigrants had come from the
4 Although the government established an office to 
implement transmigration policy in 1947, the first 
group of transmigrants (about 23 families) was only 
resettled in 1950 in Lampung (Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 127)
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regencies of Purworejo, Kebumen, Banyumas and 
Probolinggo, in Central Java. The Transmigration Office 
also resettled 114 families of refugees from East 
Priangan to Banten, West Java during this time. They 
were evacuated because their villages had often been 
terrorised and ransacked by an Islamic rebel group 
(Darul Islam) operating in the region.
Under the Ministry of Social Affairs, the stated 
goal of transmigration was to improve the prosperity 
and welfare of the population, through the development 
of the economy in various sectors (Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 
128). In 1952, Tamboenan proposed an ambitious fifteen- 
year plan for transmigration. According to the plan, 
within one year the government would open 30,000 
hectares of land in Sukadana in South Sumatra. In 
conjunction with the clearing of this land, the 
government planned to send 1,000 families to be 
employed there. Moreover, the government also 
established a land clearing agency called Japeta 
(Jajasan Pembukaan Tanah). In the end, however, this 
plan achieved little. Only 3,855 hectares of land was 
cleared and 3,851 families were moved, mostly to South 
Sumatra. The so-called Tamboenan plan slowly 
disappeared.
In the 'fifties, in addition to so-called 'general 
transmigrants' (transmigrasi umum) there were four 
other types of government-sponsored transmigrants. They
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were: 'S. O. B. ' prisoners, Surinam repatriates, ex­
guerilla fighters and ex-army members. The 'S. O. B. ' 
prisoners were people who were suspected by the 
government of being involved in the Islamic rebel group 
in West Java during the early 'fifties.5 Based on 
Presidential Instruction No. 54, 1954 (Sjamsu, 1960:
64), such people and their families were sent to 
transmigration settlements in Sumatra and Kalimantan. 
In 1954, approximately 500 families were resettled in 
Pangkalan Susu in North Sumatra, and another 242 
families in Samboja in East Kalimantan. In 1955 a 
further 326 families were sent to those two regions 
(Sjamsu, 1960: 94).6
When the war with the Dutch was over, many ex­
guerilla fighters who had lived in the various 
stronghold areas to fight the Dutch were confronted by 
serious problems of adjustment when they returned to 
their former homes. In February 1951, the government 
established a National Reconstruction Office (BRN) 
under the Ministry of Interior to assist them:
s^T 0~. B' means ^dangerous areas' (daerah bahaya) .
6 In 1954, the Transmigration Office resettled almost 
300 families, mainly of Javanese origin, who had just 
returned from Surinam, another Dutch colony in South 
America. They were Indonesians who had been recruited 
by the Dutch to work as labourers in Dutch sugar 
plantations in Surinam. The government resettled these 
people in Tongar in the regency of Pasaman Barat, West 
Sumatra.
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The government feels that job opportunities 
have to be created for various groups of ex­
guerilla fighters. The aims are, first, to 
assist them in the adjustment to the normal 
society; and second, to utilise their 
potential to rebuild the nation, in ways that 
are economically justifiable. (Government 
Decree No. 12/1951, cited in Heeren, 1979: 
68, author's translation).
From the early 1950s, agricultural activities were 
considered the best solution to 're-socialise' ex-army 
personnel and ex-guerilla fighters. Given that further 
land for agricultural extension was not available in 
most parts of Java, resettlement in the Outer Islands 
was seen as an appropriate strategy. Another benefit 
from this scheme was the removal of ex-guerilla 
fighters from 'an unhealthy environment' in the capital 
city. Around ten per cent of the ex-guerilla fighters 
who became transmigrants had been born in Jakarta 
(Heeren, 1979: 71). Another reason for this scheme was 
to protect such people from being attracted to Islamic 
rebel groups in West Java.7 Most of the projects under 
this scheme were implemented during 1951 and 1952. By 
1957, there were almost 22,000 migrants in the new 
settlement areas, mostly in South Sumatra. During this 
period, the government also introduced and promoted 
various kinds of agricultural experimentation through 
cooperative and collective systems.
7 This fear was realistic. More than seventy per cent 
of the ex-guerilla fighters who resettled in South 
Sumatra originally came from West Java, mostly from 
places around Jakarta, like Bogor, Bekasi and Krawang 
(See Heeren, 1979: 71-72).
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The resettlement scheme for ex-soldiers was 
similar to that for ex-guerilla fighters. Ex-soldiers 
also experienced adjustment problems when they returned 
to civilian life. Under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Defense, a government agency called Bureau for the 
Resettlement of Ex-military Members (BPBAT) was 
established to open up land for plantations and 
agriculture and provide better economic opportunities 
for ex-army transmigrants. From 1950 to 1955, the 
government successfully resettled more than 6,000 ex­
soldiers, mostly in Lampung.8
In the period 1956-1960, the government 
formulated, for the first time, a Five-Year Development 
Plan, in which transmigration was described as an 
instrument to: reduce population pressure in Java; 
provide labour in the sparsely populated provinces; and 
support military strategy, as well as to accelerate the 
process of assimilation (Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 128-129). 
The most significant change in transmigration policy in 
the plan was the explicit reference to a strategic 
military goal. This was apparently due to increased 
political unrest in some regions, particularly as a 
result of disappointment with central government 
leadership.
8 According to Sjamsu (1960: 88), it is difficult to 
measure the statistical achievement of the 
transmigration policy in South Sumatra. The 
transmigrants mixed with previous settlers, and many 
migrants who moved to South Sumatra, either came 
voluntarily or under various other government schemes. 
One thing was certain, however, as many observers had 
argued: Lampung was becoming another Java.
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The important strategic role of transmigration was 
further emphasized in 1962, as a result of the change 
in the national constitution (Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 
130). The new constitution was declared by President 
Sukarno to be a 'Guided Democracy', which replaced the 
'Liberal or Parliamentary Democracy' that he considered 
to have been a failure. The establishment of an 
autocratic 'Guided Democracy' and 'Guided Economy' 
under Sukarno, according to Kuntjorojakti (1978: 138- 
139), was always with the support of the central 
military leadership. The political role of the military 
increased considerably after they had successfully 
destroyed the regional rebellions between 1956 and 1958 
in West Sumatra, North and South Sulawesi. As Feith and 
Lev (1963: 37) argue:
After the end of the PRRI rebellion, through 
the removal of the regional ists from the 
political and military scene, the rebellion 
cleared the way for the emergence of a new 
set of power relationships. Of the three main 
political forces of 1957 (the President, the 
central army leadership and the regionalists) 
only the first two remained by mid 1958, and 
these continued to be markedly distinct and 
in many ways competitive with one another. 
But they also had many goals and interests in 
common.
The course of the regional rebellions had caused 
the government to adopt more centre-oriented attitudes 
in policy. According to Kuntjorojakti (1978: 139):
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At the national level, several Presidential 
edicts on regional matters were issued around 
1959-1960. These decrees treated the regions 
as mere administrative units within the 
framework of a highly centralized national 
bureaucracy, totally subservient to the will 
of the central regime. This fitted very well 
with Sukarno's idea of a monolithic Unitary 
State, which was redefined as a political 
instrument to be utilised in a 
comprehensively planned leap to create "a 
just and prosperous society of Indonesian 
socialism".
Furthermore Kuntjorojakti (1978: 141-142) states that:
The resemblance of the Guided Democracy 
central-regional system to the highly 
centralized and autocratic structure of the 
colonial regime was extremely close. Both 
started from the same premise of 
strengthening central political control over 
the regions and both pursued almost the same 
strategy of arranging the organic relation 
between the higher and lower local 
authorities and in deciding the method by 
which the centre delegated specified 
authorities or functions to the lower level.
The change in the national political constellation 
since 'Guided Democracy' in which the military had 
taken a decisive role in directing government policy, 
has significantly influenced the subsequent course of 
transmigration policy. The ultimate goal of 
transmigration was stated to be increased security and 
improved welfare, through the attainment of three 
intermediate goals: first, the opening-up of new areas 
of natural resources and land in a proper manner; 
second, moving the population from densely populated 
areas to empty areas; third, developing strategic 
regions in order to achieve greater national resilience 
under a just and prosperous Indonesian socialist
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society (Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 129-130).
In 1961, another ambitious transmigration plan was 
presented as part of the so-called Eight-Year 
Development Plan (1961-1968) formulated by the 
historian, poet and politician, Professor Muhammad 
Yamin.9 In the plan, the transmigration goal was 
described as being 'to move at least 250,000 
transmigrants to the agricultural sectors in the Outer- 
Islands' (Heeren, 1979: 23). According to Heeren (1979: 
23) there is confusion among some sources about whether 
the target number of the plan refers to persons or 
families. On the plan itself, Heeren (1979: 24) also 
commented :
It is obvious that Yamin in fact gives little 
attention to transmigration. In the plan, transmigration policy, for example, was 
mentioned under the rubric of Government and 
Police! The budget for transmigration is only 
1.5 per cent of the total government budget.
The government intention to link transmigration 
policy with 'Government and Police', however, is not 
surprising, since the military played a very important 
role in the ruling elite of the time, as well as within 
the bureaucracy which formulated the plan. As might 
have been expected, the actual number of transmigrants
9 Muhammad Yamin was described by Anderson (1972: 288) 
as: "Indonesia's best known political eccentric as long 
as he lived. It was said of him, not altogether 
unkindly, that he was like a horse: if you were in 
front of him, you were likely to get nipped; if you 
were behind him, to get kicked; and if under him, to 
get trampled on. But if you were on top of him, with 
reins in your hands, he would carry you fast and far".
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moved during the Yamin Plan was very much less than the 
target. Between 1961 and 1965, only 92,473
transmigrants were moved. One of the receiving areas 
during this period was the District of Siabu in Riau 
province. A later study showed that strategic reasons 
had been partly responsible for this resettlement, in 
order to support military operations during the 
confrontation with Malaysia (Hamidy and Ahmad, 1984: 
10) .
In 1964, an evaluation of the Yamin Plan, and a 
review of transmigration problems led, in January 1965, 
to a policy called Transmigrasi Gaya Baru (the New 
Transmigration Model). It was announced directly by 
President Sukarno, who stated:
No, Indonesia does not need birth control, 
Indonesia can feed at least 250 million people. 
250 million people, if they are properly 
distributed, if their energies are utilised 
adequately...10
Under the new plan, the government aimed to move 
100,000 families every year. The record shows that in 
the first semester of 1965 the government successfully 
moved almost 25,000 transmigrants (Heeren, 1979: 21). 
As a result of the political turmoil after the abortive 
coup of October 1965, however, the implementation of 
transmigration was significantly impeded.
Quoted from Sukarno's speech in the general meeting 
on National Movement for Transmigration on 28 December 
1964, entitled: Soal Transmigrasi adalah soal mati- 
hidup bangsa Indonesia (Transmigration is a matter of 
life or death for Indonesia) (Departemen Penerangan RI, 
c.1964: 13)
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Transmigration policy as practiced by the 
Indonesian government to solve the population and 
related problems of Java was described by Wertheim as 
not only impractical, but also illogical:
Why repeat a pattern which has produced in 
Java a scarcely enviable situation? Why 
should a solution of the population problems 
of the outer islands be exclusively sought in 
the agrarian sector, which inevitably leads 
to increasing competition for land? Why not 
try, in this early stage of development, an 
industrial development which would attract 
workers both from Java and Sumatra with 
appreciably less friction (Wertheim, 1959b: 
196) .
Jaspan (1960: 3-4, cited in Hardjosudarmo, 1956: 
122) argued that transmigration as practiced by the 
Indonesian government was only 'old stuffing with new 
cloth', and merely a 'dead end' (jalan buntu). He also 
wondered why the emigration policy, which essentially 
served the capitalists' interests and which was 
characterised by its exploitative character, was 
continued by the Indonesian government whose ideology, 
'Pancasila', was obviously opposed to such exploitation 
(cited in Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 124).
3.3. Regional Responses to Sukarno's Transmigration 
Policies
The resentment of the indigenous population of the 
settlement areas toward the central government's
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implementation of the transmigration policy in the 
1950s and 1960s was not a new phenomenon. The sources 
of resentment and dissatisfaction were mostly related 
to land disputes. Problems arose partly because the 
concept of land ownership in the Outer Islands was 
based on customary (adat) law, in which all land 
belonged to the marga or clan. The reluctance of 
indigenous people in Lampung, where most population 
resettlement was implemented, to grant their land for 
colonisation in the Dutch period, according to Heeren 
(1979: 47), had resulted in the formation of Javanese 
enclaves separate from the indigenous settlements. When 
the local people refused to give up their homeland for 
colonisation, the Dutch used perintah halus (gentle 
commands) to gain permission to use land outside marga 
jurisdiction. The areas for colonisation, therefore, 
were usually located outside the local settlements.
Nitisastro (1955: 125, cited in Heeren, 1979: 17) 
from a somewhat nationalist stance, criticised the 
Dutch assumption that had led to 'enclave politics'. 
According to Nitisastro, the result of the typical 
Dutchman's conservative politics is blockage of the 
assimilation process among ethnic communities in the 
colonization areas. Furthermore, Nitisastro argued that 
enclave politics is obviously in contradiction with the 
primary goal of Indonesian independence, that is, to 
build one Indonesian nation.
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Assimilation of the Javanese within indigenous 
populations in the Outer Islands, which was expected to 
bolster the unification of Indonesia, was not as easy 
as the government or the 'nationalists' like 
Nitisastro, had anticipated. Wertheim (1959b: 196), 
based on his observations in Lampung in 1956, noted 
that:
Assimilation of Javanese migrants is 
proceeding, neither to a Sumatran nor to a 
general Indonesian society, but to a Javanese 
society somewhat modified by a Sumatran 
environment. This situation leads to an 
increasing resistance of Sumatrans to the way 
in which resettlement has been carried on. 
Such resistance may seriously hamper further 
transmigration efforts. Thus it can be stated 
that the absorptive capacity of the outer 
islands is not only restricted by spatial and 
technical but by social factors as well. 1
In 1950, when the government of the Republic of 
Indonesia in Jakarta began to implement the 
transmigration policy in the Outer Islands, the local 
administration system was also experiencing rapid 
change. One consequence was that under central 
government pressure, the land ownership system based on 
adat law was slowly being transformed into new 
arrangements. Changes in the system of national 
administration deliberately reduced the role of the 
interests and views of indigenous populations in the 
Outer Islands. A reorganisation of regional government
Wertheim's prediction on the probability of social 
conflict in Lampung has apparently been realized in the 
'Lampung Affair' which broke out recently (See Tempo, 
18 February 1989. See also an interesting personal 
account from Wertheim (1989: 20-21) on this affair in 
Inside Indonesia, July 1989.
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structure and hierarchy was introduced, and a new 
autonomous regional government unit called negeri 
replaced the marga system. According to this new 
arrangement, a negeri could be formed from one or more 
margas and include the Javanese population living in 
this area. According to the central government, the 
organisation of a negeri was to be based on democratic 
principles. The council and the head of a negeri were 
to be democratically elected. This new rule was needed 
to supersede the adat law, which failed to grant the 
right to vote (hak pilih) to Javanese migrants. Through 
the new election system, negeri could be dominated by 
the Javanese migrants in those areas where Javanese 
outnumbered the indigenous population. This situation 
understandably created further disappointments with 
central government in the eyes of local people. Since 
they could not refuse the imposition of negeri, they 
tried to have separate negeri in which they could still 
practise their adat laws. Although in the end they 
failed, they frequently sent resolutions (resolusi) and 
motions (mosi) to the central government through their 
organisations in Lampung, pressing for more tradition- 
based reforms (Heeren, 1979: 47-48).
A further change in local administration was 
introduced by the central government in 1959, in 
conjunction with the declaration of Guided Democracy by 
President Sukarno. Liberal Democracy was considered 
inappropriate for Indonesian conditions. Under the new
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system, the marga and negeri were abolished. Regional 
authority was held by the regent (bupati). Under the 
regent, the camat (asisten wedana) was the most 
powerful authority in the regions. Both bupati and 
camat were appointed by the higher authorities. Such 
structural arrangements, in turn, contributed to the 
circumstances in which neither the local people nor the 
migrants had opportunities to influence the course of 
regional government.
The centre-regional relations are indeed a crucial 
issue in Indonesia. As Kahin (1963: 674) observed in 
the early 'sixties:
Regionalism is still an important force in 
Indonesia - scotched, but not eliminated, by 
the suppression of the 1958-1961 rebellion 
and having today considerable potential strength. The course of the rebellion and its 
overwhelming defeat demonstrated the strength 
of Indonesian nationalism to be greater, or 
at least more enduring, than most outside 
observers had assumed. But many of the 
conditions which led to the rebellion remain. 
The provinces' discontent with Jakarta's 
paternalism is still profound. Local 
dissatisfaction with the central government 
and the belief that decentralization of 
administrative authority and fiscal power 
would permit the regions to promote their own 
welfare more effectively remain strong...
A specific issue that stimulated strong criticism 
from the indigenous people, according to Heeren (1979: 
48) , focused on the government budget, which allocated 
more to transmigration settlements and less to other 
areas. Road construction, schools, agricultural 
offices, health and many other facilities were usually
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concentrated in the transmigration areas, with smaller 
allocations to other places. However, regional 
disappointment with central domination had a much 
broader base, as argued by Paauw (1963: 156) :
Resistance among the peoples of the outlying 
islands to the President's new program for 
Indonesia's development reflects fear of 
centralization of authority as well as more 
moderate attitudes toward capitalism and 
foreign enterprise. Behind these attitudes we 
find both ethnic considerations and 
significant differences in historical 
experience. The contribution of foreign 
enterprise to local welfare was more real and 
obvious than on Java, the burden of colonial 
control less onerous, and the desire to 
maintain local autonomy more respected. 
Individualism in economic activity is more 
highly valued in many of the outlying islands 
than on Java, producing conflicts over the 
degree of economic centralization to be 
promoted by political decision.
In such circumstances, transmigration policy, 
which was basically aimed at resettling population from 
Java to the other islands, has further exacerbated the 
discontent among local people toward the central 
government. Local discontent with transmigration policy 
among the indigenous population in South Sumatra was 
clearly articulated at an Adat Congress, firstly in 
Palembang in January 1957, and later in Bukittinggi in 
March 1957. The following is the full text of a 
resolution which resulted from the last congress in 
Bukittinggi. This resolution appeared in Indonesia Raya 
daily newspaper, March 20, 1957.
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All transmigration (policy) to Sumatra should 
be temporarily stopped. The reason is the 
fact that the number of transmigrants has 
reached 40 per cent of Lampung's population. 
To avoid further disappointments among the 
indigenous population, transmigrants should 
be treated equally with other people in 
Lampung; for example, they should have to 
follow the customary law wherever they 
settle. The central government should give 
attention to the important sectors of the 
indigenous people which are lagging behind 
the facilities for transmigrants. The areas 
that are still unoccupied by transmigrants 
have to be allocated for the local people who 
move as local transmigrants. The central 
government has to implement local 
transmigration as well as general 
transmigration, and the budget should be 
provided for it. The general rules for 
transmigration policy have to be re­
evaluated, and the new rules should be based 
on the interests of the regions. The areas 
for transmigration also have to be selected 
based on regional opinions. The decision to 
move transmigrants, as well as the number of 
transmigrants selected, should be agreed to 
by the regions. The regions also have the 
right to determine the requirements needed 
for transmigrants who will be sent to them. 
The transmigration officials in the receiving 
areas should be people from the region, or at 
least appointed by agreement with the local 
people (Heeren, 1979: 49-50, author's 
translation).
Heeren (1979: 50) also noted that the abandonment 
of transmigration policy was one of the main demands 
from the PRRI rebel groups (Dewan Banteng in West 
Sumatra and Dewan Garuda in Palembang) to the central 
government between 1956 and 1958. The implementation of 
transmigration was suspended during these rebellious 
years, but resumed in April 1958 immediately after the
PRRI was crushed.
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3.4. Summary and Conclusion
The Ethical Policy of the turn of the century set 
a pattern in Indonesia for the rest of the twentieth 
century. One of the enduring results was the migration 
policy, which relied on sponsored population movement 
from the 'Inner' to the 'Outer' islands. This policy, 
surprisingly, has remained on the government agenda for 
eight decades. In a much broader sense, the dichotomy 
between Java and the Outer Islands as conceived by the 
colonial government, has also persisted. This dichotomy 
resulted from the perception of the Outer Islands as 
"empty land" and the main sources of economic revenue, 
and Java, as the centre of political power, plagued by 
a population surplus. The 'population movement' 
solution, rather than the industrialisation proposed 
originally by Dutch socialists, and taken up by Hatta, 
reflects the persistence of dominant interests within 
the central government, which serves the elite of the 
day. Migration policies are merely palliative in 
nature, and consciously avoided any fundamental 
solutions that demanded redistribution of productive 
land or capital.
Although the early years of Independence produced 
an enthusiasm that transmigration would be integrated 
with industrialisation, such hopes were soon thwarted. 
This was partly due to the unsettled political 
situation and the unstable bureaucracy, as well as to
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the very limited government funds. National leaders 
were mostly absorbed by the struggle to gain and hold 
national sovereignty, particularly against the former 
colonial power, as well as to unite the country in the 
face of the centrifugal power of the regions. Within 
such countervailing pressures, particularly between the 
regions and the centre, the old outer-inner dichotomy 
became the dominant issue of the first two decades of 
Independence. It is within those centre-regional 
contexts that transmigration policy maintained its 
instrumental value.
The colonial legacy of 'emigratie' as a tool of 
welfare policy dominated the course of transmigration 
policy during the first decade of Independence. It 
promised the government a solution to population and 
related problems in Java. These included relief of 
poverty and landlessness and also help for the victims 
of Islamic rebellion in West Java, repatriates from 
Surinam, and ex-soldiers and guerilla fighters. The 
resentment of indigenous people in the Outer Islands, 
such as in Lampung, towards the central government 
policy on transmigration mostly originated from a 
different conception of land ownership. The people in 
many parts of the Outer Islands still regarded their 
lands as being inalienably owned by their customary 
groups (marga), whereas the central government 
considered that the national interest should prevail 
over regional interests. The regional disappointments
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with transmigration were openly articulated whenever 
there was a channel to do so. The regional rebellions 
against the central government between 1956 and 1958 
provided the most dramatic occasions on which local 
people in the Outer Islands expressed their resentment 
toward the transmigration policy. Strong resentments 
among people in the Outer Islands suggests that the aim 
of providing a 'melting pot' for Javanese and non- 
Javanese through transmigration was not without great 
risk.
Partly as the result of regional rebellions in 
West Sumatra and South and North Sulawesi during the 
period 1956-58, transmigration gained a new aim as a 
strategic instrument to strengthen national integration 
and security. The increasing role of military leaders 
in the government bureaucracy played an important role 
in establishing the strategic aims of transmigration. 
Up to the time of the attempted coup of 1965, although 
the total number of people who were moved under these 
schemes was very small, some resettlement areas were 
designed to bolster the national defence, particularly 
during the dispute with Malaysia. In the 1950s and 
1960s transmigration was always ambitiously planned, 
but its implementation was consistently poor. Expertise 
and funds were chronically limited. However, the long- 
lasting perceptions that have valued transmigration as 
a multi-purpose instrument may also have mystified 
transmigration as a 'panacea', a cure for many
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diseases. In the New Order period that began after 1965 
such perceptions have apparently been maintained. This 
helps to explain many controversies about the 
implementation of transmigration policy during the New 
Order. The next chapter will consider some issues that 
were revealed in the 1950s and 1960s for the analysis 
of transmigration policy during the New Order period.
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Chapter IV
TRANSMIGRATION POLICY OVER FOUR PLANNING CYCLES 
(1969 - 1988)
While the policy maker may not make 
the values or interests underlying 
his policies explicit- indeed, it may 
be in his interests not to - it is 
the task of the policy analyst to do 
so.
(Myron Weiner, 1975:76)
This chapter analyses the notion of transmigration 
as a population distribution policy and its place within 
national development, particularly since the beginning of 
the First Five-Year Plan (Repelita I) in 1969. National 
development will be examined in order to understand the 
policy cycle of the central and regional governments, and 
in turn, this overview will form the context within which 
transmigration is analysed. Transmigration will be 
examined with particular regard to the process of 
formulating goals and targets, and the nature of the 
implementing organization and its bureaucratic 
mechanisms. The New Order period has been chosen 
primarily because during this era transmigration has 
received increasing attention and legitimation and has 
been formally integrated into national development plans.
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4.1 National Development Policy: An Overview
During the New Order, economic development has 
become a major concern of the ruling elites in Indonesia. 
The emergence of a group of economists dedicated to the 
promotion of economic growth has been clearly reflected 
in the establishment of national and regional Five-Year 
Development Plans. These stress rational economic 
calculation as the primary consideration in promoting 
economic growth. Population is regarded as only one 
component of the economic system.
The conventional view among these economist- 
technocrats is that the rate of population growth is a 
significant determinant of the success of a country's 
economic development efforts. The importance of the 
population factor in economic thinking is clearly 
demonstrated by the use of average annual per capita
income as a measurement of development. The effect of
population growth on economic development has been
explained, among others by Coale and Hoover (1958: 19),
who argue that a higher rate of population growth implies 
a higher level of needed investment to achieve a given 
per capita output, while there is nothing about faster 
growth that generates a greater supply of investible 
resources. As a consequence of such an economic 
preoccupation, the reduction of population growth is 
often considered to be a necessary precondition for 
economic development.
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Despite this, the legacy of colonial policies, as 
well as the population policies of the 'old order' (which 
were basically pro-natalist and viewed uneven 
distribution of population as the main population 
problem), could not be easily eliminated from the 
thinking of the ruling elites. An illustration of how 
these elites, particularly the military, have 
persistently regarded transmigration as an important 
undertaking is shown by a request from General Suharto to 
the US ambassador in Indonesia, Marshall Green, at their 
first meeting on 29 May 1966. Suharto asked for US$500 
million in grants or soft loans to assist the 
transmigration program.1
Compared with the problem of rapid population 
growth, which at the beginning of the New Order was 
accorded high priority, the problem of uneven population 
distribution between Java and Outer Islands has not been 
generally regarded as an issue of urgency by the 
economist-technocrats. Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, 
widely known as the architect of the New Order's economic 
development policies, strongly argued that what was 
needed to overcome the population problem in Indonesia 
was:
...a massive development effort to create 
expanding employment opportunities accompanied 
by a rapid spread of fertility control (1970:
238) .
A letter from Marshall Green to Dr. Terry Hull at ANU, 
18 March 1988.
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Yet, curiously enough, the problem of uneven population 
distribution and the role of transmigration as a means to 
overcome it has long been a focus of government thinking, 
and became a very important policy within the national 
development plans during the New Order.
The real motive of President Suharto for the 
continuation of transmigration is difficult to identify. 
The explanation might be sought in the idea of 'harmony' 
among the Javanese, which in the Indonesian political 
context can be translated into the concept of 'national 
unity' or 'national integration', and which, as suggested 
by Koentjaraningrat (Visser, 1988: 75), is strongly 
represented by the President and the military. In this 
context, transmigration has been perceived as an 
instrument to accelerate the process of national 
integration.2 Government policies to move people from 
overcrowded Java to the other islands have also been 
considered as an alternative to land-reform. Land reform, 
which was aggressively promoted by the Communist Party 
(PKI) prior to the 1965 abortive coup, was identified by 
the New Order as a 'communist' policy. Wertheim (1984: 
10) noted that:
z In more recent times, Martono, then Minister of 
Transmigration, stated clearly that the ultimate goal of 
transmigration was a new society resulting from the 
amalgamation of different ethnic groups (Hopper, c.1987b: 
197) .
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Under the Suharto regime, "land reform" has 
become, for over one-and-a-half decades, a 
forbidden topic because it has the "bad" smell 
of "Marxism" and "Communism".
Tjondronegoro (1972: 12-13) noted that the shift in 
the balance of political power to the military after 1966 
resulted in a significant policy change from land 
redistribution within Java to population redistribution 
across the archipelago. Tjondronegoro (1984: 79) 
explained that:
Since 1967 the government has given higher 
priority to economic production and 
technological improvement, carefully avoiding 
policies which could have brought about 
effective social reforms. The Basic Agrarian 
Law of 1960 which is a potential instrument to 
initiate structural changes in the rural areas, 
has not been effectively enforced since the 
Coup of 1965. Since then, perhaps, the only 
occasion on which the government did implement this Law with regard to rural structural 
change, was when it had to set the land 
allocations for the migrants in the Outer 
Islands.
These seemingly ambiguous perceptions among the 
Indonesian elites of the nature of population problems 
are not unique. Weiner (1975: 66) has suggested that many 
governments assume that some of the problems exemplified 
by rapid population growth can be alleviated by policies 
aimed at the dispersal of populations. He also noted that 
migration policies are frequently embraced for a variety 
of purposes, but almost never for exclusively demographic 
reasons. In addition, transmigration as a form of land 
settlement scheme can be a supreme rhetorical device for
the government and its ruling elites. Hulme (1987: 413)
observed that:
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As a panacea for economic and social problems 
settlement schemes are a strategy almost 
without rival. If the popular expectation is 
that those in power should 'do something', then 
schemes are a most effective means of being 
seen to 'do something'.
Analysing transmigration policy within the context 
of national development plans requires it to be assessed, 
in addition to the demographic perspective, on the basis 
of two other influential considerations: first, economic 
considerations, as proposed by the economist-technocrat 
group and the World Bank; and second, non-economic 
considerations as advocated by the military, among 
others, particularly the social and political aspects of 
national integration. Alternating states of conflict and 
consensus between the groups promoting these two 
perspectives have played a decisive role behind the 
scenes in the formulation of transmigration policy and, 
more importantly, during its implementation.
Preceding the launch of the First Five-Year Plan in 
April 1969, the government, under the supervision of the 
economists, successfully reduced the inflation rate from 
a high of more than 600 per cent in 1966 to around 10 per 
cent in 1969. This achievement indicated the important 
role of the economist-technocrats in effectively 
controlling government expenditure and the money supply. 
In contrast to the situation under the Old Order, after
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1967 the government's budget had to be submitted to 
Parliament before the start of each new fiscal year. By
1968 it had become obvious that the central government 
had regained control of the economic situation. This was 
considered a suitable time to draft the First Five-Year 
Development Plan. As explained by one of the New Order's 
leading economists, the First Five-Year Plan was not an 
exhaustive plan of expenditure and was not grounded on 
any particular macroeconomic model (Mangkusuwondo, 1970). 
Mangkusuwondo (1970: 17-18) explained that:
It does not start with aggregate targets such 
as the level of GNP, total consumption, 
investments, exports, imports, etc. It does 
mention a target rate of growth of total income 
of five percent per annum but that figure is 
nothing more than a guess about the rate of 
growth of income as a consequence of 
investments in several areas of the economy, 
since neither the level of income nor total 
investment is known with a reasonable degree of confidence.
On the basis of their knowledge of conditions in the 
Indonesian economy prior to the beginning of the First 
Five-Year Plan, the designers decided that it was more 
realistic to frame a sectoral plan, rather than a 
comprehensive one. The major emphasis was placed on the 
agricultural sector, notably rice and other food 
production, and on the export sector. Other sectors, such 
as social overheads and manufacturing industries, were 
emphasized only insofar as they contributed to 
development in the food and export producing sectors or 
led to foreign exchange savings.
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Since the First Plan, a sectoral framework has 
always been used by the government as a basis for 
national development programs.3 During the preparation of 
Repelita I, the Indonesian government received a great 
deal of financial as well as expert assistance from the 
World Bank, particularly in the formulation of its 
economic policies and programs. According to Thompson and 
Manning (1974: 56), the involvement of the World Bank in 
Indonesia began in 1968 when Robert McNamara visited 
Indonesia as President of the Bank. Up to 1968, the role 
of the World Bank had been minimal. Although Indonesia 
had become a Bank member in April 1954, because of the 
political situation during the mid 50s the World Bank did 
not consider it economically feasible for the Indonesian 
government to borrow Bank money. A report based on the 
World Bank first field mission to Indonesia in mid-1955 
suggested that:
The Bank should take no decisions on further 
operations in Indonesia until the political 
situation is clarified and the ability of any 
future Government to tackle some of the 
critical and financial problems can be more 
clearly assessed (IBRD, 1956 cited in Thompson 
and Manning, 1974: 57).
At the beginning of the New Order period, the World
Bank staff worked directly with the National Development
Planning Board (Bappenas), the Ministries of Trade and
Finance and the Foreign Investment Board (Thompson and
Manning, 1974: 59-60). The central position of Bappenas
3 It is interesting that the original framework is still 
being used by Bappenas, even though the data to develop 
more comprehensive plans are readily available.
within the national policy was explain by Rudner (1976: 
255) :
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As a central planning institution Bappenas had 
substantive responsibility for the formulation 
of development strategies expressed in its 
sectoral and overall plans, consistent, of 
course, with politically - determined 
modernization goals. In the event, Bappenas 
also acquired a pivotal functions in current 
development policy decisions. It was 
responsible for getting annual departmental 
budgetary proposals, and in close collaboration 
with the Finance Ministry, reducing aggregating 
these into the state development budget. 
Foreign project aid, as well, was disbursed 
through Bappenas. The Planning Board co­
ordinated project aid finance and even 
conducted the negotiations with foreign 
governments and multilateral and international 
organizations.
At the end of the First Five-Year Development Plan, 
the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the highest 
constitutional power in Indonesia, promulgated, for the 
first time, a policy guidance document called 'The Broad 
Outlines of State Policy' (GBHN). Based on the GBHN, 
which provided the basic strategy for the national
development policy, the subsequent Five-Year Development 
Plan (Repelita II) was formulated. In theory, each
Repelita is an operationalisation of the GBHN.
According to Emil Salim, one of the New Order's 
economists (1970: 1, quoted in Djamin, 1984: 23):
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Repelita is merely an indicative plan, which 
shows the direction in which available 
resources will be focused. It provides 
information about factors that could hinder the 
dynamics and the speed of the development 
process. In addition, Repelita also reflects a 
style and system of economy that has been 
adopted by the government (author's 
translation).
Thus, the statement of a numerical target (for 
example, the number of transmigrants that were to be 
moved, the number of schools to be built, or the number 
of family planning acceptors to be achieved) in the 
Repelita documents was only an indicative goal. The 
actual numerical target was proposed by the planners on 
the basis of each department's projected budget, as well 
as the expected capacity of the bureaucracy, which played 
a crucial role in the implementation of the plan. 
Consequently, the numerical target for transmigration has 
rarely been calculated in relation to other demographic 
indicators, such as the rate of population growth or the 
rate of interprovincial migration.4
The Five-Year Development Plan is further elaborated
in an annual plan that shows, among other things, the
priority of each sector, the budget ceiling and the
sources of finance for each sector. The annual plan is
contained in the National Budget (APBN). A new
71 The current Minister for Transmigration, Soegiarto, in 
interviews with the press, stated clearly that the 
Repelita target number for transmigration was merely 
prepared for bureaucratic reasons, particularly in
association with the proposed budget allocation (See 
Suara Pembaharuan, 25 April 1988, also Editor, 1 May 
1988).
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rationalised budgetary process, based on a fiscal year 
extending from April to March of the following year, was 
initiated at the beginning of the first plan. Mas'oed 
(1983: 239) noted that in the preparation of the APBN at 
the national level the Finance Minister and the Head of 
Bappenas have acted as the 'Guardians of the Public 
Treasury' and the other departments and agencies as the 
'Spending Advocates'. The planning process has been 
summarised by Mas'oed (1983: 239-241) as follows:
1. The process starts when each individual unit or 
department within the government prepares a register of 
project proposals (DUP) that must be completed between 
June and August every year. The DUP is sent to the 
'Guardians' to be evaluated.
2. Between September and October, the 'Guardians' 
evaluate the project proposals and meet with officers 
from the various departments. During these meetings, the 
non-departmental agencies are represented by the State 
Secretariat. Included in the evaluation are 
considerations of each year's investment priorities as 
stipulated in the Five-Year Development Plan and an 
estimation of revenue.
3. Armed with projections of the level of development 
investment required, the government begins its aid 
diplomacy with the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia), a group of developed countries that have 
sponsored economic development in Indonesia since 1967.
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Based on the IGGI members' commitment and estimated 
government savings and revenues, the Finance Minister and 
the Head of Bappenas set the budget ceiling and order 
departments and agencies to prepare their specific 
budgets according to ceilings set for each.
4. In January, the President submits the proposed budget 
as a bill to the parliament. This document is usually 
accepted without significant changes. When the President 
signs the accepted bill, it becomes law.
5. The implementation stage of spending the development 
budget begins with the submission of a specified working 
program (DIP) by the departments and agencies to the 
'Guardians', on the basis of the accepted DUP. The 
acceptance of the DIP by the 'Guardians' represents the 
government's commitment to invest its money in the 
nominated projects through the various departments and 
agencies.
6. Finally the departments, through competitive bidding, 
employ contractors to carry out the projects. These 
contractors could be either government-owned or 
privately-owned companies.
The national policy-making process under the New 
Order has been described by some observers as 
predominantly technocratic-bureaucratic in nature 
(Kuntjorojakti, 1978; Mas'oed, 1983). It is bureaucratic 
because it always originates in, and is implemented by, 
the bureaucracy. The parliament functions mainly to
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ratify the plans, and debate on the matter is not 
encouraged. It is technocratic because the main criteria 
used in the process are technocratic values, such as 
'rationality' and 'efficiency': the economists are 
anxious to implement such criteria in evaluating project 
proposals and carrying out feasibility studies. In a 
similar vein, Hugo, Hull, Hull and Jones (1987: 300) 
argued that the politico-planning structure in Indonesia 
can be summarized in three words: 'authoritarian', 
'centralized', and 'technocratic'. Glassburner (1978: 29) 
views the planning process and the role of economist- 
technocrats in a slightly different way:
Although Bappenas is the centre of activity at 
the time of writing of the Five Year Plans, the 
agency itself is not set up for highly 
sophisticated central management of the 
economic system. Its primary function is to 
consider petitions from government agencies at various levels for investment funds channelled 
through the budget. I believe it is much more 
accurate to view this process as a 
manifestation of aristocratic benevolence than 
as an Indonesian version of Gosplan [Soviet 
Central Planning Office].
4.2 The Role of Provincial Government
Social, political and economic structural changes 
since the end of the 1960s have contributed to the 
development of the centralised character of the 
Indonesian government. In 1974, for example, the New 
Order government established Law No. 5, which established 
the legal framework for the role and authority of the
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provincial governments (Handajaningrat and Hindratmo, 
1986: 5) . According to this law, the provincial
government authorities exercise only those powers that 
have been granted to them by the central government. The 
national government is primarily represented by the 
Department of Home Affairs, whose minister is granted 
extensive authority under the law. With the establishment 
of this authority, the Minister of Home Affairs, acting 
through the Governors, has acquired responsibility for 
supervising and supporting all development activities 
carried out in the Provinces. However, in practice there 
seems to be a dualism of authority at the provincial 
level, since most regional development programs have been 
implemented by the national sectoral line agencies 
(Departments and Boards). The role of the departmental 
regional offices (Kanwil), as representatives of the 
national government departments, is not clearly 
distinguished from the role of the District Technical 
Offices (Dinas), which fall directly under the control of 
the governor or the district head (Bupati). The fact that 
most of the development budget is channelled through 
Kanwil offices for sectoral programs inevitably means 
that national-priority programs tend to take precedence 
over regional ones.
Development activities at the provincial level, 
based on Law No. 5. of 1974, can be classified into three 
broad categories. First are the development activities 
and programs implemented by the sectoral line agencies in
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the regions. In this category, planning, implementation, 
control and financial support are mainly the
responsibility of the central government. The 
transmigration program is an example of such an activity. 
Second are the development activities funded and 
implemented by the District Technical Offices (Dinas). 
Third are the development activities that should be the 
responsibility of a provincial government, but which, 
because the financial ability of the provincial 
government is limited, usually become the responsibility 
of the central government. An example of such activities 
is the Inpres projects that are implemented by the 
provincial government agencies under the strict control 
of the central government, particularly the Ministry of 
Home Affairs.5 (See Figure 4.1)
In 1976, the government created Regional Development 
Planning Boards (Bappeda) to strengthen the regional 
government in planning and co-ordinating development 
programs. In theory, there are a number of functions that 
should be performed by Bappeda: developing the basic 
pattern for regional development; preparing the regional 
five-year development plan; proposing annual programs 
such for the implementation of the five-year development 
plan; coordinating planning between the various Dinas and 
offices under the provincial government as well as
Inpres stands for Instruksi President or Presidential 
Instruction. At present, there are eight different types 
of Inpres grants, one for provinces, one for regencies, 
one for villages and the remainder for specific purposes 
such as health, primary education, roads and markets.
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sectoral agencies; proposing the regional budget; 
conducting research, and monitoring the implementation of 
regional development. The structure of Bappeda consists 
of the head, vice head, secretariat and four divisions, 
namely: research, economy, material and infrastucture, 
and statistics and reporting.
In practice, however, these bodies have had very 
limited control over development programs in their 
regions. Morfit (1984: 61) noted that, although the 
Bappeda, as planning institutions, are required to 
produce Regional Five-Year Development Plans (Repelita 
Daerah), these often are little more than a compilation 
of data about a given region. The weakness of Bappeda is 
typified in their lack of ability to influence 
development budgets, which are largely controlled by 
sectoral agencies.6
b Severalattempts, initiated by the economist-technocrat 
group in Bappenas and Home Affairs department have been 
made to strengthen the role of Bappeda as the provincial 
planning institution. For instance, before the 
preparation of the annual budget for the provincial 
level, Bappenas has conducted national level workshops in 
which all the Bappeda representatives participated. On 
these occasions, the Bappeda staff were briefed and 
guided to prepare their own annual regional budgets. 
Through Bappenas a number of studies, sometimes initiated 
by government departments and very often involving 
foreign experts, have also been conducted to assess the 
possibilities in strengthening the planning capacity and 
roles of Bappeda in regional development (MacAndrews, 
Fisher and Sibero, 1982; van den Ham, 1989).
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Given that sectoral line agencies in the provinces 
are directly controlled by their national offices in 
Jakarta, the governor has a duty to back the decisions of 
sectoral line agencies for the region. Bappeda, which in 
theory has the authority to evaluate the implementation 
of all projects in the region, is in reality entirely 
peripheral, since it is subservient to the governor. The 
total dependence of the governor on central-government 
decisions was noted by Major General Eddy Sahara, a 
former Inspector General of the Department of Home 
Affairs, the agency in charge of selecting new governors. 
Sahara (Editor, 26 September 1987) explained that, at the 
provincial level, the selection of the governor was 
nominally under the control of the regional military 
command. Thus, the nominee for governor must be a 
candidate who is considered politically acceptable by the 
local military command. However, they would ultimately 
refer the matter to their superiors in Jakarta. Santoso 
(1986: 51) also noted that:
He [the governor] is more a central government 
organ in the region than a representative of 
the region itself.
The circumstances in which the governor and the 
governor's office apparatus function solely as an 
instrument of the central government has undoubtedly 
contributed to the 'top-down' and 'centrally-planned' 
regional development approach.
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4.3 Transmigration Policy during Repelita I
(1969/70-1973/4)
Between the political upheaval of 1965, and the 
commencement of the first plan, the government paid very 
little attention to transmigration. At the dawn of the 
New Order, McNicoll (1968: 69), even predicted that the
program would no longer occupy a significant role in
government policy. Heeren (1979: 171) after studying the
various forms of migration schemes, argued in 1967 that 
the future trend of migration in Indonesia would be
toward voluntary internal migration. These predictions 
were based partly on an assessment that the economic and 
political environment did not favour such a policy. The 
economic and political situation, although under 
government control, was still considered unstable and 
very fragile. In the first plan, therefore, stabilization 
and rehabilitation became the immediate targets. The 
technocrats, who were mostly economists from the
University of Indonesia with backing from the military, 
formulated a relatively modest plan with emphasis first 
on increasing food production, and second, on 
rehabilitating the physical infrastructure, such as roads 
and ports. Although the economist-technocrats seemed to 
dominate the field of advice and expertise, various 
centres of economic power were essentially controlled by 
military personnel. Glassburner (1978: 34) observed that:
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The problem of economic-policy making and 
implementation is a major problem of social 
engineering in a pluralistic milieu. The FEUI 
[Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia] 
economists are thus forced to rely on their 
expertise and their persuasiveness, as well as 
their ability to appeal to national interest. 
Even within the ministries they head they must 
share power and responsibility in important 
instances.
The dominant role of the military in the formulation 
of policy was described as follows by Rudner (1976: 250):
The new development strategy sought to improve 
the performance of the laggard Indonesian 
economy not merely for its own sake, but as a 
means of securing the military elite's 
political aims of social modernization with 
stability, and national resilience. As the 
vanguard of the New Order, the ABRI, and 
particularly its army component, was to play a 
critical role in the formulation and 
implementation of the First Five Year 
Development Plan (Repelita I) , introduced in 
March 1969.
Prior to the initiation of the first plan, the 
Directorate General of Transmigration was converted into 
the Department of Transmigration and Cooperatives as a 
result of a merger between the Directorate General of 
Transmigration (under the old Department of 
Transmigration and Veterans Affairs), and the Directorate 
General of Cooperatives (formerly under the Department of 
Home Affairs). In March 1969, Brigadier General 
Soebiantoro was appointed Director General of 
Transmigration, replacing Brigadier General Boesiri. The 
appointment of military officers within the government 
bureaucracy, although very common under the New Order,
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had a special significance in the transmigration program 
because it provided an avenue for the armed forces to 
pursue their strategic and political interests in various 
aspects of the program.
In Repelita I, the government's policy on 
transmigration was stated in only two-and-one-half pages 
(Departemen Penerangan RI, 1969: 537-539). Although the 
problem of population redistribution was mentioned, it 
was not elaborated upon. The need to meet labour 
requirements for development in the regions outside Java, 
although stated as a secondary goal, was given more 
detailed attention in the plan. It seems that the 
economist-technocratic views that considered 
transmigration primarily an instrument to support the 
immediate objectives of stabilization and rehabilitation 
strongly influenced the formulation of the plan. The 
transmigration program was considered as an important 
source of labour to serve these broader goals. In 
addition, the transmigration program was expected to 
increase food production in the Outer Islands.
In the First Plan no numerical targets for 
transmigration were set. This was probably because of 
difficulties in obtaining reliable aggregate data, a 
major problem for the planners who prepared that 
document. In addition, the focus of transmigration seemed 
to be more on regional development than on solving the 
problem of uneven population distribution between Java
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and the other islands. Among the economist-technocrats 
group, the view that transmigration policy should be 
directed toward regional development rather than to solve 
the demographic problem in Java was not a surprise. In 
1963, for example, Sadli (1963: 22) argued that:
. . .transmigration has to be seen more as a way 
of providing manpower for economic development 
in the outer regions.
In commenting on this new perception of 
transmigration, Arndt (1984: 6) noted that:
As rational economic policy-making again became 
possible after the 1965-66 change of 
government, interest in transmigration revived, 
but with a different perspective. It came to be 
recognized that transmigration could not solve, 
or even substantially alleviate, the problem of 
"population imbalance" between Java-Bali and 
the other islands, if indeed that was the 
problem. Transmigration was now seen primarily as having a welfare objective, to raise the 
living standards of the migrants and that of 
their home villages in Java. It was also hoped 
that transmigration could serve as a strategy 
for regional economic development in the outer 
islands.
The declining role of transmigration policy as a 
solution to population problems was also noted by Schultz 
(1972: 117):
The (First) Five Year Plan, for the first time 
in Indonesian history, not only establishes 
population control as a legitimate objective of 
development planning but also makes the 
realistic assessment that transmigration, or 
the transporting of Javanese and Balinese to 
the Outer Islands, is not an effective means of 
population control.
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The actual course of transmigration, however, was 
neither as predicted by many observers nor as stated in 
the plan documents. In 1970, under the patronage of 
Brigadier General Soebiantoro, a national seminar on 
transmigration was held in Cipayung to discuss the role 
of transmigration in national development. The seminar, 
which was attended by scholars and policy makers, was a 
landmark because it restored transmigration to a position 
of national importance and formulated a positive basis 
for the transmigration program within the framework of 
national development policy. The document, published as a 
seminar report, shows that uneven population distribution 
was considered to be detrimental to many aspects of 
national development and, more crucially, to the 
achievement of national integration and security (Seminar 
Transmigrasi, 1970). The seminar report reflected a 
strong perception within the government elite, as well as 
among scholars, that once the demographic goals of 
transmigration were realised, that is a balanced 
population distribution, other goals, such as economic, 
social and national integration, would be automatically 
fulfil.
The issues of 'national integration' and 'national 
unity' in fact had been discussed from the early years of 
Independence, and their importance reached new heights 
during the 1956-58 regional rebellions. The decisive role 
of the military in ending the rebellions was a major 
factor in reshaping the role that military leadership has
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played in the national political scene since that time 
(Feith and Lev, 1963: 37). In addition, 'national 
integration' has become the key issue and prime concern 
for the military leaders, whose power was further 
entrenched by the political chaos of 1965. The conceptual 
links between transmigration policy and national 
integration were explained by Brigadier General Edi 
Sugardo (1987) of the National Defense Institute 
{Lemhanas), the 'think tank' of the Department of 
Defense, in the following terms:
From the 'geo-politic' and 'geo-strategic' 
point of view, transmigration policy is an 
effort, method, and means to achieve 
'geographic integration', which is a basic 
condition for the unity of the nation, to 
improve the people's welfare and awareness, and 
provide an opportunity to utilise natural 
resources. Achievement of geographic 
integration, on the one hand, will protect the 
nation from centrifugal tendencies, and on the 
other hand, strengthen centripetal forces. 
Geographic integration is also a medium to 
build understanding, friendship and co­
operation with other countries. From the point 
of view of national defence, transmigration is 
supportive of the 'Popular Defense and Security 
System'(SISHANKAMRATA), in order to resist the 
threat of subversion, infiltration and invasion 
from abroad, particularly through the provision 
of human resources (Sugardo, 1987: 4-5; 
author's translation).
Thus in the view of the military, geographic 
integration, in which transmigration policy plays an 
important role by providing human resources, is a 
necessary condition for the attainment of national 
integration. Another important element of this military 
thinking is the concept of 'basic defence'. The basic 
defense of the Indonesian armed forces, according to
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Crouch (1986: 3) , was essentially based on the doctrine
of 'Territorial Warfare':
This doctrine required that the defense forces, 
especially the army, be organised principally along 
"territorial" rather than "functional" lines. The 
whole nation was divided into territorial commands 
more or less parallel to the civilian 
administration. In terms of defense doctrine, a 
major function of the territorial commands was to 
maintain contact with the local people so that they 
could be mobilized quickly to support guerrilla 
operations whenever necessary. It may be added, of 
course, that this territorial structure has also 
been very convenient for the purpose of political 
control.
The role of transmigration in the concept of 'basic 
defence' was to populate the empty regions in order to 
support the territorial commands.
In 1971 an international-level workshop on 
transmigration was conducted in which there was active 
participation by foreign experts. The following year, in 
1972, the President established a law on transmigration 
which provided the basic legislation for the 
transmigration policy (Department of Manpower and 
Transmigration, 1979, Appendix 3: 4). According to this 
law, Indonesian transmigration policy has seven goals:
1. Improvements in living standards
2. Regional development
3. A balanced population distribution
4. Equitably distributed development throughout 
Indonesia
5. Utilization of natural and human resources
6. National union and unity
7. Strengthening of national defense and security
The numerous goals set down for transmigration reflected
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the complexity of the role of the program. These goals 
also suggested that transmigration tended to be seen by 
policy makers as a universal panacea, a cure for a wide 
range of social and economic weaknesses.
During 1973, two further seminars were held 
involving several foreign agencies, including the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 
World Food Programme (WFP), that were interested in 
providing financial assistance for the transmigration 
program. In Repelita I, FAO consultants in particular, 
worked closely within the Directorate General of 
Transmigration and played an important role in 
conceptualising the linkage between the transmigration 
program and regional development, especially through 
the expansion of agriculture. The active role of the FAO 
during the First Plan was not surprising given the fact 
that increasing food production was one of the stated 
national goals at this time. In one of the published 
seminar reports, for instance, an FAO consultant, van der 
Goot, suggested that in able to embark on a substantial 
change in the transmigration program, which at the time 
was planned to take place in 1980:
The Indonesian government has to establish and 
demonstrate its ability to integrate large-scale 
transmigration and regional development initiatives 
into a viable and long-term programme (van der Goot: 
1974: 50-51).
In the course of time, however, the actual influence of
112
the FAO in transmigration policy formulation seemed to 
decline, whereas the role of other foreign donor
agencies, particularly the World Bank, was later to 
become very significant in reshaping transmigration 
policy.
4.4 Transmigration Policy during Revelita II
(1974/5-1978/9)
During the Second Five-Year Plan, the transmigration 
program became part of the Department of Manpower, 
Transmigration and Cooperatives. Professor Subroto, an 
economist from the University of Indonesia, was appointed 
minister. Soebiantoro, who had been promoted to the rank 
of Major-General, continued as Director General. In this 
plan, the transmigration program gained more attention 
than previously. The increase in government revenues from 
the oil boom provided funds to support the program on a 
much larger scale than previously possible. For the first 
time, it was stated clearly that transmigration was 
considered to be an important means for strengthening 
national integration. By contrast, the demographic 
rationale that had regarded transmigration as a tool for 
population redistribution was mentioned only implicitly 
(Departemen Penerangan RI, 1974: 451-458).
The Second Five-Year Development Plan criticised the 
implementation of the transmigration program during the
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First Plan period. The problems identified as hindering 
effective policy implementation were those relating to 
settlement preparation in the receiving regions, the 
choice of location, the provision of equipment, and co­
ordination with the regional government, as well as with 
other agencies. Prior to the Second Plan, there was some 
hope, particularly among economic observers, that the 
plan would be prepared in a more systematic way, based on 
research and the cooperation of a large number of 
economic experts. But, as Glassburner (1978: 167) argued, 
as a result of the rice crisis and the radical impact of 
changing oil prices meant that Professor Widjojo, the 
head of Bappenas, and his subordinates could not prepare 
a comprehensive plan. The plan, according to Glassburner 
(1978: 167), was 'no more than a statement of qualitative 
obj ectives'.
Although the demographic rationale for 
transmigration was only implicitly stated in the plan, a 
numerical target was explicitly mentioned. The target was 
to move 250,000 families within five years. The Minister 
of Manpower and Transmigration, Subroto (1974: 28) argued 
that the resettlement of large numbers of people from 
Java, Bali and Lombok would make a positive contribution 
to regional development in the Outer Islands. In 
selecting the sending areas, priority was to be given to 
regions that were considered 'critical', such as areas 
prone to flooding, and to rural places with population 
densities of more than 1,000 persons per square
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kilometre. South Sumatra, South and East Kalimantan, and 
South, Central and Southeast Sulawesi were designated as 
the main receiving areas for transmigration settlement 
(Departemen Penerangan RI, 1974: 456).
In 1976 a significant development in the
transmigration program was begun by the approval of the 
first World Bank-assisted transmigration project. The 
World Bank project consisted of two pilot schemes in 
southern Sumatra. The first was the rehabilitation of an 
existing settlement in Way Abung and initiation of a new 
settlement in Baturaja, and the second was to conduct 
research on cropping systems and long-term monitoring and 
evaluation. In the first project, new settlers in 
Baturaja were provided with 5.0 hectares farms, which 
included 1.25 hectares cleared for food crops and 1.0 
hectares of rubber trees established for the smallholders 
by a public sector estate (PTP X) . These benefits were 
provided to the settlers as a grant. To promote food crop 
development, farmers were given cattle for draft power, 
and free agricultural inputs (seed, fertilizer and
pesticides) for three years. Transmigrants also received 
a house and one year of subsistence supplies. The project 
was implemented by a Project Management Unit (PMU) with 
considerable financial autonomy, and both domestic and 
foreign technical assistance was provided to support the 
PMU. The first project was considered by the World Bank 
(1988: 161) to have been successful.
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The second Bank-assisted transmigration project, 
approved in 1979, was intended to resettle 30,000
families along the new Trans-Sumatra highway, 
particularly in Jambi province. The project was also 
promoted as a model for the Repelita III (World Bank, 
1988: 161). The World Bank (1988: 159) reported that 
bank-supported projects had introduced a number of 
innovative features into the transmigration policy in 
Indonesia. These included improvements in site screening 
and evaluation, support for and evaluation of the major 
farm models, assistance for program management, and 
development of procedures for utilizing timber from 
transmigration sites. In addition, the World Bank also 
admitted that a number of problems had been encountered 
during their involvement in the program. Some of these 
problems were common to all projects in Indonesia, among 
them: land allocation, co-ordination between the 
implementing agencies, and the problem of guality control 
(World Bank, 1988: 159). However, the Bank discovered 
that some problems resulted from difficulties inherent in 
programming and implementing a complex sequence of events 
and from ambitious program targets that had strained the 
capacity of the implementing agency.
By the end of Repelita II, it had become clear that 
the achievement was far below the target (see Table 4.2). 
Only 55,083 families had been resettled, compared with 
the target of 250,000 families. One study indicated that 
the failure was largely due to the lack of co-ordination
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between the various central, provincial and district 
offices of the Transmigration Department assigned to 
carry out the program (Guinness, 1977: 11). Another
problem was the limited capacity of transmigration 
implementing agencies to actually spend the budget. A 
special report on 'Transmigration Budgetary and 
Accounting Procedures' by Beddoes (1976 cited in 
Guinness, 1977: 11-12) showed that, in the first year of
Repelita II, 24 per cent of the transmigration budget had 
not been spent. In the second year, 34 per cent and by 
the second half of the third year, 96 per cent of the 
budget remained. These represented very large sums, since 
the transmigration budget had increased from Rp. 800 
million in 1969/70 to Rp. 6,652 million in 1974/75 and 
Rp. 14,936 million in 1975/76.
4.5. Transmigration Policy during Repelita III
(1979/80-1983/4).
During Repelita III, the Directorate General of 
Transmigration became part of the Department of Manpower 
and Transmigration, while the Directorate General of 
Cooperatives was transferred to the Department of Trade. 
Harun Zain, an economist from the University of Indonesia 
and a former governor of West Sumatra, was appointed 
Minister of the new department. In addition, a new post 
of Junior Minister for Transmigration was established, 
reporting directly to the President but attached to the 
department. The appointment of Harun Zain, a civilian, as
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head of the department directly responsible for the 
transmigration program, can be seen as indicating the 
interest of the technocrat group in incorporating 
transmigration into regional economic development. Harun 
Zain, with his experience as governor in one of the 
receiving provinces, was expected to play an important 
role in achieving this goal. However, the appointment to 
the position of Junior Minister for Transmigration of 
Martono, who was described by Harun Zain as 'a political 
man' close to the President, was also an indication that 
the President did not want to completely hand over policy
7control to the technocrats.
The division of responsibility between the Director 
General, who reported directly to the Minister, and the 
Junior Minister for Transmigration, who was directly 
responsible to the President, seemed unclear. Perhaps 
partly due to this situation but also as a consequence of 
the very rapid expansion in the size of the 
transmigration program since the beginning of Repelita 
II, several special decrees were promulgated, 
particularly Presidential Decree No. 26/1978, in which 
the organizational responsibilities for the 
transmigration program were laid down. A series of 
special bodies were created to coordinate policies, 
implementation and administration. These were:
The statement describing Martono as 'a political man' 
was made by Harun Zain during an interview with the 
author, January 1988.
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1. Bakoptrans (Badan Koordinasi Penyelenggaraan 
Transmigrasi or the Co-ordinating Body for Implementation 
of Transmigration), composed of Ministers and chaired by 
the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration.
2. Satdaltrans (Satuan Pengendali Transmigrasi or the 
Control Unit for Transmigration) , composed of the 
Directors-General and chaired by the Junior Minister of 
Transmigration.
3. Satbintrans (Satuan Pembinaan Transmigrasi or 
Transmigration Guidance Unit) I, composed of provincial- 
level staff and chaired by the governor of each province.
4. Satbintrans II, composed of district-level staff and 
chaired by the district-head (Bupati) in each district.
Although the numerical achievement of the Second 
Plan was far below the target, the Third Plan continued 
to plan for a further substantial increase in the target 
to 500,000 households (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1978: 
304-337). The reason for increasing the target, apart 
from the general euphoria occasioned by the second oil 
boom, was the economist-technocrats' feeling that the 
implementation of the program would be improved by the 
increased support being given by many foreign donor 
agencies.
The second World Bank-assisted transmigration 
project started in 1979, concentrating on the 
resettlement of transmigrants in dry-land areas along the 
new Trans-Sumatra highway. Technical assistance was also 
provided to the Junior Minister for Transmigration to aid 
in co-ordination of the overall program. Such assistance 
was important, given that lack of co-ordination was 
considered to have been the major problem in the
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implementation of transmigration under Repelita II. The 
focus of the second round of World Bank projects on dry­
land and food-crop transmigration schemes, also reflects 
an important new development. It was a significant 
departure from the Bank's successful first project on 
tree-crop transmigration schemes. The change constituted 
an important development in the evolution of World Bank 
involvement on transmigration for at least for two 
reasons. First, the World Bank had failed to influence 
the policy makers in directing transmigration policy into 
more market-oriented types of population settlements. 
Second, although the economist-technocrat group had 
played a larger role in reshaping transmigration policy 
into the so-called 'integrated regional development' 
mode, the ambitious targets of Repelita III mirrored the 
influence of strong forces that continued to view 
transmigration as a population policy aimed at relieving 
population pressures in Java through the development of
Qagricultural settlement in the Outer Islands.
The beginning of Repelita III, therefore, indicated 
an important change in transmigration policies. The 
change could be interpreted, on the one hand, as a 
revitalisation of the non-economic forces, particularly 
those represented by the military elite and the
■o---------------------------------------------------------The central government obsession with promoting 
population resettlement based on food crop agricultural 
systems as practiced in Java, according to Dove (1985: 
32), is essentially a manifestation of the agroecological 
mythology of the Javanese that has developed on Java and 
strongly influenced the thinking of many policy makers in 
the central government.
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government bureaucratic apparatus, and, on the other, as 
an expression of the difficulties and declining roles of 
the economic views represented, in particular, by the 
economist-technocrats and the World Bank. The fact that 
the World Bank also tolerated the more demographic 
orientation of transmigration policy suggests that the 
Bank and, in particular, its bureaucratic elements had 
adopted a rather pragmatic approach. This, aside from its 
bureaucratic interest in keeping the project going, also 
reflected the fact that it had become politically 
impractical for the Bank to withdraw from its extensive 
involvement in the Indonesian transmigration program.9
Another factor that also raised the hopes of the 
government was the success of what it called Bedol Desa 
transmigration. This type of transmigration was carried 
out in conjunction with the evacuation of an entire 
population following a government decision to use an area 
for the construction of a dam or some other large 
project. The first and apparently the largest project was 
the relocation of people from some districts in Wonogiri 
in Central Java to Sitiung in West Sumatra. The success 
of the Wonogiri-Sitiung project within the Bedol Desa 
program increased confidence among the transmigration 
planners that the country was capable of carrying out 
similar settlement projects in the future. Wonogiri also 
happened to be the area of the President's childhood
I am particularly indebted here to Dr. McNicoll, my 
adviser, for raising some points which I developed 
further for this argument.
121
home. According to Gondowarsito's study of Bedol Desa 
transmigration (1986: 89-90), because of this privileged 
status, the utmost involvement and cooperation on the 
part of various government agencies, namely the 
Departments of Manpower and Transmigration, Public Works, 
Communication, and Agriculture, were enlisted.
Population distribution and regional development, 
which had alternately dominated as goals of the First and 
Second Plans, received equal emphasis in this Third Plan. 
Given the government's focus on equal distribution of 
welfare, under a policy called 'The Eight Paths of 
Equity' (Delapan Jalur Pemerataan), transmigration also 
became an important vehicle for the achievement of this 
new goal. The plan also stated that priority would be 
given to the poorest sending areas, where the problem of 
landlessness was most acute, and noted that the selection 
and preparation of receiving areas also needed more 
careful attention.
In the Third Plan, the government anticipated 
resettling transmigrants not only in dry-land areas, but 
also on pasang-surut (tidal) areas. The increased numbers 
to be settled led to difficulties in providing sufficient 
suitable land in the receiving areas. Compared to the 
First and Second plans, the Third Plan described in great 
detail the facilities and equipment to be provided to 
transmigrants. The plan seems to have been more seriously 
and professionally prepared than its predecessors. Co-
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ordination among the implementing agencies, which was 
always at the centre of the program's problems, was also 
given more attention.
With the establishment of Bakoptrans, the 
responsibilities of the various departments involved were 
more clearly defined. For example, the Department of 
Public Works was responsible for the selection and 
planning of sites, for land clearing and for construction 
of infrastructure; the Department of Home Affairs was to 
conduct land-use planning and deal with the legal status 
of land; the Department of Agriculture was responsible 
for planning and implementing agricultural development; 
and, finally, the Department of Manpower, Co-operatives 
and Transmigration was in charge of the recruitment, 
transportation, and resettlement of transmigrants, as 
well as providing them with five years of economic and 
social guidance at each site. Under this highly 
bureaucratic and hierarchical organizational structure, 
each department was expected to plan its activities and 
budget in consultation with the Junior Minister. However, 
the authority, budget and staff of the Junior Minister's 
office were far too limited for efficient co-ordination. 
Furthermore, co-ordination proved impossible because each 
department continued to work independently. In addition, 
since the Junior Minister of Transmigration reported 
directly to the President, a hidden rivalry was 
unavoidable between the Minister and the Junior
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Minister.10 Under the new arrangement, which was 
implemented in 1978, the Junior Minister was given more 
authority to control the foreign assistance than the 
Minister. This authority considerably reduced the power 
of the Minister to effectively implement the program.
At the end of the Third Plan, 535,474 families were 
reported to have been moved (Table 4.1), although the 
target of 500,000 was met only by defining 169,947 
spontaneous migrants as transmigrants, with or without 
government assistance. According to Hardjono (1986: 29),
to say that the Repelita III target was reached gives a 
slightly exaggerated picture of the extent to which 
people were moved from Java and Bali at government 
expense:
In fact, only 365,977 families were moved by 
the government transmigration agency as fully 
supported or general (umum) transmigrants. 
Furthermore, this figure includes local people 
who moved into transmigration projects and 
families that had to be resettled within the 
same province for some reasons. The remaining 
169,497 families, representing 32% of the 
total, were swakarsa (literally, 'self 
initiative') transmigrants who moved with 
limited, or in many cases, no government 
assistance (Hardjono, 1986: 29).
Another observer, Babcock (1986: 182), formerly 
working as a consultant in the Public Works department, 
even described the government's claim that the Third Plan 
had achieved its target as a manipulation to justify the 
overly-ambitious target.
1:0 A personal communication with a senior member of 
staff in the Department of Transmigration, December 1987.
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Table 4.1
Realization of the Transmigration Program during 
Repelita III (Families)
Target Realization
Fiscal Year World Bank Hardjono Percentage
1979-1980 50,000 23,078
(1,985)
49,772
(24,298)
99
1980-1981 75,000 76,562 
(3,359)
108,081 
(34,428)
144
1981-1982 100,000 93,437
(8,961)
123,846
(35,780)
124
1982-1983 125,000 125,269
(32,445)
167,477
(47,124)
134
1983-1984 150,000 217,128 
(122,747)
86,298
(24,867)
58
Total 500,000 535,474
(169,497)
535,474
(169,497)
107
Notes: 1. The number in parentheses represents unassisted 
or partly-assisted transmigrants.2. The percentage figures is calculated from 
Hardjono's column.
Sources: World Bank (1988: 11)
Hardjono (1986: 29)
Widespread scepticism has been expressed about the 
statistical manipulation involved in determining program 
achievements during Repelita III. There are guite 
remarkable statistical inconsistencies among the several 
sources that have presented the transmigration 
realization statistics for Repelita III. For example, the 
figure reported by the World Bank (1988: 11) is obviously 
different from that presented by Hardjono (1986: 29) 
(Table 4.1). Although, the total number of resettled 
migrants is similar, their annual distributions,
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especially the number of spontaneous migrants, are 
remarkably dissimilar. While both Hardjono and the World 
Bank described their sources as the Department of 
Transmigration, the salient differences in their figures 
raise serious doubts as to the accuracy of the 
information. With regard to the distribution of 
spontaneous transmigrants, although the accuracy of both 
columns must be suspect, the figures in Hardjono's column 
seem more logical than those of the World Bank. The 
distribution of spontaneous transmigrants, who were 
mostly concentrated in the last budget year in the World 
Bank data, are unlikely to reflect the actual pattern of 
movement. That is more likely to have been more evenly 
distributed throughout the plan period, as in Hardjono's 
figures. The World Bank concentration of spontaneous 
transmigrants in the last budget year probably reflects 
hasty decisions by the Department of Transmigration due 
to pressure at the end of the plan period to document a 
public image that program targets had been successfully 
achieved. The method chosen was apparently through 
manipulation of statistics on spontaneous 
transmigrants.11
±± Such statistical manipulation was recognized by the 
World Bank, which noted in one of its reports (1988: 134) 
that:
Although some spontaneous families were settled 
in existing areas, no program of partially 
assisted movement or of support for spontaneous 
migration was developed in Repelita III. 
However, the Repelita III target of 500,000 
families was eventually achieved by including 
169,500 "spontaneous" families in the total 
moved. Of these, about 30,000 families were 
moved with partial assistance and the remaining 
140,000 moved without assistance, but were 
identified in sending or receiving areas. It is
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4.6 Transmigration Policy during Repelita IV 
(1984/5-1988/9)
Under Presidential Decree No. 45/M/1983, for the 
first time in the history of the transmigration program, 
a separate Department of Transmigration was established. 
Martono was appointed Minister. This ended the previous 
rivalries between the Minister controlling the 
Directorate General of Transmigration, and the Junior 
Minister of Transmigration. It was hoped that an 
independent department could solve the problem of co­
ordination, which had been so serious during the 
implementation of the Third Plan. The President also 
established a State Minister for Population and 
Environment (KLH), who was responsible for the 
formulation, management and co-ordination of national 
population policies. Professor Emil Salim, a Minangkabau 
and one of the New Order's leading economists, was 
appointed as minister.
An integrated national population policy had been 
long overdue. Given the number of economists in the 
central government, including economist-demographer 
Professor Widjojo, the lack of integration between
important to emphasize that these families were 
identified to round out official targets, and 
the data collected from sending provinces is 
not a good indicator of the number of people 
who actually move.
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population policy and national development policy seemed 
'paradoxical' at least to outside observers (Hugo, Hull, 
Hull and Jones, 1987: 315). The paradox, however, is 
hardly surprising given the very different perceptions of 
the 'population factors' held by the President and his 
military elite and the economist-technocrats. The 
difficulties that had been experienced by the economist- 
technocrat group in dealing with the military were 
confirmed by one of the Deputy Ministers for Population 
and Environment.12 The political position of the 
economist-technocrats, as explained by Glassburner (1978: 
32-33), was almost entirely dependent on their ability to 
convince the military leadership, and the President in 
particular, that their expertise was essential. In a 
similar vein, Rudner (1976: 255) argued that :
Having no political base other than military 
patronage, technocrat ministers and planners were 
ultimately dependent upon the confidence of the 
military elite in general, and the President in 
particular. Whatever their formal functions in 
economic policy-making, the decisions of economist- 
technocrats became operative only when, and to the 
extent that they acquired executive support from 
military leaders and local commanders. In the last 
analysis, the authority of the economist-technocrats 
went only so far as their economics proved amenable 
to the ABRI's own conception of national 
modernization.
In the Fourth Plan, therefore, it was likely that 
transmigration would remain largely beyond the influence 
of the Minister of Population and Environment, Emil 
Salim, an economist-technocrat, because Transmigration 
had also become an independent department with a minister 
1:2 Personal communication with the author, January 1988.
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who was close to the President.
Following the decision to make Transmigration an 
independent department, two Directorates of the 
Department of Public Works were absorbed into the 
Department of Transmigration. Some sections of the former 
Directorate of City and Regional Planning (DITADA) of the 
Directorate General Cipta Karya, which had been 
responsible for transmigration site selection and 
physical planning, became the Directorate of Programme 
Development (Bina Program) in the newly formed 
Directorate General of Settlement Preparation (PANKIM). 
The Directorate of Land Preparation was moved to that 
directorate general, from the Directorate General of 
Highways in the Department of Public Works. The former 
Directorate General of Transmigration became the 
Directorate General for Mobilisation and Development 
(RAHBIN). The budgets of some agencies, such as health 
and education, were also incorporated into the Department 
of Transmigration, while other agencies such as Agrarian 
Affairs and the directorates in agriculture, retained 
control over their own funds. Under the new department, 
the staff and functions of the Inspector General and the 
Secretary General were expanded in order to improve 
financial and administrative control (see Figure 4.2)
Fi
gu
re
 4
.2
: 
Or
ga
ni
za
ti
on
al
 S
tr
uc
tu
re
 o
f 
th
e 
Mi
ni
st
ry
 o
f 
Tr
an
sm
ig
ra
ti
on
129
Source :
t « * — 4 « | M g
r***
V«t
•itjoixiia
«•JO
J \ *A*0 
Hi
>o )
I J  «* <3 v w  I
fv* •>utM« ^
»■rrilftij
V\V«£*g
|TVO]3Tl]UfUo
t~* T«*n
Adapted from World Bank (1988)
130
There is no doubt that Repelita TV reflected the 
increasing role of the transmigration program within the
national development policy. The target number to be
resettled was increased to 750 ,000 households. The
claimed successful outcomes of the Third Plan had
apparently provided a strong argument for the government 
to increase the target to this level. In the Fourth Plan, 
foreign financial support to the transmigration program, 
particularly from the World Bank, also increased 
dramatically. However, the appointment of Martono as the 
minister suggested that the technocrats were losing 
control of the program. Furthermore, instead of 
demographic and regional development arguments, national 
defense and security were highlighted as important goals 
of transmigration (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1983: 371- 
372) .
The important role of transmigration for national 
defense and security was emphasized by the Chief of Armed 
Forces, General Benny Moerdani, when he delivered a 
keynote address at the seminar in the National Defense 
Institute (Lemhanas). According to Moerdani, 
transmigration policy was the only policy within the 
economic development framework which had a direct linkage 
with national security and defense. He argued that it was 
necessary for the military to be involved in site 
selection, primarily because transmigration location had 
a strong relation with the concept of territorial 
management (Kompas, 8 March 1985). An obvious attempt
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from the military to influence the transmigration policy, 
among others, was shown by the appointment of Major 
General C. I. Santoso, a former regional commander in 
Irian Jaya (1978-1982) , as the general secretary of the
In the plan documents, transmigration was discussed 
in a fairly substantial separate chapter of 58 pages. 
According to Sjahrir (1987: 193), economist from the 
Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), the Fourth Plan showed 
considerable technical improvement over previous plans, 
specifically in the utilization of more sophisticated 
econometrics.14 However, there were inconsistencies in 
the numerical targets between sectors and sub-sectors. 
Sjahrir has argued (1987: 193), that these 
inconsistencies may have been due to the strong influence 
of the non-economic considerations in the plan's 
formulation.
The hopes that had emerged at the beginning of the 
Fourth Plan, however, were soon confronted with some hard 
realities and problems. These problems can be broadly 
categorized as internal and external problems. The 
internal problems related to departmental management,
According to Anderson (1985: 140), a long-standing 
scholar of Indonesian politics, this appointment should 
be read as General Murdani's move to take full control of 
the 'explosive mass-transmigration program in West-
xiie Centre for Policy Studies is a non-government 
research institute. Among the senior staff is Professor 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the 'guru' of the New Order's 
economist-technocrat group.
Department of Transmigration in 1983.13
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particularly the problem of the unspent budget that 
reflected the inefficiency of plan implementation. This 
problem was exacerbated by the gloomy prospects for world 
oil prices. These internal problems were first felt, 
according to the Minister, around the second year of 
Repelita TV. The external problems mostly related to 
criticisms from abroad, particularly on issues concerning 
the destruction of tropical forests and unfair treatment 
of the indigenous populations whose lands were allocated 
for transmigration.
Approaching the end of 1984, the Minister of
Transmigration asked Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo to
act as an adviser to the Minister on matters related to
program planning and internal management.15 Among the key
persons working for Sumitro was Harun Zain, the former
Minister for Manpower and Transmigration. One of the
elements of advice requested by the Minister related to
the problem of unspent budgets. A series of meetings and
interviews were conducted with several ministers who were
directly linked with the transmigration program, such as
Public Works, Interior, Population and Environment,
Forestry, and Food Production, the Governor of West
Kalimantan, and several Directors General. The report was
completed in April 1985 and submitted to the Minister. It
was considered 'a reconnaissance phase', and mainly
focused on the internal management of the transmigration
^  A source close to Professor Sumitro told the author 
(January 1988) that the request to employ Sumitro as an 
adviser on transmigration had come from President 
Suharto.
133
program (Redecon, 1985). The 'technocratic' nature of 
this report and its avoidance of more controversial 
issues, such as the influence of the strategic military 
interests on the policy, can be seen as major limitations 
to the value of the report as a basis for program 
improvement.
The external problems of transmigration 
implementation soared rapidly especially after the 
government decided to shift the geographic focus of the 
transmigration receiving areas to the eastern part of 
Indonesia, particularly to the border between Irian Jaya 
and PNG. Such a decision, for example, resulted in many 
technical, as well as social and political problems 
(Manning and Rumbiak, 1987: 71-82). Due to issues such as 
environmental degradation and the displacement of the 
indigenous population, international criticisms began to 
be heard against the transmigration policy in Indonesia. 
The World Bank, which for almost fifteen years had 
supported transmigration policy, also became the target 
of international criticism.16
In January 1985 a research team from Gajah Mada
University headed by Professor Mubyarto was asked by
Minister Martono to observe and report on transmigration
in Irian Jaya. Their observations were presented at a
seminar held at the Centre for Rural and Regional
1:6 For example, The Ecologist (No. 2/3, 1986) in 
collaboration with Survival International and Tapol, 
published a special issue which strongly criticised the 
transmigration program in Indonesia
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Studies, one of the research centres at Gajah Mada 
University. Among the issues raised during the seminar 
and subsequently highlighted by the press, was the need 
to revise and reschedule the transmigration target for 
Irian Jaya (Kompas, 8 February 1985). In addition to the 
potential social and political conflicts, the original 
transmigration target in Irian Jaya was considered to be 
economically unrealistic. However, in an apparent 
response to this criticism, after immediate consultation 
with the President, Minister Martono strongly emphasised 
that:
The transmigration target for Irian Jaya will 
not be reduced but will even be increased 
(Kompas, 26 February 1985).
Some observers felt, that:
Transmigration has become such a fetish with 
the President that cabinet members dare not try 
to persuade him to approve drastic changes to it. The premises and goals are non-negotiable. 
(Osborne, 1985: 25).
However, the program was drastically hit as oil 
prices collapsed in 1985-86. As a result, the government 
subsequently reduced the budget for transmigration by 44 
per cent in the 1986/87, and a further 65 per cent in the 
1987/88 fiscal years (Tempo, 16 January 1988). With the 
budget cut, the transmigration target seemed likely to be 
reduced considerably. This drastic reduction was 
described by Professor Mubyarto 'as the will of God'.17
17 This description was made by Professor Mubyarto at 
the 'Conference on Regional Economy in Indonesia' at ANU, 
Canberra, February 1987, at which the author was one of 
the participants.
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The substantial cuts in the government budget for 
the transmigration program had significantly reduced the 
government's capacity to continue the program. This was 
mainly because the cost per transmigrant family in the 
recent period had become very high. In 1983-84, for 
example, the cost per transmigrant family was approaching 
US$6,500, whereas at the beginning of Repelita I (1969- 
70) the cost per transmigrant family was only US$577 
(Arndt, 1983: 66).
As extensively reported in the press, since the 
budget cuts, many transmigration projects have had to be 
abandoned. On 24 November 1987 the Minister of 
Transmigration announced that 16,000 houses built for 
transmigration had been declared unusable, because the 
government had no money to send transmigrants (Kompas, 25 
November 1987).18 This set-back attracted many comments 
and criticisms. Some critics suggested that the 
transmigration program should be overhauled or the 
department downgraded to its original status as a 
directorate general.19 However, rumours surrounding the 
future of transmigration were dispelled when, in mid- 
March 1988, the President appointed Major General 
Soegiarto, a former Head of Social and Political Affairs 
in the Defense Department, as the Minister of
An unofficial source informed the author that the 
actual number was over 40,000 houses.
19 See: Tempo, 5 December 1987 ('Interview with Minister 
for Transmigration, Martono'), also, Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 29 October 1987 ('Indonesia: Resettlement 
rethink, the government overhauls its transmigration 
scheme').
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Transmigration.20 This appointment was further evidence 
that the economist-technocrat group had become less 
influential in the program, but it was also an indication 
that transmigration would retain an important role in the 
national scene for many years to come.
4.7. Repelita I to TV: Target Achievement and Its
Demographic Impact
During the four planning periods (Repelita I to TV) 
the central government substantially increased the 
transmigration target from less than 50,000 families in 
Repelita I to 750,000 families in Repelita TV. The 
sharpest increase occurred at the beginning of Repelita 
III in 1978/79, when 500,000 families were targeted to be 
resettled.
^Soegiarto,according to Anderson (1985: 142), was one 
of the 'stars' among the A.M.N. (Military Academy) Class 
of 1960. Recognition of Soegiarto as one among of the few 
'brilliant' generals was acknowledged by Goenawan 
Mohamad, editor in chief of Tempo magazine, in a personal 
communication to the author, 23 March 1988.
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Table 4.2
Repelita I-IV: Transmigrant Families Moved by Province of Orgin
Repelita I Repelita II Repelita III Repelita IV
1969/70-1973/4 1974/5-1978/9 1979/80 -1983/4 1984/5- 1988/9
Province ----
Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent
Jakarta 750 2 2. 405 4 4.412 1 2.937 1
West Java 4. 941 13 7.230 13 60.003 16 37,196 16
Central Java 10.966 29 20.148 37 96, 099 26 45.851 20
Yogyakarta 5.260 13 5,150 9 19.998 5 8. 950 4
East Java 12.044 31 15.390 28 93,314 25 44.512 19
Java 33.961 88 50.323 91 273,826 73 139.446 60
Bali 5. 100 13 3, 060 6 14,735 4 4.369 2
Nusa Tenggara
Barat 300 1 1. 700 3 12,718 3 4.236 2
Nusa Tenggara Timur 3.300 1
Lampung 787
APPDT 75 22,284 6 43.531 19
Resettlement 42.414 12 26,896 12
Relocation 5. 857 3
General
Transmigrants 39.436 100 55.083 100 365.977 100 228,422 100
Unassisted/Partly 
Assisted Transmigrants 7. 281 169, 497 521,728
Total 39. 436 62,364 535,474 750,150
Note: Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly.
§9VfV9f * As stated in the Presidential Address, 16 August 1985 (Departemen Penerengan RI, 
1985: XII/48-50) .
As stated in the Presidential Address, 16 August 1989 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 
1989: XII/692-5) ,
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Throughout the four plan periods (Table 4.2) the 
provinces of Central and East Java have always been the 
major sending areas for transmigration, followed by West 
Java and Yogyakarta. The share of transmigrants moving 
from the provinces of Yogyakarta, East Java and Bali 
declined steadily, while in the later years there was a 
sharp increase in the share of APPDT (Settlement 
Allocation for People of the Transmigration Area) and 
transmigrants under 'resettlement' schemes.21 The 
proportion of transmigrants categorised as APPDT or 
'resettlement' had been increased from about 2 0 per cent 
in the period of Repelita III to more than 30 per cent in 
Repelita IV period.
Beginning from Repelita III, both APPDT and 
'resettlement' have become important sources of general 
transmigrants. The central government has paid more 
attention to the local population as a source of general 
transmigrants partly because transmigration settlements 
often create resentments among the local population. In 
the eyes of the local population, the government has 
provided more facilities to the transmigrants than for 
the indigenous population. The APPDT scheme therefore
The 'resettlement' scheme was introduced at the 
beginning of Repelita III, initially to resettle the 
shifting cultivators who are mostly members of isolated 
tribes (suku terasing). The unstated reason behind this 
policy, according to Sayogyo (1989: 24) was to allow
private companies holding timber concessions to exploit 
timber in areas where isolated tribes resided. In the 
government statistics, however, other types of 
transmigrants were often included under this category. 
For instance, in Repelita III a number of general 
transmigrants who moved from unsuitable locations were 
counted in this category (Hardjono, 1986: 30).
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aimed to contain local resentment that might encourage 
larger regional dissatisfaction against the central 
government. Another consideration was economic: under 
strong pressure to meet the ambitious targets of Repelita 
III, the lower cost of recruiting of local people was 
attractive.
In Repelita IV, even though the number was small 
(787 families), Lampung began to be counted as a sending 
area for the transmigration program. This clearly proved 
that population pressure was a problem in Lampung. The 
earlier remarks of several scholars that Lampung had 
become 'another Java' are no longer just speculation.22 
Another notable development (Table 4.2) was the 
substantial contribution, starting in Repelita III, of 
unassisted/partly assisted transmigrants to the realised 
transmigration figure. In Repelita III, as shown in Table 
4.2, 169,497 families or 37 per cent of the total 
transmigrants were categorised as unassisted or partly 
assisted transmigrants. In Repelita IV, this proportion 
increased dramatically to 521,728 families, or 70 per 
cent of the total number of transmigrants moved in this 
period. Only 30 per cent (228,422 families) of the 
realised target were classified as general transmigrants. 
However, this low proportion of general transmigrants was 
not surprising because the transmigration program had 
experienced a drastic budget cut after 1986. In addition,
2 2 MasriSingarimbun commented on this development 
through his witty column entitled 'Kisah Lampung' ('The 
Story of Lampung') in Tempo, 20 December 1986.
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from the last years of Repelita III, formidable 
implementation problems had been encountered largely due 
to the selection of unsuitable land for settlement sites.
In many cases this had led to the abandonment of
settlements by transmigrants. In this context, and
bearing in mind the great pressures to indicate that the
transmigration targets had been reached, considerable
doubt must b<5 attached to the accuracy of the
unassisted/partly assisted transmigrant figures.
From the beginning of Repelita III it had been 
suggested that the western part of the archipelago, 
particularly Sumatra, was no longer a major destination 
for general transmigrants. However, the empirical 
evidence (Table 4.3) strongly suggests that such opinions 
were not correct. Over the four periods, Sumatra - and 
even Lampung - continued to absorb the major proportion 
of transmigrant families resettled under the fully 
supported transmigration program. From Repelita I to IV, 
the major change that occurred was the shift from 
Sulawesi to Kalimantan. While Sulawesi's role as a 
destination area declined from 28 per cent to 11 per 
cent, the proportion of transmigrants resettled in 
Kalimantan increased steadily from 14 per cent to 3 0 per
cent.
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Table 4.3
Repelita I-IV: General Transmigrant Families Moved, by Province of Destination
Repellta I Repelita II Repelita III Repelita IV
1969/70-1973/4 1974/5-■1978/9 1979/80-1983/4 1984/5- 1988/9
Province
Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent
Aceh 800 1 10.771 3 7.084 3
North Sumatra 200 500 1 8. 006 2 3. 651 2
West Sumatra 450 1 3. 950 7 7, 603 2 9. 185 4
Riau 500 1 662 1 37.522 10 27,300 12
Jambi 2. 450 6 10,362 19 16,682 5 19.737 9
South Sumatra 6,254 16 6. 598 12 91,340 25 24.446 11
Bengkulu 1. 300 3 3, 600 7 12.187 3 9.076 4
Lampung 11,397 29 4.500 8 42.876 12 17.893 9
Sumatra 22.551 56 30,972 56 227.047 62 118,372 54
West
Kalimantan
Central
952 2 2. 100 4 15.141 4 19.684 9
Kalimantan
South
1.253 3 700 1 28,221 8 17.907 8
Ka1imantan 
East
1,490 4 4,300 8 15.374 4 13,922 7
Ka1imantan 1. 775 5 3. 311 6 11.878 3 15.179 7
Kalimantan 5. 470 14 10.972 19 70.614 19 66,692 30
North
Sulawesi 1.060 3 950 2 4. 154 1 2. 811 1
Central
Sulawesi
South
3. 452 9 5. 700 10 15,740 4 10.441 5
Sulawesi
Southeast
4. 441 11 3. 300 6 3. 607 1 5. 325 2
Sulawesi 2, 012 5 3.250 6 19.225 5 7. 002 3
Sulawesi 10,965 28 13.200 24 42.726 11 25.579 11
Ma luku 350 1 200 7. 635 2 3.270 1
Irian Jaya 100 300 16.616 5 12.598 6
Nusa Tenggara Barat 1.289 977
East Timor 50 934
Total 39.436 100 55,083 100 365.977 100 228,422 100
Note: Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly.
Sovrces: As stated in the Presidential Address, 16 August 1985 (Departemen Penerangan RI,
1985: XII/4 9) .
As stated in the Presidential Address, 16 August 1989 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 
1989: XII/693).
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Table 4.4
Repellta I-IV: Average Annual Number of General Trasmigrants Moved as Percentage of Annual Population Increase in Selected Sending Areas (In Thousands)
Periods «Java Central Java East Java
Aver. Ann. Aver. Ann. Per Aver. Ann. Aver. Ann. Per Aver. Ann. Aver. Ann. Per
No.of Tran. Pop. Incr. Cent No.of Tran. Pop. Incr. Cent No.of Tran. Pop. Incr. Cent
RepelJta I 
1969/70-1973/4
34 1, 522 2 11 350 3 12 383 3
Repellts II 
1974/5-1978/9
50 1. 680 3 20 379 5 15 409 4
Repellta III 
1979/80-1983/4
274 1,578 17 96 308 31 93 354 26
Repelits IV 
1984/5-1988/9
139 1. 720 8 46 227 20 45 377 12
Notes: 1. Average Annual no. of transmigrants is calculated from table 4.2 assuming that
every transmigrant families consist of five persons (two parents and three children).
2- Average Annual Population Increase is calculated from table 2.2 in Hugo et al 
(1987: 42-43), assuming that for the period of Repellta I and II (1969-1978) 
population growth rate (per cent) approximately similar as 1971-1980 period, 
and for Repelits III and IV (1979-1988) similar as the growth during 1980-1985 
period (Hugo et al, 1987: 42-43).
Table 4.5
Repelita I-IV: Average Annual Number of General Trasmigrants Resettled as Percentage of Annual Population Increase in Selected Receiving Areas (In Thousands)
Sumat ra Kalimantan Sulawesi
Aver. Ann. 
No.of Tran.
Aver. Ann. 
Pop. Incr.
Per
Cent
Aver. 
No .of
Ann. 
Tran.
Aver. Ann. 
Pop. Incr.
Per
Cent
Aver. Ann. 
No.of Tran.
Aver. Ann. 
Pop. Incr.
Per
Cent
RepelJta I 23
1969/70-1973/4
689 3 5 155 3 11 180 6
RepelltM II 31
1974/5-1978/9
809 4 10 179 6 13 209 6
Repellts III 227
1979/80-1983/4
340 67 71 208 34 43 234 18
Repeats IV 118
1984/5-1988/9
397 30 67 240 28 26 261 10
Notes: As for table 4.4.
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The geographic shift of transmigration policy to 
Eastern Indonesia, especially to Irian Jaya, although the 
centre of international attention at the beginning of 
Repelita IV, was no longer an empirical issue by the end 
of the plan. The original plan in the beginning of 
Repelita TV to resettle 167,739 transmigrant families to 
Irian Jaya over five years (Hugo, Hull, Hull and Jones, 
1987: 184), had only been minimally realised.
The demographic impact of the transmigration 
program, particularly in the receiving areas has been 
estimated, among others by the World Bank (1989) based on 
the population projections proposed by Gardiner (1985). 
The World Bank estimation, however, is limited only to 
the receiving provinces and covers a rather long period 
of time (1971-1985). Tables 4.4 and 4.5 propose an 
alternative estimation of the demographic impact of the 
program in selected sending and receiving areas.
The alternative estimation is based on Tables 4.2 
and 4.3, particularly on the number of general 
transmigrant families achieved by the program during the 
four planning periods (Repelita I to Repelita IV) . This 
is a crude estimation, particularly because only the 
fully sponsored or general transmigrants are included. 
Other transmigrants (that is, swakarsa transmigrants) are 
disregarded. The numbers of transmigrants in Tables 4.4 
and 4.5 assume that each transmigrant family consists of 
5 persons (2 parents and 3 children). The average annual
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number of transmigrants in each Repelita is obtained by 
dividing the total number of transmigrants into five. The 
average annual population increases in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 
are derived from Table 4.2 in Hugo, Hull, Hull and Jones 
(1987: 42-43), on the assumption that the annual
population growth rate for the period of Repelita I and 
II (1969-1978) is similar to that between 1971 and 1980. 
The annual population growth rate between 1980-1985 is 
used for Repelita III and IV (1979-1988) . The annual 
population growth rate during those two periods is 
obtained from Hugo, Hull, Hull and Jones (1987, Table 
4.2: 42-43). This does not take into account the
discounted effect of net migration on population growth.
The contribution of the transmigration program in 
reducing the average annual population growth rates in 
the sending areas was very limited (mostly below 10 per 
cent), except for the Repelita III period (Table 4.4). 
During Repelita III, the transmigration program 
contributed a 17 per cent reduction to the average annual 
population increase in all of Java. In the same period, 
the impact was greater, however, in Central Java, where 
transmigration reduced the average annual population 
increase by almost one-third, and by over a quarter in 
East Java. However, as argued by Douglass in Jones and 
Visaria (eds.), forthcoming, although the hundreds of 
thousands of people who were sent to the Outer Islands 
each year did not reduce the absolute size of the 
population of Java, in many sending areas of Java the
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program was seen as a viable alternative to the prospects 
of landlessness and near-landlessness under increasing 
demographic pressure and further concentration of land 
ownership.
The contribution of the transmigration program to 
population growth in the receiving areas was less obvious 
during the first two Repelita periods. However, the 
program contribution increased drastically in Repelita 
III, especially in Sumatra where three-quarters of the 
average annual population increase came from the 
transmigration program. This also occurred to a lesser 
extent in Kalimantan and Sulawesi. During Repelita IV, as 
had been predicted, among other reasons because of the 
implementation problems, transmigration's contribution to 
population growth in the receiving areas was reduced by 
almost half from the previous period.
The real difficulty in estimating the true 
demographic impacts of the transmigration program stems 
from the lack of accurate data on the unassisted/partly 
assisted or swakarsa transmigrants. Although the central 
government claimed that 70 per cent of the realised 
target in Repelita IV was made up of unassisted/partly 
assisted transmigrants, detailed information is lacking 
on which part of Java (or Bali) they came from, and where 
they were resettled in the Outer Islands.
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This lack of information on the place of 
destination, as well as the precise numbers of the 
unassisted or partly assisted transmigrants, is hardly 
surprising. As noted by the World Bank (1988: 9):
Figures on unassisted movement are based mainly 
on information provided by sending provinces. 
It is uncertain whether all families who 
registered to move from those provinces 
actually did move or whether most families who 
moved also registered.
The World Bank (1988: 9), among others, was almost 
certain that the number quoted by the government sources 
underestimated the amount of spontaneous migration. The 
question, however, is whether those migrants can then be 
classified as transmigrants, unassisted or partly 
assisted. Such a question becomes significant because the 
government never formulated any policies specifically 
designed to deal with unassisted or swakarsa 
transmigrants. In 1978, for instance, Hardjono (1978b: 
60) stated that:
The government has given no elucidation of its 
expectation or hopes in the field of swakarsa 
transmigration beyond the statement that it 
should be teratur ("regulated") and besar- 
besaran ("on a large scale").
Apparently a decade after Hardjono made this 
comment, the policy on swakarsa transmigration has not 
shown any substantial changes.
The lack of a clear and detailed policy on swakarsa 
transmigration, surprisingly, was frankly admitted by the 
new Minister for Transmigration, Soegiarto, (Kompas, 28 
March 1988). One result of the lack of policy on swakarsa 
transmigration is the uncertainty of land status in their
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4.8. Summary and Conclusion
Even though the economist-technocrat group has 
played a significant role in rationalising the process of 
national development during the New Order, since the 
actual political power is largely controlled by the 
President and military elite, the policy outcomes have 
suffered from many inefficiencies and irrationalities. A 
close examination of the notion of transmigration from 
the beginning of the New Order until the end of the 
Fourth Plan shows that, although this policy was formally 
designed to redistribute the people from Java and Bali to 
other islands, this 'conventional' notion has been 
constantly changing due to circumstances as well as the 
ruling elites' perception and interest in the policy. The 
demographic motive for transmigration will remain, 
whatever the circumstances, primarily because uneven 
population distribution is self-evident and provides an 
immediate justification for the government. Yet, to 
analyse transmigration policy as if it were solely a 
demographic or economic endeavour would be naive and 
misleading.
new settlements. As reported by Kompas (7 December 1989) 
in Lampung, for example, around 3,500 swakarsa 
transmigrant families, some of whom had been there since 
1973, were being threatened with evacuation because the 
government planned to allocate the areas for plantations 
companies own privately by people in Jakarta.
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Since the beginning of the New Order, transmigration 
has become the target for various interest groups,
particularly the military, which has perceived 
transmigration as a vehicle for strategic goals such as 
national defense and security, and the economist- 
technocrats who have considered transmigration as a tool 
to promote the development of remote areas as well as to 
alleviate poverty in Java. However, the principal actor 
has been President Suharto himself. It was Suharto who in 
1966 saw the program as an important policy to solve the 
population problems of Java.
At the beginning of the New Order development 
policy, population distribution was regarded by the 
economist-technocrats, such as Widjojo, as a low 
priority. The fact that the President himself paid 
personal attention to the matter made it impossible for 
rational technocrats to remove the program from the 
national development policy. It therefore became an 
obligation for the economist-technocrats to develop 
arguments to legitimate the program. They found this in 
the notion of regional development. From the First 
through the Fourth Five-Year Development Plans, 
transmigration was described as a government policy to 
resolve the problem of population distribution and to 
enhance the regional development of the Outer Islands. 
The strategic goal of transmigration for national 
integration and security, hardly surprisingly, was not 
always fully articulated.
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Transmigration policy was revitalized when revenue 
rapidly increased as a result of the oil boom and further 
flourished as foreign donor agencies, particularly the 
World Bank, became deeply involved in assisting the 
program. Plan documents show that the program has become 
an important strategy for the achievement of a wide range 
of development goals. However, the declaration of 
explicit targets in plan documents primarily reflects 
bureaucratic procedures in relation to the projected 
availability of resources and budgets. Numerical targets 
were not based on any specific economic or demographic 
considerations. The elusive and multifaceted goals of the 
policy and the constant changes in implementing agencies 
were strong indications that the program had never been 
carefully monitored and evaluated. Furthermore, the 
unavoidable rivalry and conflicts between the economist- 
technocrats who viewed the program mainly as an element 
in regional development, and the political bureaucrats, 
such as Martono, who were close to the military with its 
strategic interests, have undoubtedly distorted plan 
formulation as well as implementation. In this situation, 
the World Bank, which in the beginning saw transmigration 
as a means to promote commercial tree-crop cultivation, 
could not avoid the pressure to use transmigration policy 
as a primary tool for distributing people from Java and 
Bali to the other islands. The crisis in transmigration 
since the middle of the Fourth Plan, although mainly a 
direct result of the drastic budget cutback, has also
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been a consequence of overly-ambitious target setting and 
the heavily political element in the program's 
formulation.
Observing particularly the realization of plan 
target numbers from Repelita I to IV, the number of 
families resettled under transmigration policy was 
drastically increased since the beginning of Repelita 
III. However, the number of families resettled with full 
support from the government declined substantially during 
Repelita IV period. Interestingly, the government has 
claimed that the target number was realized. A large
proportion of the resettled families, however, were
classified as spontaneous transmigrants, though the
statistics are doubtful. On the question of the
geographical destination of transmigration policy, 
throughout the period of the four Repelita, Sumatra and 
to a smaller extent Kalimantan and Sulawesi, were still 
dominants as the transmigration receiving areas. The 
demographic impact of transmigration particularly in 
reducing the growth of population in Java was almost 
negligible, except in Repelita III when the budget for 
the program was abundant. Transmigration had significant 
demographic impact on the receiving areas, especially 
during Repelita III, particularly in Sumatra and to a 
lesser extent Kalimantan and Sulawesi. The government 
intention to shift the geographic focus of transmigration 
policy to the eastern islands, in particular to Irian 
Jaya, has largely failed as the transmigration policy has
151
been confronted with severe financial difficulties since 
1985-86 .
Since transmigration inevitably has a bearing on a 
broad range of regional interests, the role of the 
regional governments in shaping program performance 
presumably should have been considerable, especially in 
the areas designated by the central government as 
receiving areas. In the next chapters the implementation 
of transmigration policy in the provinces of Riau and 
South Kalimantan will be examined.
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Chapter V
RIAU AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN: TWO REGIONS 
AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
This chapter provides a description of the 
geographic and socio-demographic settings as well as the 
economic and political aspects of the provinces of Riau 
and South Kalimantan. The aim of this chapter is to show 
the relationship of Riau and South Kalimantan with the 
Central Government in Jakarta.
5.1. Geographic Setting 
Riau
Riau is a huge province (see Figure 5.1). In terms of 
land area it is the sixth largest province in Indonesia 
(nearly 95,000 square kilometres). Its size is increased 
by the expanse of littoral sea which lies between the 
eastern-central coast of Sumatra and the western coast of 
Kalimantan. This sea covers some 235,300 square 
kilometres and contains more than 3,200 islands. Riau is 
commonly divided into two regions: mainland Riau (Riau 
daratan), the land mass belonging to Sumatra including 
its off-shore islands, and island Riau (Riau kepulauan), 
the sea area with its numerous islands. A prominent 
physical feature of Riau is the predominance of rivers.
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Most rivers originate from the Bukit Barisan mountain 
range in central Sumatra, and flow eastward to the coast. 
Among the dozens of rivers intersecting Riau, four are 
most important. They are, from north to south, the Rokan, 
Siak, Kampar and Kuantan-Indragiri rivers. In mainland 
Riau, the population lives mainly along the rivers, 
whereas in island Riau the population is concentrated 
along the coast.
The geographic position of Riau which is located on 
the boundary with other countries (Singapore, Malaysia 
and Vietnam) , as well as its archipelagic nature, has 
made this province vulnerable to outside influences. In 
this context, transmigration settlements, particularly in 
the Natuna Islands was intended by the central government 
to form 'a security belt' in strengthening national 
defense. From the strategic and military point of view, 
Riau province, has therefore become an important region.
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FIGURE 5.2 SOUTH KALIMANTAN PROVINCE
S o u r c e :  A d o p t e d  f r o m  P o t t e r  a n d  H a s y m i  ( 1 9 8 7 )
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South Kalimantan
South Kalimantan, on the other hand, is one of the 
smaller provinces (37,000 square kilometres) and by far 
the smallest of the four provinces into which Kalimantan, 
the largest island in Indonesia, is now divided (see 
Figure 5.2). Its topography is almost entirely flat, with 
only a small area of mountainous and hilly country in the 
eastern part of the province. The flatness is such that 
the Barito river, the largest river, is navigable 100 
kilometres upstream, rising only 0.5 metres over that 
distance. The Barito with its tributaries, connects the 
south and north of the province. Banjarmasin, the 
capital, is at sea level and the high tide regularly 
floods part of the city and surrounding country. More 
than half of the area of one million hectares under 
swamps and lakes is influenced by tide water.
South Kalimantan may conveniently be divided into 
three regions: the western lowlands; a central region of
foothills and mountain country; and the eastern lowlands. 
The western lowlands comprises the lower reaches of the 
Barito river and its southern tributary, the Martapura, 
and the floodplain of another tributary, the Negara. 
Bordering the western foothills of the Meratus mountains 
is a strip of alluvial soil which comprises the most 
fertile area for rice production, and is thus the most 
heavily populated rural district. It contains the 
important towns of Barabai and Kandangan, in the district
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of Hulu Sungai Tengah and Hulu Sungai Selatan, and Rantau 
in the district of Tapin. The western foothills region 
has been exploited, mainly by shifting cultivation 
methods, for over a century. Parts of the foothills have 
long been under smallholder rubber in the northern 
district of Tabalong and Hulu Sungai Utara. In the most 
southern district of Tanah Laut, where grassland is most 
extensive, much scope exists for livestock development. 
Along the southern and eastern edges of the mountains, 
human occupation has been more recent. The eastern 
lowlands, occupied by one district, Kota Baru, constitute 
South Kalimantan's 'frontier zone'.
5.2. Socio-demographic Aspects
Riau
In 1985 the population of Riau was over 2.6 million, 
an increase of almost half a million from the 1980 figure 
(Table 5.1). The rate of population growth in Riau 
increased from 3.1 per cent in the period 1971-1980, to 
3.9 per cent in 1980-1985. The rate of growth during the 
period of 1971-1980 was considerably above the national 
level (2.3 per cent). The most rapid population growth 
since 1971 has occurred in the regencies which were the 
main recipients of transmigrants. Kampar district has 
drastically increased from 3.8 per cent (1971-1980) to 
7.8 per cent (1980-1985). Bengkalis has also steadily 
increased from 3.2 per cent (1971-1980) to 4.5 per cent
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(1980-1985). While the rate of population growth in 
Indragiri Hulu has risen remarkably from only 1.7 per 
cent (1971-1980) to 5.5 per cent (1980-1985), Indragiri 
Hilir, on the other hand, has dropped from 3.7 per cent 
(1971-1980) to 1.4 per cent (1980-1985). This rapid drop 
was probably due to the shift in transmigration policy 
since the early '80s, from low land (pasang-surut) such 
as Indragiri, to dry-land like Indragiri Hulu and Kampar. 
The rate of population growth of Pekanbaru, the 
provincial capital of Riau, over the periods, 
interestingly, was much lower than some of these more 
rural regencies.
Table 5.1
Riau: Population, 1971-1985;
Average Annual Growth 
and Population
Rate, 1971-1980, 1980 
Density by District
-1985;
District
Population ( 
1971 1980
'000)
1985
Growth
(Per
71-80
Rate
Cent)
80-85
Persons 
per sq km 
1985
Pekanbaru 145 186 207 2.8 2.1 3,293
Kampar 259 363 529 3.8 7.8 19
Bengkalis 424 567 602 3.2 4.5 23
Indragiri
Hilir 286 398 427 3.7 1.4 37
Indragiri
Hulu 197 229 299 1.7 5.5 19
Kepulauan
Riau 331 425 465 2.8 1.8 58
Total 1,642 2,169 2,623 3.1 3.9 28
Sources: Harlen (1986: 17).
Kantor Statistik Riau (1986: 64 & 68).
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In terms of population composition, Riau is a mosaic 
of ethnic groups. This is somewhat unusual among 
Indonesian provinces, where a particular cultural 
identity tends to be closely associated with each region. 
For Riau, no single cultural identification is possible, 
except for a loose application of the term Melayu (Kato, 
1984). Over its history, Riau has been exposed to 
successive waves of population movement. Being situated 
in the centre of Sumatra, along the straits of Malacca, 
the area has long been a meeting place for different 
cultures and relatively receptive to outside influences.
The most important distinct immigrant ethnic group 
in Riau is the Minangkabau, who have migrated from West 
Sumatra over several centuries. Early Minangkabau 
migrants settled mainly on the eastern flank of the Bukit 
Barisan mountain range (Naim, 1979). Recent Minangkabau 
migrants mostly reside in urban areas. More recent 
migrants from North Sumatra include Christian Bataks as 
well as Moslem Tapanuli Mandailings. They have also 
generally settled in urban centres. Banjarese from South 
Kalimantan and Buginese from South Sulawesi have been in 
contact with island Riau for centuries, but it was mainly 
after the late nineteenth century that they began to 
establish communities of their own and to put down roots 
in mainland Riau. Pioneers in this development were the 
Banjarese, who settled in the present district of 
Indragiri Hilir. According to Hamidy (1981: 2-6), about
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45 per cent of the population in this district are 
Banjarese. In some districts, such as Tembilahan and 
Kuala Indragiri, the Banjarese account for almost 70 per 
cent of the population. Buginese migrants have also 
established some villages in Indragiri Hilir and there 
are Buginese living in island Riau as seafarers.
Riau has the largest number of so-called suku 
terasing (isolated tribes) in Sumatra. These include the 
Sakai, Talang Mamak, Bonai, Akit, Hutan and Laut. 
According to government estimates, in 1985 their total 
number was 32,058 persons in 7,140 households (Kantor 
Statistik Riau, 1986). Another ethnic group is the 
Chinese, who are concentrated in cities and large towns 
of both mainland and island Riau. However, it is not 
unusual in island Riau for Chinese to live in villages, 
where they sometimes form a majority of inhabitants. The 
Javanese who now live in Riau arrived in several waves. 
Many came to work as labourers on European estates during 
the Dutch period. Later, during the Japanese occupation, 
many were brought over as romusha or forced labourers to 
work on Japanese military construction projects. Recent 
Javanese settlers have come to Riau on government 
sponsored transmigration programs as transmigrants. 
Despite the diversity of ethnic groups who live in Riau, 
if there are any cultural elements that give some 
coherence to the society, they are religion and, to a 
lesser extent, language (Kato, 1984). Except for most of 
the Chinese, Christian Bataks and isolated tribes, almost
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all the inhabitants of Riau are Moslems. As for language, 
the Melayu Riau, from which the national language, Bahasa 
Indonesia, is derived, is the lingua franca of Riau.
Unfortunately, recent population censuses do not 
provide information on ethnicity so it is impossible to 
obtain precise data on the ethnic composition of Riau. 
Nevertheless, the information on place of birth or 
previous place of residence can be used as a rough proxy 
for ethnic identification if it is assumed that the place 
of birth or previous place of residence indicates an 
individual's ethnic group. For example, a person who was 
born or resided in West Sumatra can be assumed to be a 
Minangkabau, and a person who was born or previously last 
resided in Java can be assumed to be a Javanese.
In the 1980 population census two definitions of 
migrants are used: 'lifetime migrants' and 'recent 
migrants'. Lifetime migrants were those persons whose 
places of residence in 1980 were different from their 
places of birth. Thus, persons residing in Riau in 1980, 
but whose place of birth was not Riau, are defined as 
lifetime in-migrants to the province. Conversely, those 
whose place of birth was Riau, but whose place of 
residence in 1980 was another province, are defined as a 
lifetime out-migrants from Riau. Recent in-migrants to 
Riau were defined as persons whose residence in 1980 was 
Riau but whose places of residence five years before the 
census was a province other than Riau, whereas recent
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out-migrants were persons whose place of residence five 
years before the time of the census was Riau, but whose 
place of residence at the census was another province.
Table 5.2
Life Time In-Migration to, and Life Time Out-Migration
from the Province of Riau, 1980.
Provinces In Out Net-migration
Aceh 3,766 923 2,843
North Sumatra 42,346 12,576 29,770
West Sumatra 117,200 24,988 92,212
Jambi 4,541 11,931 -7,390
South Sumatra 6,538 3,606 2,932
Bengkulu 377 566 -189
Lampung 577 1,047 -470
Jakarta 5,657 14,662 -9,010
West Java 9,361 56 4,305
Central Java 41,921 3,370 38,551
Yogyakarta 1,792 1,409 383
East Java 47,091 2,759 44,332
Bali 200 253 -53
West Nusa Tenggara 410 165 245
East Nusa Tenggara 1,451 60 1,391
West Kalimantan 845 1,181 -336
Central Kalimantan 137 193 -56
South Kalimantan 3,689 219 3,470
East Kalimantan 56 152 -96
North Sulawesi 1,116 328 838
Central Sulawesi 501 48 453
South Sulawesi 51,739 721 51,018
Southeast Sulawesi 981 175 806
Maluku 578 131 447
Irian Jaya 39 21 18
East Timor 65 0 65
Other Countries 10,170 0 10,170
Don't Know 3,078 0 3,078
Total 356,272 85,540 269,723
Percentage of
Total Population 16 4 12
Source; Harlen (1986: 50)
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Table 5.2 shows that the largest proportion (33 per 
cent) of total life-time in-migrants to Riau were born in 
West Sumatra, followed by those born in South Sulawesi 
(15 per cent), East Java (13 per cent), North Sumatra (12 
per cent) , and Central Java (12 per cent) . If it is 
assumed that the province of birth is an indicator of 
ethnicity, then the Minangkabau are the dominant migrant 
ethnic group in Riau, followed by the Javanese, Buginese 
and Bataks. Table 5.3 shows that recent in-migrants were 
also dominated by migrants from West Sumatra (34 per 
cent), followed by North Sumatra (19 per cent), East Java 
(12 per cent) and Central Java (8 per cent). Most of the 
recent Javanese in-migrants, who constituted almost 25 
per cent of the total, were probably transmigrants, since 
the transmigration target for Riau at the beginning of 
Repelita III (1978/79) had been drastically increased to 
50,000 families, more than ten times the target of the 
previous period.
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Table 5.3
Recent In-Migration to, and Recent Out-Migration from the
Province of Riau, 1980
Provinces In Out Net-migration
Aceh 680 647 33
North Sumatra 18,699 6,663 12,036
West Sumatra 33,786 21,819 11,967
Jambi 3,227 5,897 -2,670
South Sumatra 2,011 1,873 138
Bengkulu 244 248 -4
Lampung 475 912 -437
Jakarta 4,947 6,249 -1,302
West Java 3,524 2,718 806
Central Java 7,627 1,915 5,352
Yogyakarta 654 808 -154
East Java 11,754 2,241 9,513
Bali 100 19 81
West Nusa Tenggara 103 78 25
East Nusa Tenggara 258 124 134
West Kalimantan 140 294 -154
Central Kalimantan 41 0 41
South Kalimantan 167 0 167
East Kalimantan 170 114 56
North Sulawesi 167 151 16
Central Sulawesi 41 41 0
South Sulawesi 5,277 847 4,430
Southeast Sulawesi 120 99 21
Maluku 96 0 96
Irian Jaya 0 0 0
East Timor 43 0 43
Other Countries 218 0 218
Don't Know 4,443 0 4,443
Total 98,652 53,757 44,895
Percentage of
Total Population 5 3 2
Source: Harlen (1986: 52)
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South Kalimantan
In 1986 the population of South Kalimantan was over 
2.3 million, a rise of about 600,000 over the 1980 census 
figure (Table 5.4). Average growth rates have been 
moderate, around 2 per cent a year over the period, 
considerably below those of the neighbouring provinces 
and Kalimantan as a whole. The 1980 census figures 
covering the previous five years reveal a small negative 
net-migration balance overall, but a slight positive flow 
to rural areas, which would include most transmigrants. 
At the district level, there was considerable variation 
in the rate of population growth during 1971-1986 period. 
A remarkable population increase was experienced in the 
District of Kotabaru, from 3.2 per cent (1971-1980) to 
6.6 per cent (1980-1986). The reason for such a dramatic 
increase was no doubt that this region had become the 
focus of transmigration settlements. During Repelita III 
in South Kalimantan province around 17,000 transmigrants 
families had been resettled, and the target was increased 
to 50,000 for Repelita IV. The rate of population growth 
in Tanah Laut, which was the highest in South Kalimantan 
during 1971-1980 (5.2 per cent) declined slightly during
the period 1980-1986 (4.4 per cent). Constant low rates
of population growth occurred in the 'inner regions' such 
as Hulu Sungai Selatan, Hulu Sungai Tengah, Hulu Sungai 
Utara, and Tabalong. The low rate of population growth in 
those regencies was probably due to out-migration, in 
many cases outside the province.
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Table 5.4
South Kalimantan: Population, 1971-1986; 
Average Annual Growth Rate, 1971-1980, 1980-1986; 
and Population Density by District
Population ('000) Growth Rate Persons 
District ----------------------  (Per Cent) per sq km
1971 1980 1986 71-80 80-86 1986
Banjarmasin 282 381 433 3.4 2.1 6009
Tanah Laut 78 123 159 5.2 4.4 74
Kotabaru 145 194 285 3.2 6.6 23
Banj ar 285 348 391 2.2 2 63
Barito Kuala 128 170 201 3.2 2.8 61
Tapin 84 109 120 2.8 1.6 52
Hulu Sungai 
Selatan 166 176 180 0.7 0.4 106
Hulu Sungai 
Tengah 196 200 208 0.2 0.6 141
Hulu Sungai 
Utara 221 240 253 0.9 0.9 91
Tabalong 115 125 135 0.9 1.3 34
Total 1, 473 1, 699 2 ,364 2.2 2.3 64
Sources: Djohansyah (1986: 18).
Kantor Statistik Kalimantan Selatan 
(1987: 60-61).
The dominant ethnic group in South Kalimantan is the 
Banjarese. South Kalimantan is sometimes referred to as 
the Banjarese heartland. The Banjarese are in fact a 
mixture of the indigenous population (the Dayaks), 
refugee Malays, who migrated after the downfall of 
Melaka, and the Javanese, who fled Demak after the attack 
of Sultan Agung of Mataram (Saleh, 1962: 17). The 
manifestation of such a mixture is also seen in the 
Banjarese language which is a patois of Malay, Javanese
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and indigenous languages. The penetration of Javanese 
into the Banjarese culture can also be seen from the 
Banjarese aristocratic status and associated language 
patterns, organizational arrangements, food, dances and 
costumes (Saleh, 1962:62).
The Banjarese, like the Minangkabau and the Bugis, 
have a high propensity to move. Traditionally they have 
migrated to Sumatra, Malaysia, Java and Maluku. In the 
1930 census about 13 per cent of the Banjarese were 
counted outside South Kalimantan, most of these in 
Sumatra (9.6 per cent) and the Malay peninsula (2.5 per 
cent) (Basri, 1988). Naim (1979), based on the 1930 
census and his own survey, argued that, in contrast with 
the Minangkabaus, the volume of Banjarese out-migration 
has been gradually declining.
Basri (1988) argued that Banjarese migrants are 
economically conservative because the majority of them 
continue to work in agriculture, as in their homeland. 
The majority of Banjarese migrants in North Sumatra, 
Riau, Jambi and Malaysia are padi (rice) farmers and 
rubber or coconut plantation owners, with only a few 
working as labourers. A large number of the Banjarese who 
migrated to Sumatra originated from the regencies of Hulu 
Sungai, Kandangan, Barabai and Tanjung (Basri, 1988: 48). 
The first waves of Banjarese who migrated from South 
Kalimantan were motivated by political considerations
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after their defeat by the Dutch. However, their success 
in opening new lands attracted more movement and formed 
chains of migration which persist today.
The Dayaks are concentrated in the regencies of Hulu 
Sungai Utara, Tabalong and Barito Kuala, whereas the 
Bugis migrants from South Sulawesi have formed 
communities in the district of Kotabaru. The Javanese and 
Madurese, who mostly migrated under government 
assistance, are settled in a variety of small 
transmigration areas, particularly in the Regencies of 
Barito Kuala, Tanah Laut and Kotabaru. Tribal groups 
(suku terasing) are scattered in remote areas, such as in 
the Regencies of Tanah Laut, Tapin, Hulu Sungai Selatan 
and Tabalong. Most of them still practice shifting 
cultivation (ladang berpindah), as well as hunting and 
gathering. The government estimated their number in 1983 
at almost 30,000 persons. Apart from tribal groups and 
the Chinese, the majority of the population in South 
Kalimantan are Moslem. According to Saleh (1962), Islam 
was brought and spread through traders and Islamic 
leaders from Demak on the north shore of Central Java.
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Table 5.5
Life Time In-Migration to, and Life Time Out-Migration 
from the Province of South Kalimantan, 1980
Provinces In Out Net-migration
Aceh 538 225 313
North Sumatra 2,387 1,526 861
West Sumatra 1,069 190 879
Riau 219 3,689 -3,470
Jambi 169 2,541 -2,372
South Sumatra 1,392 1,421 -29
Bengkulu 23 43 -20
Lampung 109 1,229 -1,120
Jakarta 1,863 10,981 -9,118
West Java 11,714 4,905 6,809
Central Java 30,807 4,229 26,578
Yogyakarta 3,289 1,124 2,165
East Java 59,528 12,986 46,542
Bali 246 220 26
West Nusa Tenggara 331 401 -70
East Nusa Tenggara 278 186 89
West Kalimantan 1,167 1,377 -210
Central Kalimantan 12,046 78,536 -66,490
East Kalimantan 4,676 39,932 -35,256
North Sulawesi 536 605 -69
Central Sulawesi 403 421 -18
South Sulawesi 9,271 1,973 7,298
Southeast Sulawesi 168 103 65
Maluku 302 524 -222
Irian Jaya 45 191 -146
Total 142,576 169,561 -26,985
Percentage of
Total Population 6.9 8.2 -1.3
Source: Djohansyah (1986: 60)
Net migration for South Kalimantan has been negative 
in recent censuses. In 1971, 66,119 persons were lifetime 
in-migrants, comprising 4 per cent of the population. The 
lifetime out-migrants based on 1971 census were 84,257 
persons or 5 per cent of the population born in South 
Kalimantan. By 1980, lifetime in-migration had increased
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to almost 7 per cent, and lifetime out-migration to 8.2 
per cent. The main destinations for lifetime out-migrants 
from South Kalimantan, in 1971 and 1980, were Central and 
East Kalimantan, followed at a considerable distance by 
East Java and Jakarta (Table 5.5).
Table 5.6
Recent In-Migration to, and Recent Out-Migration from the 
Province of South Kalimantan, 1980
Provinces In Out Net-migration
Aceh 128 106 22
North Sumatra 939 224 715
West Sumatra 248 0 248
Riau 0 167 -167
Jambi 104 123 -19
South Sumatra 391 186 205
Bengkulu 74 0 74
Lampung 90 809 -719
Jakarta 2,018 3,173 -1,155
West Java 8,753 1,216 7,537
Central Java 11,815 1,761 10,054
Yogyakarta 2,083 697 1,386
East Java 20,597 4,246 16,351
Bali 72 24 48
West Nusa Tenggara 293 138 155
East Nusa Tenggara 142 168 -26
West Kalimantan 338 299 39
Central Kalimantan 6,752 17,871 -11,119
East Kalimantan 2,876 13,324 -10,448
North Sulawesi 87 58 29
Central Sulawesi 51 116 -05
South Sulawesi 1,818 1,181 637
Southeast Sulawesi 0 122 -122
Maluku 0 22 -22
Irian Jaya 0 30 -30
Total
Percentage of
59,669 46,061 13,608
Total Population 3.4 2.6 0.8
Source: Djohansyah (1986: 66)
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The main reason for out migration from South 
Kalimantan is economic. East Kalimantan in particular has 
offered many employment opportunities in logging as well 
as in oil exploration activities since the early 1970s. A 
large proportion of migrants to Central Kalimantan 
probably moved as a result of the government decision in 
1957 to separate that area from South Kalimantan to form 
a new province (Djohansyah, 1986: 61) . As a conseguence 
of this decision, many public servants had to move to new 
offices in Central Kalimantan. The three Hulu Sungai and 
Tabalong Regencies were traditionally the main source 
areas for migrants, partly because these areas offered 
very limited employment and income-earning opportunities. 
The relatively high population densities in those areas 
had strained employment opportunities in the agricultural 
sector. A Bappeda Kalimantan Selatan (1984: 62-63) 
report, moreover, indicated that only limited amounts of 
capital had been invested in industries in these 
regencies.
The main sources of lifetime migrants to South 
Kalimantan - East Java, Central Java and South Sulawesi - 
remained unchanged between 1971 and 1980. Migrants from 
East and Central Java were mostly transmigrants. In 1980, 
3.4 per cent of the population were recent in-migrants, 
whereas recent out-migrants comprised 2.6 per cent. The 
majority of recent in-migrants to South Kalimantan came 
from East Java and Central Java, most of them apparently 
residing in rural areas as transmigrants. Most recent
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out-migrants from South Kalimantan mainly went to Central 
and East Kalimantan (Table 5.6).
5.3. Economic and Political Factors
Riau
The economy of Riau, in general, can be divided into 
three broad categories (Table 5.7). The first is the 
rural or traditional sector, in which more than 60 per 
cent of the labour force in Riau is engaged, and where 
agriculture is the main activity. Even though Riau has 
set self-sufficiency in food as a goal, since most of the 
land is unsuitable for rice, self sufficiency is likely 
to be achieved only in the distant future (Rice, 1987: 3- 
4). The second category is the urban or modern sector, in 
which around 3 0 per cent of the labour force in Riau is 
primarily involved, in such activities as trading, 
manufacturing, and services. The third category is an 
'enclave' centred on the oil industry and located around 
Dumai and Duri. Even though only a small proportion of
the labour force (10 per cent) is employed in this
enclave, more than 75 per cent of the Gross Domestic
Regional Product (GDRP) of Riau is generated from this
sector (Table 5.8). Most revenues from the enclave sector 
are collected directly by the central government, which 
controls exploitation of mineral resources.
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Table 5.7
Riau: Employment Structure, 1971, 1980 and 1985
Male Female Total
1971 1980 1985 1971 1980 1985 1971 1980 1985
Total Economic Active 
Pop. ('000) 409 314 592 140 173 241 550 687 833
Primary Sector
Agriculture 64 57 52 75 69 55 67 60 53
Secondary Sector
Mining 3 4 2 1 1 0 2 3 2
Industry/ 
Manufacture 6 5 4 2 5 4 5 5 4
Electricity, Gas 
Water Supply 0
&
0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
Construction 2 4 5 0 0 0 1 3 3
Tertiary Sector
Trade 8 9 10 5 10 14 7 9 11
Transport. & 
Communication 3 4 5 0 0 0 3 3 4
Financial 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Publ.Service 10 14 15 7 14 16 9 14 15
Others 4 0 0 11 0 0 6 0 0
Not Stated 1
Total 10C) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly.
Sources: Harlen (1986: 62)
Biro Pusat Statistik (1986)
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Table 5.8
Riau: Percentage Distribution of Regional Gross Domestic 
Product by Sector (Current Prices), 1983, 1985
1983 1985
Sectors
Excl.Oil Incl.Oil Excl.Oil Incl.Oil
Agriculture 29 4 27 5
Food Crops 15 2 14 3
Plantation Crops 5 1 5 1
Livestock 2 0 2 0
Fishery 5 1 4 1
Forestry 2 0 2 0
Mining & Quarrying 7 85 8 77
Industry/Manufact. 7 3 7 5
Electricity, Gas & 
Water Supply 1 0 1 0
Trade, Hotel & 
Restaurants 27 4 26 7
Trade 26 4 25 7
Hotel 0 0 0 0
Restaurant 1 1 0
Transportation & 
Communication 11 1 11 2
Road Transport. 5 1 5 1
Sea Transport. 4 0 4 1
Air Transport. 0 0 0 0
Communication 2 0 2 0
Banking & Finance 1 0 1 0
Housing (Rent) 6 1 7 1
Admin. & Defence 6 1 7 1
Services 1 0 2 0
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
GDP Per Capita 
(Rp'000) 403 3,129 505 2,658
Note: Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly. 
Source: Kantor Statistik Riau (1987).
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The ethnic diversity of Riau's population, along 
with its fragmented economy, has resulted in a fragile 
social and political cohesiveness. The Malays, who 
considered themselves to be the indigenous population and 
the 'owners' of the region, have felt disadvantaged in 
relation to the in-migrants, in particular the 
Minangkabau. The influx of Javanese transmigrants since 
the New Order has increased their frustration. The 
position of governor has always been held by a non-Malay, 
usually a Javanese military general, during the New 
Order. The strategic position of Riau has been one of the 
reasons for this central government choice.
In 1985, however, the central government candidate, 
Lieutenant General Imam Munandar, a Javanese, was 
defeated by Ismail Suko, a local born Malay, in the DPRD 
(Provincial People's Representative Council) election for 
governor. Although in the end Ismail Suko withdrew his 
name and the President appointed Imam Munandar, this 
event reflected the undercurrent of regional resentment 
toward the overwhelming central government domination. 
Local discontent, which seemed more prominent among Malay 
intellectuals, was also exacerbated by the fact that the 
wealth of Riau's natural resources, particularly oil, had 
been 'sucked-up' by the central government.
x Interview with a senior lecturer at University of 
Riau, December 1987.
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According to a Kompas correspondent in Pekanbaru, 
the governor of Riau, Imam Munandar, knew very little 
about the situation inside the provincial government 
office. It was suggested that he probably did not even 
know the names of his Section Heads. In Indonesia it is 
usually necessary to have personal contact in order to 
conduct business with the governor. The ultimate approval 
of sectoral projects in Riau would be very much 
determined by whether or not the Head of Regional Offices 
(Kanwil) had a close personal relationship with the 
governor. Where sectoral projects had been personally 
approved by the governor, sectoral agencies would be able 
to implement and control them without consulting 
Bappeda.2 The impression that Bappeda in Riau had been 
neglected by the sectoral line agencies was expressed by 
one of the Dean in the University of Riau in Pekanbaru.3
South Kalimantan
In contrast with Riau (and other 'boom' provinces, 
such as East Kalimantan), South Kalimantan is a non-oil 
economy. This has a beneficial side, in that South 
Kalimantan has not experienced any of the extreme 
fluctuations that have hit the oil-rich areas. A recent 
survey on the regional economy of Indonesia classified 
South Kalimantan as one of the 'Settled Outer Island 
Provinces' (Hill, 1989: 4). The traditional sectors,
particularly agriculture, continue to dominate the
2 Interview,December 1987.
Interview, December 1987.
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economy. Although, from the early 1970s, the proportion 
of the labour force employed in agriculture has been 
decreasing, during the 1980s around 60 per cent of the 
labour force has remained primarily involved in this 
sector (Table 5.9). The proportion of the labour force 
engaged in the secondary and tertiary sectors, 
particularly in industry and manufacturing, increased 
slightly during the 1970s and 1980s. Since the mid 1980s, 
as the world oil price has declined, the Central 
Government has strongly encouraged non-oil exports. A 
major part of this effort has involved the export of 
plywood, which is mainly produced in South Kalimantan. 
Agriculture and trade have also contributed significantly 
to the economy of South Kalimantan, providing 31 and 26 
per cent respectively of the total Gross Domestic 
Regional Product (GDRP) in 1985 (Table 5.10). A further 
breakdown of the agricultural sector shows that food- 
crops contributed about 17 per cent of the total GDRP, 
while manufacturing contributed about 9 per cent.
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Table 5.9
South Kalimantan: Employment Structure 1971, 1980 and
1985
Male Female Total
1971 1980 1985 1971 1980 1985 1971 1980 1985
Total Economically
Active Population ('000)
401 476 563
Primary Sector
Agriculture 66 56 57
Secondary Sector
Mining 1 2 0
Industry/ 
Manufact. 4 6 5
Electricity, Gas & 
Water Supply 0 0 0
Construction 1 3 3
Tertiary Sector
Trade 9 12 10
Transportations 
Communication 4 4 2
Financial 0 1 0
Publ. Serv. 12 15 15
Others 2 0 0
Not Stated
187 255 362 589 731 925
77 68 61 70 60 59
0 1 0 1 2 0
4 8 9 4 7 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 2 2
10 14 14 9 12 11
0 0 16 2 2 2
0 0 0 0 1 0
5 9 7 10 13 12
4 0 0 3 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly.
Sources: Djohansyah (1986: 83),
Biro Pusat Statistik (1986)
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Table 5.10
South Kalimantan: Percentage Distribution of Regional 
Gross Domestic Product by Sectors (Current Prices) 1983,
1985
Sectors 1983 1985
Agriculture 31 31
Food Crops 16 17
Plantation Crops 2 2
Livestock 3 4
Forestry 3 2
Fishery 7 6
Mining & Quarrying 1 1
Industry/Manufacturing 8 9
Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 1 1
Constructions 5 4
Trade, Hotel & Restaurants 27 26
Trade 13 12
Hotel 14 14
Restaurant 0 0
Transport & Communications 11 11
Road Transportation 5 4
Sea Transportation 1 1
Air Transportation 3 3
Communications 3 3
Banking & Finance 3 3
Housing (Rent) 3 3
Administration & Defence 9 10
Services 2 2
Total 100 100
GDP per-capita 
(Rp'000) 346 423
Note: Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly. 
Source : Bappeda Kalimantan Selatan (1986: 485-488).
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The position of the Banjarese in South Kalimantan 
appears to be different from the position of the Malays 
in Riau. If the Malays as the indigenous population of 
Riau have perceived themselves as being neglected and 
losing their influential roles in the regional 
government, the Banjarese, by contrast, seem to have been 
able to maintain their domination in South Kalimantan. 
The current governor of South Kalimantan, Mohamad Said, a 
civil engineer who graduated from the Bandung Institute 
of Technology, is a Banjarese. This, perhaps, reflects 
the supremacy of the Banjarese in their own region. 
Another political manifestation of Banjarese success is 
the local newspaper, the Banjarmasin Post. This daily, 
owned and run by Banjarese, is regarded as the best local 
newspaper outside Java. For local people, the Banjarmasin 
Post has become an important avenue for articulating 
indigenous concerns. The regional university, Universitas 
Lambung Mangkurat, is also an important source of the 
Banjarese educated elite, a number of whom are actively 
involved in directing regional development of South 
Kalimantan.
5.4. Central Government Policy in Riau and South 
Kalimantan
Central government policy has greatly affected 
regional development in Riau, as well as in South 
Kalimantan. A major factor has been the Central
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Government's strong commitment to promoting development 
through its national budget. With the sharp increase in 
the export price of oil in 1973, and further in the late 
1970s, total Indonesian Government revenues increased. 
This led to increases in regional development budgets, 
especially for improvements in infrastructure, education 
and health. However, since the beginning of Repelita III 
period, the transmigration program has probably been the 
single most important generator of regional development 
in the two provinces (Table 5.11). The strong central 
government commitment to the transmigration program 
derives partly from the priority given under Repelita III 
to the location of transmigration settlements in such 
areas as: along the Sumatran highway and the road linking 
South and East Kalimantan; the east coast of Sumatra and 
the west and south coasts of Kalimantan; and the border 
areas of Kalimantan (Departemen Transmigrasi, 1983). 
Through the transmigration program, the Central 
Government has made large investments in social overhead 
capital such as irrigation systems, swamp drainage, 
schools, health clinics and roads. Perhaps most important 
in terms of its impact on the local inhabitants, has been 
investment in transportation facilities.
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Table 5.11
Riau and South Kalimantan: Sectoral Budget Allocation 
(1984/85, 1985/86, 1986/87) - (billions of Rupiah)
Riau South Kalimantan
O C / L .  U  Jl  s
1984/85 1985/86 1985/86 1986/87
Agriculture 8,603 7,025 5,010 2,854
Industry 138 164 511 291
Mining n.a 1,490 11,811 79
Transportation 13,997 17,062 3,846 n. a
Trade & Coop. 
Manpower &
567 685 1,087 690
Transmigration 26,013 26,437 12,530 6,617
Religion 756 944 1,498 1,065
Education 
Health and Social
11,005 10,138 11,762 6,451
Welfare 2,983 3,005 3,946 2,680
Housing 1,035 1,299 n.a n.a
Law 2,117 1,238 763 513
Defence 
Information &
n.a n.a n. a n. a
Communication 
Science &
548 423 505 945
Technology 734 876 n.a n.a
Govt. Employees 2,123 3,980 n. a n. aResources 784 904 n. a n.a
Note: n.a = not available.
Sources : Kantor Statistik Riau (1986: 352)
Bappeda Kalimantan Selatan (1987: 17-18)
The drastic increases in the transmigration targets 
in the Provinces of Riau and South Kalimantan led the 
Central Government to build air-strips in Pasir 
Pangarayan for Riau province and in Batulicin for South 
Kalimantan. Apart from directly transporting 
transmigrants by air from Java to their destination, the 
construction of air strips could provide fast
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transportation for the transmigrants' agricultural 
products, which often faced marketing problems due to the 
remoteness of the locations. However, these two air
strips have been underutilised because, on completion of 
construction, the government encountered severe budget 
problems. The air strip in Pasir Pangarayan was only used 
during the President's visit in 1985.4
Before Repelita III, South Kalimantan was divided
into two development areas (Wilayah Pembangunan).
Development Area I, with Banjarmasin as the centre,
consisted of nine regencies, and Development Area II,
with Kota Baru as the centre, consisted of two regencies.
Partly because Development Area I covered a very wide
region, the provincial government decided to split
Development Area I and formed Development Area II with
Kandangan as the centre, consisting of five regencies.
Former Development Area II has been renamed as
Development Area III. Because the central government
concentrated development efforts in the southern and
eastern parts of the province, especially with the
accelerated construction of an asphalt road linking
Banjarmasin, Batulicin and Tanah Grogot in East
Kalimantan, little attention has been paid to the
northern part of the province in which the Hulu Sungai
regencies are located. The Hulu Sungai regencies are the
4 The local Bappeda officials were critical of the plan 
to build an air strip at Batulicin, but, since the 
central government pushed the implementation of this 
plan, the local officials' views were ignored(interview 
with the Head of Bappeda Research Division, January
1988) .
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most densely populated areas and are experiencing net 
out-migration. Previously the area was known as the rice 
bowl of South Kalimantan. The Hulu Sungai region forms a 
core area for South Kalimantan, and the majority of the 
indigenous population live there. However, the central 
government has directed its development efforts to the 
frontier areas in the southern regions, so only a few 
projects were allocated to these most densely populated 
regions.
The frontier areas of South Kalimantan are located 
in the regencies of Tanah Laut and Kota Baru. These 
sparsely populated areas are where the majority of the 
Javanese have been resettled under the transmigration 
program. A demographer in the University of Lambung 
Mangkurat, Dr. Marliani Djohansyah 5, contended that the 
future of South Kalimantan would be clouded if poor and 
landless Javanese farmers eventually dominated the 
region, both because of their numbers and because many 
Banjarese migrated to other places. She argued that this 
migration of indigenous people to other places reflected 
the government's failure to create job opportunities for 
the local people, resulting in a strong push factor. She 
feared that, as a transmigration receiving area, South 
Kalimantan might become a dumping place (tempat 
pembuangan) for the poorest Javanese. As the majority of 
the transmigrants were unskilled, their productivity 
would also be low. This would, in turn, result in only a
Interview, February 1988.
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marginal contribution from the transmigrants to regional 
economic growth in South Kalimantan. Swasono, an 
economist from University of Indonesia who has carried 
out an extensive study on transmigration, also claimed 
that:
The Outer Islands in fact are being structured into 
areas of low comparative advantage and low economic 
opportunity through transmigration policy.
In the province of Riau, starting from the beginning 
of the Third Plan, the central government has 
concentrated the transmigration settlements into the 
areas along the border with the provinces of North 
Sumatra, West Sumatra, and Jambi, proximate to the Trans- 
Sumatran Highway. In addition to locating settlers in 
underpopulated areas, central government planners also 
planned to link the development of transport facilities, 
particularly the Sumatran Highway, with the growth of 
transmigration settlements. They hoped that markets would 
be stimulated if transmigration areas raised the level of 
agricultural production and attracted traders from other 
places. Another central government decision that shows 
the priority given to transmigration is an 'instruction' 
that, for Repelita IV, the development of Inpres 
projects, such as school buildings, health clinics and 
markets, should be directed to transmigration settlement 
areas. As argued by MacAndrews (1986b: 52), the
°Interview,November 1986.
Interview with Drs. Samrony, the Head of Inpres 
Projects in the Governor Office in Banjarmasin, February 
1988.
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Indonesian transmigration program (that by the early 
1980s had moved between 3 million and 4 million people, 
both under the government-sponsored program and through 
spontaneous movement) had become a major force in 
developing new areas in the Outer Islands.
5.5. Conclusion
Probably because of its natural resource richness 
and also its geographically strategic position, Riau is 
accorded high priority by the central government. South 
Kalimantan, on the other hand, is relatively less 
attractive, due to its relative poverty in terms of 
resources, and lack of geographic importance. Although 
this situation has somewhat changed in recent years due 
to the increasing role of non-oil exports such as 
plywood, which is produced in large quantities in South 
Kalimantan, nonetheless the province has been subjected 
to relatively little central government pressure and 
therefore has had more room to articulate its own 
regional interests. Its indigenous people, the Banjarese, 
unlike the Malay in Riau, are more cohesive and have been 
able to maintain their domination of the regional 
government.
Perhaps their cultural similarity to the Javanese 
also makes the Banjarese more acceptable to a central 
government strongly influenced by Javanese culture. The
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current governor of South Kalimantan, a Banjarese 
civilian, has also shown an ability to maintain the 
interest of local people without creating conflict with 
the central government. In Riau, on the other hand, the 
central government has almost always installed a Javanese 
general as governor, which undoubtedly has exacerbated 
the latent resentment of the local population, 
particularly the Malays, towards the central 
administration.
Particularly during Repelita III and IV, through the 
transmigration program, both Riau and South Kalimantan 
received a substantial increase in their budget 
allocation from the central government. The provinces 
were able to expand regional development, such as health, 
education and other infrastructure, through 
transmigration. However, since the mid-1980s, government 
revenue from oil has been declining, and the budget for 
the transmigration program has also been severely cut. 
This has affected project implementation in many regions, 
but specifically where the transmigration settlements 
were concentrated.
Although the transmigration program has benefited 
Riau and South Kalimantan, particularly in the provision 
of infrastructure, it has not always been welcomed by the 
indigenous segment of the population. Resentment against 
the program has been mostly articulated by the indigenous 
intellectuals. Among other things, they perceive
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transmigration as not benefiting the region, particularly 
in the long run because transmigrants are mostly poor 
and unskilled, thus contributing only a small economic 
return to the province.
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Chapter VI
TRANSMIGRATION IN THE PROVINCE OF RIAU AND 
SOUTH KALIMANTAN : THE EVIDENCE OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
... it remains clear that for many 
years transmigration has been a most 
visible manifestation of the 
Indonesian centre into the landscape 
of the major islands of the 
periphery.
Babcock (1986: 157)
This chapter reviews the process of transmigration 
policy implementation in Riau and South Kalimantan. Its 
purpose is to investigate how and why the transmigration 
policies evolved as they did and how and why they were 
implemented as they were in Riau and South Kalimantan 
during the New Order. The analysis will concentrate on 
Repelita III and IV during which the program experienced 
periods of boom and bust. The dynamic interaction between 
the central government - which formulated the 
assumptions, objectives and targets - and the regional 
level governments - which implemented the programs - will 
be explored. An historical account of transmigration in 
Riau and South Kalimantan will be provided in the first 
part of the chapter.
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6.1. Transmigration in Riau and South Kalimantan
Riau
Riau was formally designated as a transmigration 
receiving area in 1975 by Presidential Decree No. 29. 
However, the first group of transmigrants was actually 
resettled in 1962 in Siabu, Bangkinang sub-district, 
Kampar District. This group consisted of 58 families (275 
persons). A second group of 42 families (212 persons) 
arrived in 1963 in the same area. According to a study by 
Hamidy and Ahmad (1984: 10), the government resettled
transmigrants in Riau during that period for security 
reasons, due to political tensions between Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Transmigrants were sent to the border regions 
that were considered by the central government to be 
under-populated, in order to bolster territorial defense 
in the 'confrontation' against Malaysia. However, Hamidy 
and Ahmad (1984) reported that the development of those 
settlements was unsatisfactory, partly due to poor 
planning and hasty implementation.
At the beginning of the New Order period, Riau 
played only a small role as a receiving area for 
transmigration. The first group of transmigrants in that 
period, consisting of 98 families (459 persons), were 
resettled in 1968 at Simandolak in Kuantan-Tengah sub­
district, Indragiri Hulu District. In 1969, 200 families
(866 persons) were sent to the same destination. However, 
the transmigration settlement in Simandolak was also
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considered unsuccessful. Hainidy and Ahmad (1984: 11) 
noted that, just two years after they were resettled, 
some of the transmigrants had to sell their belongings to 
local people in order to obtain money to buy food. Some 
were even described as paupers. For the local population, 
the hardship of the transmigrants' life in Simandolak 
provided a very bad image of the Javanese transmigrants 
in Riau. A journalist reported that in the first year of 
Repelita III about half of the transmigrants in this area 
left the settlement (Kompas, 25 March 1980).
Table 6.1
The Chronology of the Transmigration Program in Riau
Year/Arrival Location No. of families Year/Transfer
1962-63 Siabu 100 19761968-69 Simandolak 298 1977
1971-75 Tidal areas 500 1979
1977-79 Tidal areas 900 1982-85
Coastal areas 2,000 1987
1979-81 Up land regions 19,417
1981-83 Up land regions 15,772
1983-87 Up land regions 17,509
Notes:
1. The figure for transmigrant families in this table 
should be used with caution because it was taken at the 
beginning of the resettlement. In the course of time, 
some transmigrants probably left and new migrants arrived 
and resettled.
2. In January 1988 (at the time of fieldwork) settlements 
which opened after 1978 were mostly still under the 
responsibility of Department of Transmigration.
3. For more detail information on the area of 
transmigration settlements in Riau see Appendix 1.
Source: Kanwil Transmigrasi Riau (1987)
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The central government began to pay more attention
to the province of Riau as a potential area for
transmigration in 1971. This was partly because the
central government decided to open tidal swamps for a
transmigration project to cultivate rice, due to the need 
to increase rice production. During Repelita I, the 
government reclaimed 12,830 hectare of tidal swamp land 
in South and Central Kalimantan, 2,730 hectare in West 
Kalimantan, 9,830 hectare in South Sumatra, 6,800 ha in 
Jambi and 900 hectare in Riau (Collier, 1979) . This 
undertaking was one of the world's major experiments in 
marginal land utilization and a classic example of a 
resource-creation strategy (Hanson and Koesoebiono, 
1977) . In Riau, the first transmigration settlement in 
the tidal swamp area was in Teluk Kiambang, Tempuling 
sub-district, in the District of Indragiri Hilir, where 
150 families (735 persons) were resettled, followed by 
another 150 families (732 persons) in 1973/74 (Figure 
5.1).
In 1974 President Suharto instructed the Department 
of Public Works to open up another one million hectares 
of tidal swamp. A substantial portion of this was to be 
used for transmigration settlements. The transmigration 
program was one of several methods being promoted to 
expand the agricultural base in the Outer Islands in 
order to increase food production. As stated in the First 
Five-Year Plan document, increasing food production was 
one of the major targets in Repelita T. The government
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decision to use tidal swamp was partly because the best 
lands in the upland areas were already under cultivation 
by local residents. In many areas customary (adat) law 
gave land management rights to contiguously spaced local 
units known as marga or clans. In many areas where these 
rights had been exercised, particularly by shifting 
cultivators, the problem of alienating sufficient land 
for transmigration was more serious. Thus, in general, 
the upland areas of Sumatra presented difficult land- 
rights situations for new settlements.
Since the beginning of the Second Plan, regional 
development and the establishment of growth poles outside 
Java have become a major preoccupation of Indonesian 
planners. Regional development has become the fundamental 
justification for the transmigration program. Hanson 
(1981) considered the tidal swamp development effort to 
be supportive of both agricultural sectoral goals and 
regional development goals. Another element in regional 
development was the improvement of security and avoidance 
of disturbances in sensitive areas. According to Hanson 
(1981: 224), the central government was anxious to settle 
transmigrants in such areas in order to reduce 
opportunities for illegal activities, such as smuggling. 
In coastal Riau, particularly at isolated outposts and 
along the network of swampland channels or rivers, there 
were ample opportunities for many kinds of smuggling. 
These considerations have been factors in the emphasis on 
coastal development. During the Repelita II period
(1974/75-1978/79), 3,100 families (12,395 persons) were
resettled in Riau, the majority of them in the coastal 
areas (Figure 5.1).
The transmigration target for Riau was increased 
significantly from the beginning of Repelita III 
(1978/79-1983/84) . The increase was due to the rapid 
increase in the target at the national level, and the 
judgement that Riau was one of the provinces with the 
greatest potential for resettling transmigrants. In 
Repelita III, the national target was 500,000 families, 
of which Riau was to receive 50,000. However, the planned 
expansion of the transmigration target confronted an 
immediate problem: the availability of suitable land for
resettlement. By the end of Repelita III, it was evident 
that resettlement in tidal swamps had created many 
problems. As a result, it was recommended that this type 
of project should be de-emphasized in the future. Since 
then, the central government has decided to shift 
transmigration settlement into non-irrigated areas in the 
up-land regions (Figure 5.1). Since fertile land in the 
upper regions mostly has been occupied by the local 
population, the new settlements for transmigration were 
resettled in the areas with poor soil conditions. In 
addition to food crops, since the beginning of the Third 
Development Plan the central government introduced the 
tree crops type of transmigration. In Riau an oil palm 
plantation was established in Tandun and Sei Tapung in 
the District of Kampar. It was follow by a rubber tree
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plantation in Air Molek in the District of Indragiri 
Hulu.
The province of Riau was given special attention by 
the central government partly because of national 
security as Riau has an open border with other countries 
in the north, including Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. 
In 1981, the government moved 350 families (1,627 
persons) to the Natuna Islands, and in 1982 another 600 
families (2,425 persons). The government explicitly 
stated that the aim of this resettlement was to provide 
'a security belt' against foreign intruders. One 
researcher from the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB) , 
who had conducted field research in transmigration 
settlements in Natuna, gained a strong impression that 
living conditions among these transmigrants were very 
poor indeed, particularly due to the very low 
agricultural productivity. He considered the government's 
expectation that the transmigrants could act as a 
security belt when they had to live under such conditions 
was merely wishful thinking.1
South Kalimantan
Whereas Riau has become a transmigration receiving 
area only recently, South Kalimantan has a longer history 
of population resettlement. It was in the early 'thirties 
that the Dutch government decided to extend their
T Personal Communication, January 1988.
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colonisation schemes from Sumatra to Kalimantan.2 In 
Kalimantan, the Dutch government experimented with two 
kinds of landscape, tidal swamp lands and the alang-alang 
covered uplands. For the tidal swamp lands they selected 
an area to the south of Banjarmasin which later was 
called Purwosari, and for the alang-alang covered 
uplands, an area in the north-east of Banjarmasin was 
chosen, which later was called Madurejo.
According to Pelzer (1945: 223-225), in July 1938 
the first group of 95 families was placed near the 
village (kampung) of Kertakhanyar to cultivate 100 bouws 
of swamp sawah that had been leased from the local 
population. The experiment was successful, and the Dutch 
Government felt sufficiently encouraged to send a second 
group of 106 families in 1939. This group came early 
enough to help with the harvest, and the settlers of 1938 
were then transferred across the Barito river and settled 
on their own land south of the Serapat Canal and 
southwest of the town of Banjarmasin. The colony, given 
the name of Purwosari, comprised an area of 34,000 
hectares. The second group was brought to a local village 
on the banks of the Lauk River to learn the new technique 
before they joined the settlers of Purwosari. In May 
1940, the third year, a third group of 198 families was 
added to the Purwosari project. The planners of this
2 Sjamsu (1960: 59~) noted that, in 192 0, the Dutch sent 
250 families from Central Java to a location near 
Barabai. After two years this settlement was abandoned as 
a large numbers of colonists left the area or died due to 
malaria.
colony estimated that 15 per cent of the land would be 
occupied by villages, canals and roads, leaving 28,900 
hectares of swamp lands for the cultivation of rice.
The other scheme, Madurejo, also differed 
fundamentally from the colonies in Sumatra. In Madurejo, 
dryland was cultivated exclusively, and Madurese
villagers were chosen to be the settlers. The colony, 
located near Pengaron in the Meratus Mountains, included 
16,000 hectares of cultivable land, none of which could 
be irrigated. This was no drawback in the eyes of the 
Madurese settlers, since the peasants of Madura surpass 
all other Indonesians in the tilling of tegalan (dry 
land). The Madurese are excellent stock breeders. The 
goal in Madurejo was to establish a system of mixed 
farming. The colony was started in 1938 with 100
families, and these were joined in 1939 by 194 additional 
families.
Today, the population settlements in Purwosari 
(1937) and Madurejo (1938) are regarded by some observers 
as an example of successful resettlement. Collier (1980 
cited in Potter and Hasymi, 1987: 16)) strongly argued
that the success of 'colonisation' in Purwosari was 
because the Javanese followed the type of cropping system 
devised for the tidal swamps by spontaneous Banjarese 
settlers, who had earlier opened sections of the swamps 
for the production of rice and tree crops in a system 
which he described as productive and self-sustaining.
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However, an interview by the author in February 1988 with 
some former colonists in Purwosari gave the strong 
impression that the tight control by the Dutch over the 
lives and agricultural practices among the settlers was 
perhaps the primary factor in making the settlements 
sustainable. For example, for two years after their 
arrival in the area, the Dutch officers did not permit 
the settlers to move freely from the settlement areas. In 
addition, the agricultural activities that could be 
practiced by the settlers, such as the crops to be grown, 
were also strictly selected and defined by the Dutch. One 
ex-colonist said, 'It was like living in prison'.3
To judge the success of the colonisation policy in 
terms of the current situation is also misleading for two 
reasons. First, the original settlers currently alive are 
the remnant of colonists who survived after almost 50 
years of hardship and whose human and social costs are 
impossible to calculate. Second, the settlements have 
attracted considerable numbers of new migrants, many of 
whom have brought capital from their place of origin.
J Dr. Lesley Potter of Adelaide University who was 
conducting research on population mobility in South 
Kalimantan, among other things found a Javanese 
settlement at Guntung Ujung, Kecamatan (Sub-District) 
Gambut, about 12 km south of the main Banjarmasin- 
Martapura road. According to Dr. Potter, there were about 
4 0 households, some of them descendants of a group who 
fled from the colonisation at Purwosari during the 
Japanese occupation of the 1940s. They left the
settlement because they found life in Purwosari too 
difficult (A personal communication with Dr. Potter, 
December 1989)
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Table 6.2
The Chronology of the Transmigration Program 
in South Kalimantan
Year/Arrival Location No.of Families Year/Transfer
1938-40 Purwosari 399 1960s
Maduredjo 410 1960s
1953 Takisung 724 1960s
1957-67 Up land regions 250 1970s
1969-74 Tidal areas 1,859 1980s
1975-78 Up land regions 6,631 1980s
1979-81 Up land regions 11,096
1984-88 Up land regions 5,332
Notes:
1. The figure for the number of the transmigrants in this 
table should be seen with caution since the figure was 
taken at the beginning of the resettlement. The actual 
figures could be different as some transmigrants probably 
had abandoned their settlements or some spontaneous 
migrants resettled in those areas.
2. As also happened in Riau, by the time the author was 
conducting field work (February 1988) the majority of 
settlements which were opened after 1978 were still in 
the hand of the Department of Transmigration.3. The detail information on the area of transmigration 
settlements in South Kalimantan see Appendix 2.
Sources: Pelzer (1945: 224-264).
Bappeda Kalimantan Selatan (1985: 2).
Djohansyah (1986: 11-13).
Kanwil Transmigrasi Kalimantan Selatan 
(1987: 15).
The arrival of the Japanese in the Indonesian 
archipelago in 1942 put an end to all colonisation 
projects. Most of the settlements already established 
suffered considerably during the three years of 
occupation; in many cases farmers were taken from 
colonisation villages to provide labour for Japanese war 
projects (romusha). After Independence, the Government of 
Indonesia resumed the program. The first group of
transmigrants was sent to South Kalimantan in 1953 to
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Takisung sub-district, Tanah Laut District. They 
comprised 724 families (2,595 persons) (Bappeda 
Kalimantan Selatan, 1985: 2) . After Takisung, the 
government began to open tidal-irrigation projects 
(proyek pasang surut), the first at Tamban in 1957, 
followed by two more tidal projects at Marabahan in 1959 
and Balandean in 1961. All of these projects are located 
in the District of Barito Kuala. Two other projects were 
established in the District of Kota Baru: first in 
Berangas in 1960 and second in Sebelimbingan in 1961. 
From 1962 until 1967 the government moved only around 250 
families to South Kalimantan. A survey of the regional 
economy (Partadiredja, 1970: 51) reported that, by 1968, 
only two-thirds of transmigrants arriving after 
independence still resided in the transmigration areas. 
The others had left for other places to find employment. 
The report also found that, out of five areas designated 
as transmigration areas since 1959, only one was 
officially regarded as developed and four as 'backward'.
South Kalimantan was formally designated as a 
destination for transmigration in 1972 by Presidential 
Decree no. 2 (Department of Manpower and Transmigration, 
1979, Appendix: 1). During Repelita I, about 8,000 
persons were resettled in seven transmigration areas. 
Around half were located in Barambai in the District of 
Barito Kuala in 1969, and the other half were located in 
1973 in Tambarangan, Hatungun, Sidodadi, Miawa, 
Parandakan and Ayunan Papan in the Tapin District.
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According to a study by a team from Gajah Mada 
University, the transmigration settlement in Barambai was 
relatively more developed than the other settlements 
(Guinness, 1977).
In Repelita II, the government moved around 28,000 
persons into the dry land areas in the District of Kota 
Baru. The majority were located in Tajau Pecah in 1975 
and in Sebamban I in 1978. The others were located in 
Suato, Hatungun, Batu Tungku, Masingai and Belawan. In 
Sebamban I, in which around eight thousand persons were 
located, an agro-economic survey showed that a large 
number of transmigrants were engaged in non-farm 
employment, such as logging and the informal sector 
(ORSTOM, 1984 cited in Widayatun, 1989: 16). During
Repelita III, 77,000 sponsored and around 9,000
spontaneous transmigrants were resettled in South 
Kalimantan. In addition to the transmigration program 
based on food-crops, after 1981 a tree-crops 
transmigration scheme, mainly rubber, began to be 
introduced in South Kalimantan. These projects were 
located in Batulicin, Pamukan, Paringin and Muara Uya. At 
the beginning of Repelita IV (1984-1985), a 
transmigration area associated with a sugar plantation 
was established in Pelaihari in the District of Tanah
Laut.
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6.2. Central Government Decisions and Their Regional
Implementation
In Riau and South Kalimantan, the transmigration 
program has been implemented since the First Five-Year 
Development Plan of the New Order period. However, the 
momentum of the program increased markedly from the 
beginning of the Third Five-Year Development Plan 
(1978/1979). At the national level, this marked change 
was reflected through at least three important 
developments. The first was the commitment from the World 
Bank to financially support and assist the transmigration 
program on a substantial scale. This dates from 1979, 
when the government and the World Bank agreed to a second 
Bank assisted project that was to be a model for 
transmigration in the Repelita III (World Bank, 1988: 
161). Second, a total of 500,000 families were targeted 
to move in the Repelita III. Third, a Junior Minister for 
Transmigration was appointed to assist the Minister for 
Manpower and Transmigration but directly reported to the 
President. In addition, a co-ordinating body (Bakoptrans) 
was set-up to co-ordinate the implementing agencies for 
transmigration.4
Based on their study in South Kalimantan and South
Sulawesi, Guinness (1977: 137) noted that, although the
government had established a co-ordinating body at the
4 Co-ordination between the many departments involved in 
transmigration has long been a concern of the central 
government.
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national and regional levels, this body was not able to 
reduce the tensions and conflicts between the
implementing agencies. The only experience of workable 
co-ordination, according to this study, was shown during 
the preparation of the Wonogiri-Sitiung Project in 1976. 
However, from another study (Gondowarsito, 1986) the 
seemingly better co-ordination among the implementing 
agencies in the Wonogiri-Sitiung Project was because the 
President had given his personal attention to the 
project, presumably because Wonogiri happened to be in 
the area of his childhood home. Because of this 
privileged status, the utmost involvement and cooperation 
on the part of various government agencies (namely, the 
Departments of Manpower and Transmigration, Public Works, 
Communications, and Agriculture) were enlisted 
(Gondowarsito, 1986: 89-90).
The main reason which eventually led the central 
government to rapidly increase the scale of the 
transmigration program was the increase of national 
revenue from oil, as well as the increasing confidence 
among the economist-technocrats in their ability to 
expand the development programs on a nationwide scale. 
The central government decision to resettle 500,000 
families in the Third Five-Year Plan compelled the 
designated provinces to accept a larger number of 
transmigrants than had ever been experienced before. This 
obligation in turn created a heavy burden and many 
problems for the regional governments.
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In Riau, prior to the commencement of the Third 
Plan, the regional government had planned for 50,000 
transmigrant families to be accepted for the next five 
years, and had already allocated areas for transmigration 
settlement. Suddenly, and without any consultations with 
the regional government, the new Minister for Public 
Works, Ir. Poernomosidi, increased the target to an 
unprecedented 100,000 families. The central government, 
through their vertical line agencies in the region, 
particularly Public Works, began to select settlement 
areas, clear the land and construct roads. The 
Transmigration Regional Office then started to build the 
houses and social facilities, such as markets and 
mosques. During the project's development, almost all 
consultations were carried out directly between the 
central government's implementing agencies and the 
governor's office, largely by-passing Bappeda, which was 
supposed to co-ordinate all development projects in the 
region.5
The bureaucratic elites in South Kalimantan, 
especially the planners, have realised that partly 
because of the soil conditions their province could not 
receive large number of transmigrants from Java. 
According to Drs. Sam'ani, the Head of Research Section 
in the Bappeda office, the findings of the Third Plan 
evaluation strongly indicated that for the Fourth Plan
Interview with the Vice Head of the Bappeda of Riau, 
January 1989.
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South Kalimantan should receive no more than the target 
in Repelita III, which was about 17,000 families. He 
argued that even to realise such number would be a
difficult task, requiring considerable effort. It was 
therefore beyond the regional capacities to accept a 
bigger target number. For the Fourth Plan, therefore, 
Bappeda planned for only 17,000 families. Unfortunately, 
before it was officially publicised, one senior official 
from the Department of Transmigration in Jakarta detected 
this plan during his visit to South Kalimantan. He
claimed that the figure was too low and could be 
interpreted as indicating that South Kalimantan did not 
support the national policy on transmigration. As a
result, in the Development Plan book 50,000 families was 
listed as the province's target for the Fourth Plan. 
However, by February 1988 only about 13.5 per cent of 
this target was realised.6
The government approach to transmigration during the 
Third Plan period was known as 'Plan As You Proceed'
(PAYP). At the time the transmigration program was 
reorganised in 1978, the responsibility for the selection 
and evaluation of large sites was assigned to the 
Directorate of City and Regional Planning (DITADA) within 
the Department of Public Works.7 Plan As You Proceed, 
initially promoted by World Bank consultants, denotes an 
approach that was adopted especially by the planners in
6 Interview,February 1988.
DITADA apparently had no previous experience in 
agricultural planning and implementation.
206
ODITADA to accelerate the completion of land clearing. In 
the PAYP, site investigation and land development 
proceeded simultaneously. This approach was adopted 
partly because the government had been forced to realise 
a very ambitious target for the Repelita III. Under this 
approach, site selection was made without prior detailed 
feasibility studies. The sites were selected mainly based 
on topographic maps of land slopes. Based on those 
considerations the contractors were assigned to land 
clearing and construction of the main roads. It was then 
the responsibility of the Transmigration Regional Offices 
to construct houses and other public facilities for the 
transmigrants.9 A Kompas correspondent in Pekanbaru noted 
that the contractors who won the projects from Kanwil 
Transmigrasi often ignored the existence of the district 
government or its subordinates during project 
implementation. All jobs were directly negotiated with 
the provincial level government. However, in the event of 
a dispute or conflict with the local population, for 
example as a result of unfair land compensation, the 
contractors eventually turned to the district or village 
level government for help or advice.10
Co-ordination between DITADA, which was under the
-o----------------------1----------------------------------The information regarding the role of the World Bank 
as the promoter of PAYP was obtained through a personal 
communication from Mr. Wong Tai Chee, a consultant with a 
Malaysian firm in charge of land development for 
transmigration in Riau, November 1988.
Interview with Abdul Muin Abbas B.A., a former field 
supervisor during the PAYP phase in South Kalimantan, 
February 1988.
10 Interview, December 1987.
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Ministry of Public Works, and the Transmigration Regional 
Offices was not easily achieved. There was a strong 
tendency for DITADA to finish their job well before the 
Transmigration Offices were ready to follow it up. Among 
the planners in DITADA, such an acceleration of land 
development was known as 'saving' (menabung). It meant 
that land development was accelerated and continued 
without consideration for whether Transmigration Regional 
Offices had been prepared to construct the houses and 
other facilities (Hamzah, 1980: 5) . As a result of the 
delays in the settlement preparation, for example, Hendra 
Sasmita, the Head of the Transmigration Regional Office 
in Riau, admitted that only twenty per cent of the target 
of 9,500 families for the first year of the Third Plan 
was realised (Kompas, 11 March 1980).
According to the Deputy Head of Bappeda, Riau, as a 
result of the PAYP approach, a considerable proportion of 
the sites proved to be inappropriate for transmigration 
settlements. The soils in many areas proved unsuited for 
agricultural cultivation due to the abandonment of the 
detailed soil structure studies. In 1982, a daily 
newspaper reported that 1,836 transmigrant families from 
fourteen settlements in Riau were in critical conditions 
resulting from floods in their lands (Sinar Harapan, 7 
October 1982). According to one staff member of the 
Mobilisation and Development Division (RAHBIN) in the 
Transmigration Regional Office in Pekanbaru, it was no 
accident that the majority of the settlers had left the
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transmigration settlement in Belilas area because of 
floods. In fact, before the area was opened for 
transmigration the Head of the Transmigration Regional 
Office had already recognized that the area was not 
feasible for resettlement. However, the Head of Kanwil at 
the time insisted that the project be 'coercively' 
implemented (dihajar, literally meaning 'to crush')
because there was an order from the centre under the so- 
called 'crash program' to achieve the transmigration 
target by all means.
Another problem resulting from the PAYP and target- 
oriented approach was disputes over the land required for 
transmigration among the different government sectoral 
agencies. The land sites that had been claimed for 
transmigration settlements and were being cleared had 
often been originally planned for other purposes, for 
example as forest conservation areas. In Riau, land 
clearing for WPP (Partial Development Areas) X in 
Bangkinang District had to be suspended as the Forestry 
Technical Office (Dinas Kehutanan) in Riau claimed that 
the area was already reserved for conservation. At the 
end of the dispute, which was handled by Bappeda, the 
claim of the Forestry Office was approved (Kompas, 30
November 1982). In South Kalimantan when the 
transmigration program was implemented under the PAYP 
approach, land disputes commonly occurred with the 
Forestry Offices. Abdul Muin Abbas explained that, as a
XT Interview, December 1987.
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field supervisor, he required a tough character because a 
quick decision and sometimes even physical pressure was 
needed to win the dispute with other agencies.
According to Muin Abbas, because of frequent 
disputes between agencies, the Regional Government in 
conjunction with other agencies which used land, such as 
Public Works, Agriculture and Transmigration, began to 
construct a kind of land use map to mark the forest 
boundary according to its functions. The map was latter 
known as 'Map of Forestry Agreement' (Peta Hutan 
Kesepakatan) . At the bottom of the map was the signature 
of the head of each agency involved. However, because the 
map was prepared only to provide a broad guide-line, 
particularly during the PAYP approach, in practice 
disputes between agencies still occurred. Part of the 
reason was that the Central Government, particularly 
Public Works, often intervened directly through their 
sectoral agencies in the province without any 
consultation with the Bappeda or other sectoral 
agencies.13 The problems of land unsuitability for 
transmigration settlements, which continued during the 
Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, were unavoidable 
because the land that had been allocated for settlements 
in Repelita III was mostly poorly selected and hastily 
studied during the Repelita III period, particularly when 
the PAYP approach was adopted.14 The result of poor 
1:2 Interview, February 1988.
13 Interview with Drs. Anwar Rahman, Bappeda Riau, 
January 1988.
14 In the case of South Kalimantan, the Department of
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planning and hasty implementation of the transmigration 
programs in Riau and South Kalimantan is readily apparent
from two indicators: first, the extent to which the
target was realized, and second, the very low number of
villages that have been transferred from the
transmigration department to the regional government (See
Appendices 1 and 2) . In 1988, for example, no
transmigration villages that were opened since the
beginning of Repelita III were transferred to the
regional government.
6.3. Regional Responses to the Central Plan
Formulation
Regional development, which on paper is the 
responsibility of the Regional Development Planning Board 
(Bappeda), in reality has been firmly controlled by each 
sectoral agency (Kanwil). The regional plan for sectoral 
agencies in fact is largely decided by the national level 
planning board in Jakarta (Bappenas). If the regional 
level agencies have any opportunity to formulate a 
regional plan, it is necessary that this be in accordance 
with priorities at the national level. In the words of 
one planner in South Kalimantan:
Transmigration, funded by the World Bank, had employed a 
British Consulting Firm to conduct a detailed land survey 
in South and East Kalimantan. The report of this survey 
was unfortunately released only in May 1987. The findings 
from this survey have never been used, since many of the 
transmigration projects were being implemented from 
around the early '80s.
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We should know what musical instrument is being 
played in Jakarta. For example if Jakarta plays 
the gamelan, we in the region also have to play 
the gamelan. 5
The bureaucrats in Pekanbaru or Banjarmasin are well 
aware of the dominant role played by the central 
government, either by the ministerial offices or the 
National Planning Board in Jakarta. This is reflected in 
their attitudes and responses in attempts to influence 
the decision making process regarding development in 
their regions. Among the factors that they perceive as 
crucial to development in their regions is the allocation 
of the development budget. As noted earlier, the central 
government allocates 70 to 80 per cent of the Regional 
Development Budget (APBD) in all provinces in Indonesia. 
Since the allocation of the development budget will be 
determined according to the priorities of the Five-Year 
Development Plan, it is very important for each regional 
government to make sure that as many as possible of their 
regional development priorities are mentioned in that 
document.
There are at least two opportunities for the 
regional government to influence the decision-making 
process in the Central Government. The first is at the 
time when the central government is preparing the draft 
of Repelita. This event usually commences around the end 
of the fourth year of the current development plan. The
^  Interview with Dr. Ismet Ahmad, the Dean of 
Agriculture Faculty, University of Lambung Mangkurat 
(also the Head of Governor's Task Force), February 1988.
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second is around January and February in each year when 
the budget for the following financial year is being 
prepared. The approach used by the regional governments 
in their attempt to influence the plan formulation in the 
Central Government is popularly known as 'lobbying the 
centre'.
The Deputy Chairman of Bappeda in Riau explained 
that his agency's major attempt to influence central 
government decisions was by inviting experts from the 
Faculty of Economics of the University of Indonesia in 
Jakarta to conduct an evaluation of the implementation of 
the Fourth Plan and at the same time to prepare a plan 
for Repelita V . The Deputy Chairman (himself an economist 
who graduated from the University of Indonesia) 
apparently knows very well that by inviting economists 
from this university he will be able to bring Riau's 
economic issues to the inner circle of decision makers in 
Jakarta, which is dominated by economists from the 
University of Indonesia, some of whom are ministers who 
meet regularly at the University to discuss the latest 
economic development issues.
Another reason for inviting economists from Jakarta 
is because they are more likely to be listened to when 
speaking about the problem in Riau than are the people 
from Riau. The issue of revenue from oil, which only
"I pT The evaluation and planning of the previous Repelita 
usually was carried out by local economists from the 
University of Riau, Pekanbaru.
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brings a small economic return to Riau, is an example of 
an issue that would be regarded as very sensitive if it 
was raised by local people. Through the economists from 
the centre it was hoped that the decision makers in 
Jakarta would be more willing to accept the fact that
1 7Riau needs a larger share of the national revenue.
The bureaucrats in South Kalimantan used a different 
approach in lobbying the central government to pay more 
attention to development in their province. According 
to Dr. Marliani Djohansyah, in 1986 the Governor had 
decided to form a Task Force consisting of academics and 
intellectuals concerned with local problems. Their main 
task was to advise the governor on development matters. 
Such a role should be played by the Bappeda, but the 
Governor initiated this Task Force because he considered 
that Bappeda was often too slow in responding to his 
requests. Another duty given to the Task Force was to 
lobby the central government to direct more attention to 
development in South Kalimantan.19
1' From a conversation with one researcher from the 
University of Riau (December 1987) it was known that the 
principal researchers who conducted the study on Riau 
were Dr. Dorodjatun Kuntjorojakti, Director of the 
Institute of Economic and Social Research, Faculty of 
Economics, University of Indonesia, and Dr. Iwan Jaya 
Azis, a researcher and regional economic expert, who 
strongly supported the idea of decentralisation of 
regional development in Indonesia.
18 The information regarding this issue was gathered 
from separate interviews with Dr. Ismet Ahmad and Dr. Ali 
Hasymi from University of Lambung Mangkurat, and Drs. 
Sam'ani from Bappeda. They were all the members of the 
Governor's Task Force.
19 Interview, February 1988.
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In a manner rather different from what happened in 
Riau, South Kalimantan preferred to send its messages to 
Jakarta through contact persons or close friends who 
held key positions, for example in Bappenas, the Ministry 
of Finance or the State Secretariat.20 On January 1988, 
when the author was in the field, the central government 
had begun to prepare the Fifth Development Plan. The 
lobbyists from South Kalimantan had therefore started 
visiting Jakarta seeking to ensure that South Kalimantan 
would be given priority within the forthcoming Repelita 
V. South Kalimantan was seeking a larger budget 
allocation for development. According to one member of 
the Task Force, to attain this goal, the payment of 'a 
greasing fee' (uang pelicin) to central government
officials was a common practice. He said that:
If you want to reach destination faster, you 
should used the toll road. It means that you 
must pay.
6.4. Co-ordination: An Unresolved Problem
Dr. Marliani Djohansyah, who conducted a study in 
several transmigration settlements in the District of 
Kota Baru, stated that a major problem in transmigration
^ I n t e r v i e w  with Drs. Sam'ani on February 1988 provides 
information that on 25 January 1988 Dr. Ali Hasymi and 
Drs. Asnawi, and on 28 January 1988 Dr. Ismet Ahmad and 
Drs. Sam'ani went to Jakarta in an effort to lobby the 
decision makers in Jakarta.
21 Interview, February 1988.
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program implementation in South Kalimantan was that the 
government officers at the district level could not 
change the policy during implementation. Everything had 
been rigidly decided by the higher level offices in the 
centre (in this case either in Banjarmasin or Jakarta). 
The Head of Bappeda at the district level even said that:
I think everybody in Kota Baru knows that the 
areas which have been chosen for transmigration 
are not suitable for cultivation. But I 
couldn't change anything since it has been 
decided from above.
In Sebamban, Batulicin, where transmigrants had been 
resettled for almost five years, the co-ordination 
between agencies, such as those responsible for co­
operatives, health and transmigration, occurred only in 
the form of formal meetings, in which agencies informed 
each other about their plans. Since most of the funds 
were controlled by the Transmigration Office the other 
agencies could only follow what they were told by the 
transmigration officials. As described by Dr. Marliani 
Djohansyah, other agencies working in transmigration 
areas usually followed the lead of the transmigration 
officials. Any resentment towards, or dissatisfaction 
with, the transmigration officials was usually not openly 
articulated, although on one occasion an open protest was 
made by some young medical doctors ('dokter Inpres'). 
They protested that funds allocated to purchase medicines 
had been misused by transmigration officials. As a result
As told by Dr. Marliani Djohansyah to the author 
during interview, February 1988.
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of this protest the official who apparently misused the 
money was transferred to another location. Another 
example of very rigid and centralised program 
implementation was the provision of salted fish to the 
transmigrants. The central government determined that 
this had to be imported from Surabaya. As a result, the 
cost of the salted fish was three times higher than if it 
had been purchased in the local markets, which had an 
abundant supply.
Any observers who visits transmigration settlements 
in Sebamban in the District of Kotabaru, which during 
Repelita III and IV periods became the focus of 
transmigration activities in South Kalimantan, will 
immediately be aware of the noticeable failure of 
transmigration implementation. The settlements, although 
they have been inhabited by migrants from Java since 
1980, have shown very little progress. In February 1988 
(at the time the author visited the areas) these 
transmigration villages were still under the Department 
of Transmigration with no indication when they were 
likely to be transferred to the provincial government. 
Since the mid 1980s the press has continuously reported 
the plight and difficult lives of the transmigrants in 
these areas. For example, press reports documented many 
people who abandoned their settlements, most of whom 
returned to their places of origin in Java. In March 1986 
a press report showed that hundreds of transmigrant
73 Interview, February 1988.
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families who resettled in Sebamban II project since 1980 
were in serious difficulties. Their agricultural lands 
could not produce anything exept cassava, and many of 
them even had to sell the tin from their roofs and wood 
from the walls of their houses just to buy rice (Kompas,
8 April 1986). An interview by the author with an 
apparently succsesful transmigrant trader in Sebamban II 
in February 1988 provided information about common 
happenings in transmigration areas. According to him, to 
survive in an environment such as Sebamban, transmigrants 
have to find jobs outside their settlements in off-farm 
activities, for example working as labourers in logging 
activities or taking a risk, with two or three friends 
working under contract with their "boss" to colect 
sandal-woods (kayu gaharu) in the forest. The problem, he 
said, was that productive jobs were very limited and so 
many people was looking for work. As a result the 
employers or the "boss" have often paid them a very low 
wages, but of course there was no alternative for these 
people other than to accept this low payment. This 
informant also stated what has become a public knowledge 
in these areas, that some wives of transmigrants were 
engaging in prostitution, again organised by a "boss" in 
the nearby town, to earn some money for their families to 
survive.
Problems of co-ordination were experienced, not only 
between implementing agencies from different departments 
but also within the Department of Transmigration itself.
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For the implementing agencies in the region, the problem 
arose whenever there was a conflict or confusion about 
central office decisions, for example, between 
instructions from the Minister and the General Secretary. 
This happened in Riau with regard to arrangements for 
transporting rice for transmigrants. Initially an 
instruction letter signed by the Minister stated that 
transportation should be arranged by the central office. 
Before this instruction could be implemented, the region 
received another instruction from the General Secretary 
which said that the regional office was responsible for 
transport arrangements. It took some months before the 
confusion could be resolved. In the meantime, the 
transmigrants who had been waiting for their rice ration 
suffered.24
According to an agricultural engineer who worked as 
a staff member of the Program Development Division (Bina 
Program) in the Transmigration Regional Office in 
Pekanbaru, the accuracy of transmigration statistics in 
many government reports was questionable. This was partly 
because statistics sent from the district to the 
provincial office were not seriously checked. Statistical 
reports were essentially just outcomes of formal and 
routine tasks. Interestingly, whatever the quality of 
information or data that were sent to the central 
government, they had never been refused or queried.
^  Interview with Drs. Anwar Rahman, the Head of Social 
and Cultural Section of Bappeda in Pekanbaru, January 
1988.
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Everything sent to the central office are 
always accepted (laku), although the statistics 
have been collected hastily (ngawur) and the 
reports were inappropriately completed.25
Another problem in implementation was related to the 
long delay of the budget approved by the central 
government. This took about two years after the 
submission of the budget proposal to the Ministry of 
Finance. The delay severely restricted the amount of time 
available for the project leader to complete projects in 
the region and often led to hasty project implementation. 
In South Kalimantan, another problem resulting from 
delayed budget approval was that more than two billion 
rupiah of the 1984 budget for the Department of 
Transmigration could not be spent. The Governor of South 
Kalimantan explained that this was partly caused by the 
interdependencies between the sectoral agencies in 
implementing the program. In such a situation, although 
the budget for the Department of Transmigration had been 
approved, they could not, for example, build houses for 
the transmigrants, because the Office of Land Use in the 
province was still waiting for their budget approval in 
order to be able to survey the land for transmigration 
(Kompas, 4 March 1985).
Problems of implementation during the Third Plan
resulted mostly from the separation of DITADA - which was
25 Interview, December 1987. The problems of inaccuracies 
and inconsistencies of government statistics are 
unavoidable for anyone studying transmigration. In this 
thesis, this issue is discussed in Chapter IV Section 
4.6.
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in charge of the selection and planning of sites, land 
clearing and construction of infrastructure - from the 
Directorate General of Transmigration, which was 
responsible for housing construction, recruitment of 
transmigrants at the place of origin, and their 
transportation, resettlement and provision with five 
years of economic and social support. DITADA was 
concerned only with the completion of land and 
resettlement preparation and reported directly to the 
Ministry of Public Works. Its tasks were mainly related 
to the physical works, such as land clearing and 
infrastructure construction, and were relatively less 
complicated than those of the Directorate General of 
Transmigration, which mostly dealt with people. As a 
result of task distinctions between DITADA and the 
Directorate General of Transmigration, preparation of the 
physical settlement often was completed but the 
transmigrants failed to arrive on schedule.
The perception and view of transmigrants toward the 
implementation of transmigration policy certainly varied 
according to their personal experiences. Pak Didik 
Mulyadi, a transmigrant leader who was appointed an 
acting village head in Pasir Pangarayan, Bengkalis 
District, told the author that transmigrants most likely 
will survive in their new settlements if at the time they 
arrive the land is in the condition of "siap-tanam" 
(ready to be planted). According to him, the span of time 
in which the land is in this condition is indeed very
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crucial, because if the transmigrants arrived either 
before or after this period they would probably encounter 
problems, for example weeds growing wild in their land. 
He remembered when he first arived in 1980 the land was 
relatively in a good condition and ready to be planted. 
At that time, there were 510 families from Java and 60 
families of APPDT. After arrival they received food 
rations (jadup = jatah hidup) for two years, but since 
their land still had not produced sufficiently, they 
received additional food from WFP (World Food Program). 
About 10 families left the village just after the food 
ration from the Transmigration Department finished, but 
then around 30 families arrived and resettled as
p f:spontaneous transmigrants.
In Riau, Pasir Pangarayan has been considered by 
many people, for example bureaucrats, academics or others 
with whom the author held discussions, as a relatively 
succsesful transmigration settlement. Each transmigrant 
family, beside their home-lot of 0.25 hectares in a 
ready-to-plant condition and a fully constructed house, 
received 1.0 hectares of land (referred to as Lahan I or 
Land One) from which vegetation had been completely 
removed. In addition, each transmigrant family in theory 
should also receive 0.75 hectares (known as Lahan II or 
Land Two) of uncleared land. According to Pak Didik, in 
his village, among transmigrants who have received Lahan 
II, the distance from the village to that land varies,
^  Interview, 10 August 1986.
222
for example, some are only 1 km but some are about 13 km 
away. About 60 families however have not received Lahan 
II land that was supposed to be provided for them. There 
was a rumour that those lands were still in dispute 
becuse the local people claimed the land as their own.
Problems with local people with regard to acquiring 
land for transmigration settlement are relatively rare,
either in Riau or South Kalimantan. This is not
surprising since much land in these provinces is
unfertile and therefore not being used by the indigenous 
people. In many cases disputes with local people over 
land are related to the land allocation for PIR-Trans 
projects, - in which the Transmigration Department only 
deals with the recruitment of transmigrants, whereas the 
process of land acquisition from the locals is directly 
handled by PTP and Dinas Perkebunan. An example of such a 
dispute occurred in the District of Kampar in Riau which 
550 family heads from several villages in Siakhulu sub­
district complained that they had been pressed by the PTP
to give up their land for PIR areas without any
compensation. They brought this case to the DPRD
(Provincial People Representative Council) but they
failed in an attempt to talk with the governor. According
to the bupati of Kampar, he has explained to the people 
that they would not receive compensation in the form of 
money since as the land owners they would be given 
priority to be PIR-transmigrants (Kompas, 23 February 
1985) . It was also reported that some local people
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rejected the offer to become PIR-Transmigrants because 
they must wait for at least five years before the rubber 
can be tapped. "In the mean time, how shall we make a 
living?", asked one of these local people. A similar 
situation was also experienced by local people in Dusun 
Tengah sub-district, Barito Selatan District in South 
Kalimantan. Only 27 out of 299 families whose lands were 
taken to be cleared for PIR-Trans projects decided to 
join the program. The majority of these indigenous Dayak 
people refused to join the program or to reside in the 
houses which had been provided for them. Similar to the 
local people in Riau, these Dayaks also considered that 
their economic situation would be worse off if they 
engaged in a PIR-Trans project (Kompas, 27 December 
1987) .
The Kompas corespondent in Riau, in a conversation 
with the author (28 February 1988), observed that in many 
cases, development projects such as the PIR-Trans schemes 
more often disadvantaged the local populations rather 
than improved their economic life. For example, a local 
man who owned six hectares "rubber plantation" (karet 
rakyat) could employ around 10 workers. Therefore, in 
addition to earning an adequate income from his land, 
socially he also enjoyed a certain status as owner and 
employer. If he joined the PIR-Trans, although he wuld 
receive two hectares of land he would have to give up his 
six hectares, and his status as employer would drop to 
the status of labourer for the PIR company. More
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importantly, his economic condition would also be unsure 
for several years to come because while his own 
plantation had been cleared away, he would have to wait 
until the rubber plantation began producing for the first 
time. An informal local leader in Taluk Kuantan, during 
an interview with the author, also argued that even 
though the local people have been given their share in 
PIR-Trans scheme, they usually were not consulted in 
advance about the use of their areas by the government 
for such projects. He observed that in many cases the 
government ignored or did not pay attention to the local 
interests or local aspirations. In other words, the local 
people were treated merely as objects rather than as 
human beings. It is therefore no surprise that indigenous 
people often refused the government plan and as a result 
conflict occurred. In such situations the government 
blamed the local people as being opposed to regional 
development. But what was actually happening, he 
explained, was that the government basically adopted "a 
wrong approach" in relation to the local people.
Institutionally, the difficulties and problems of 
implementing the central government plan for 
transmigration, were noted by Tjokroamidjojo (1979: 80) 
in his Way Abung study:
27 Interview, 28 December 1987.
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While problems of implementation thus stemmed 
to a certain degree from the weakness of 
coordination, they also resulted from other 
causes, some of which are indicated here. In 
planning, more emphasis had been placed on the 
relief of demographic pressures in Java than on 
regional development and social improvement in 
Sumatra. Delays in the processing of government 
financial aid and disbursements contributed to 
a lowered capacity of the program to absorb 
transmigrant in destination areas. Government 
clearance and land, lagged behind the need for 
allocation of plots to newly arrived settlers, 
and the latter did not have the necessary 
equipment to clear the land themselves. In 
addition, official administration of land 
titles was unduly cumbersome.
For the Fourth Plan period, the government decided 
to establish a new Department of Transmigration. It was 
essentially a merger of the former DITADA of Public Works 
and the Directorate General of Transmigration. Following 
the decision to establish a separate department, the 
personnel of some sections in DITADA were moved to the 
Directorate General of Preparation and Settlement 
(PANKIM) and personnel of Directorate General of 
Transmigration joined the Directorate General of 
Mobilisation and Development (RAHBIN) of the new 
Department of Transmigration. Although the implementation 
problems that resulted from the physical separation 
between DITADA and the Directorate General of 
Transmigration seemed to have been solved with this 
unification, the different experiences of the personnel 
of PANKIM and RAHBIN could not be easily co-ordinated.
The personnel of the former DITADA, which had been 
dominated by planners, mostly from engineering
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backgrounds, continued to operate in their own style, and 
tended to complete their tasks faster than their 
counterparts from RAHBIN. Partly because their tasks 
mostly dealt with physical activities involving heavy 
equipment, PANKIM used to obtain a larger budget from the 
central government compared with RAHBIN. Partly because 
of its abundant financial resources was that PANKIM was 
able to achieve its target for physical settlement 
preparation, particularly during Repelita III and 
Repelita IV periods. Preparation of the settlements had 
to be completed before the RAHBIN staff could commence 
their work. This situation, according to a senior staff 
in the Department of Transmigration, was the major cause 
of the large number of unoccupied houses in the project 
areas, a problem that was given wide publicity by the
7 Qpress in November 1987 and known as the puso issue.
Due to the serious problems that the transmigration 
program had experienced during implementation, the 
President on 16 October 1985 promulgated an instruction 
(Keppres No. 59) that the governors in each receiving 
province should be responsible for co-ordination of the
Zö Puso is a term which is used to denote food-crops 
that failed to produce, usually as a result of insect 
attack or natural disaster. In the context of 
transmigration, puso was used to denote the unused 
houses. These houses which mostly needed reconstruction 
had been completed by PANKIM before RAHBIN had begun to 
recruit, transport and resettle transmigrants and just at 
the time when the budget was experiencing a severe 
cutback, according to an interview with a senior staff 
member in the Department of Transmigration, December 
1987. The current Minister for Transmigration, Soegiarto, 
gave a similar reason in his explanation to the press on 
the issue of puso (Kompas, 28 February 1989).
transmigration program in their area. However, this move 
failed to solve the problem, mainly because frequent 
interventions from ministerial offices in Jakarta had 
more direct influence on program implementation than did 
the governor. The formal authority of the governor was 
not strong enough to overcome this direct intervention 
from Jakarta. Governors have directed their attention to 
transmigration implementation problems in their provinces 
but the effects have often been somewhat token. For 
example, partly due to strong pressure from the central 
government, as well as national press coverage on program 
delays, the Governor of Riau immediately visited several 
transmigration projects and ordered the contractors to 
speed up their work (Kompas, 23 January 1980) .
The Governor has less power than the ministerial 
office in Jakarta in relation to the transmigration 
program because transmigration has national priority and 
is considered as a strategic program. The Minister who 
has direct command over the program's resources and 
manpower has more power to deal with it and is located in
Jakarta, close to the centre of power. President Suharto
himself has given strong personal attention to
transmigration. This, explains why the latter was so
influential, and by the same token, the seemingly lesser 
power of the governors during program implementation. One 
former director of the Department of Transmigration 
reported that, in his personal experience, because 
transmigration had been considered a strategic program,
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it had been very easy for government agencies working for 
the program to request budget funds, no matter how much 
they needed (Gunawan, 1986: 5).
6.5. Summary and Conclusion
Many of the problems experienced in the 
implementation of the transmigration program were 
basically a result of the joint connection of a top-down 
and centralised approach among the implementing agencies 
at the centre, and a strong, centrally-imposed target 
orientation among the implementing agencies in the 
regions.
In the boom periods, starting from the beginning of 
Repelita III until the middle of Repelita TV, as the 
transmigration program became an important vehicle for 
developing the regions, the implementation of the program 
become an arena in which each agency attempted to achieve 
their own physical target. This was especially the case 
for the implementing agencies under the Ministry of 
Public Works. However, integration with other agencies 
was often neglected. Co-ordination, particularly in the 
Repelita III period, was essential due to the many 
different departments that dealt with transmigration. 
However, effective co-ordination was rarely achieved. In 
the regions, disputes among the implementing agencies
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involved with the transmigration program were almost 
unavoidable because each agency, including Public Works, 
Agriculture or Transmigration, acted on the directions of 
its office in Jakarta.
In the Fourth Development Plan, partly because the 
co-ordination between agencies had created many problems 
during the implementation of the Third Plan, the 
President decided to establish a separate department that 
mainly dealt with transmigration. The new department was 
essentially a merger of DITADA of Department of Public 
Works and the former Directorate General of 
Transmigration. As a merger of two different departments, 
adaptation and consolidation were required. These proved 
difficult. Although transmigration was to be carried out 
by a single department, co-ordination remained a serious 
problem, in particular between the two major directorate 
generals of Settlement Preparation (PANKIM) and 
Mobilisation and Development (RAHBIN). The two 
directorates, in practice, have continued to act 
independently partly due to their different backgrounds 
and previous experiences.
The Governors, since the end of 1986, have been 
given formal authority to co-ordinate the transmigration 
program, but in reality have little power and are not 
influential. Within the government structure in 
Indonesia, the governor and his administration are just 
another sectoral agency in the region, subordinated to
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the Ministry of Home Affairs. With regard to 
transmigration, the governor's problem is even more 
difficult since transmigration is a national priority in 
which President Suharto himself take an active personal 
interest. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that 
transmigration had become a sacred program, an article of 
faith, that no one dared to oppose. In such 
circumstances, as precisely argued by Arndt (1984: 49) to 
recommend the abandonment of the transmigration policy, 
however sound the arguments might be, would be pointless.
Another major problem during program implementation 
was related to the availability of funds. Since the 
transmigration program is almost totally dependent on the 
central government budget, a major cutback since 1986 has 
drastically affected the program implementation, both in 
Riau and South Kalimantan.
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Chapter VII
THE CENTRE-REGIONAL CONTEXT OF TRANSMIGRATION 
IMPLEMENTATION: AN ASSESSMENT
This chapter will assess the transmigration policy 
as it was formulated and implemented during the New Order 
(1969-1988) . The assessment is based on two assumptions. 
The first assumption is that population policy analysis 
can only be meaningful if it is placed in the specific 
country context. As argued by Korten (1975: 139) a 
comprehensive country-specific analysis is required to 
provide insights into three crucial aspects of the policy 
process: first, the process through which political will 
or acquiescence is developed for population policies; 
second, the dynamic decision processes through which 
specific policy choices are made and programs are 
designed; and third, the contextual aspect of the 
implementation processes that are central to the success 
or failure of a given policy.
Korten (1975) provided only a general approach to 
the analysis of population policy. A more workable 
approach is offered by the framework of implementation 
analysis proposed by Smith (1973b). While Korten's 
approach is useful in identifying the broad, general 
aspects of the policy process, Smith's approach provides 
a more detailed framework in which to locate and analyse 
such factors as the process of policy making and the
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roles of implementing organisations, target groups, and 
environments in a dynamic-interaction processes. (See 
Smith's framework, above, p. 28.)
The second assumption underlying this assessment is 
that transmigration, given its function of redistributing 
population from 'inner' to 'outer' Indonesia, has always 
been influenced by the dynamic relations between the 
centre, in this case Java or Jakarta, and the periphery, 
that is, the regions or the outer islands. The provinces 
of Riau and South Kalimantan were selected to provide 
case studies in which to explore the context of 
transmigration policy implementation. This chapter will 
assess transmigration policy implementation under the New 
Order, adopting the policy implementation framework 
proposed by Smith, supported by evidence from the Riau 
and South Kalimantan case studies.
7.1. The Policy-Making Process
The policy-making process is defined as a process in 
which a particular policy or program is formulated. There 
are several important elements to be considered in 
analysing policy-making. These are: consultation, time, 
the source of the policy, and lastly, expediency or 
analysis that are used to support or to accomplish the 
policy-making process.
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Consultation. The questions that should be asked 
here are as follows: Are there consultations with, or 
active participation during policy formulation by the 
target groups affected by the policy or implementing 
organizations? Is participation encouraged or blocked?
Transmigration policy has been formulated solely by 
the planners at the central government in Jakarta. The 
potential transmigrants, who are mostly rural people in 
Java and Bali, in the view of transmigration planners, 
are primarily seen as 'objects' rather than 'subjects' to 
be consulted or to participate in policy formulation. In 
Indonesia, the notion of consultation in a western- 
democratic sense is irrelevant, given the Indonesian, or 
more precisely the Javanese, concept of government which 
is essentially paternalistic and autocratic. Consultation 
with the target group, that is the potential 
transmigrants, therefore, has never been considered by 
Indonesian policy makers in formulating transmigration 
policy.
During the New Order period, formally, the principal 
planners of transmigration policy were the economist- 
technocrat group, which was institutionally represented 
in the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) in 
Jakarta. In formulating the plan Bappenas was responsible 
for co-ordinating the several ministries dealing with 
transmigration policy, including Transmigration, Home 
Affairs, Public Works and Finance, as well as the
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Regional Development Planning Boards (Bappeda). As argued 
by Glassburner (1978: 29), although Bappenas is the 
centre of activity at the time of writing the plan, this 
agency is not granted a real central management system 
which would allow it to control and operationalise the 
formulated plan. During the implementation of the plan, 
changing policy directions without any consultation with 
Bappenas could easily take place, mainly because the 
actual power holders are beyond the control of Bappenas. 
In the case of transmigration, the President or the 
Ministers are often more influential in directing the 
policy implementation.
In the policy-making process, the roles of 
provincial level government apparatus, as well as the 
regional level implementing agencies (Kanwil 
Transmigrasi), were largely confined to the provision of 
the information needed by the planners and decision 
makers in the central government. Part of the reluctancy 
on the part of the central government to give power to 
the regional government, as it relates to the development 
planning activities, is pointed out by Hugo, Hull, Hull 
and Jones (1987: 299) as being:
...the belief that technocratic skills are weak at 
the provincial and kabupaten level, an (expressed) 
suspicion that corruption will be more rampant in a 
decentralized system, and perhaps an (unexpressed) 
aim to keep centralized control on larger resources 
for reasons of personal/departmental aggrandizement 
and/or financial gain.
Among the planners and bureaucratic elites in the
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regions, the dominant position of the central government 
in the policy making process was fully recognized. In 
attempting to influence the decision making process of 
the central government, several strategies were adopted 
by the bureaucratic elites in the regions. As discussed 
in Chapter VI (Section 6.3), one such strategy was 
lobbying. Although they were unlikely to have been able 
to achieve major changes, the regions often made 
considerable efforts to influence the course of 
development in their areas.
The participation of the target groups in the 
formulation of the policy was insignificant, given the 
dominant position of the government in the policy-making 
process. Target groups, like other segments of civil 
society in Indonesia, are not granted avenues to 
articulate their demands or to participate in directing 
or formulating government policies. The ruling elites, 
which are dominated by the military, control the 
interests of the citizens through their domination over 
the selection of the people's representatives in 
parliament (DPR). In this political environment, the role 
of the people's representatives have been primarily to 
approve the development plans that have been formulated 
by the government.
In the New Order, the political participation of the 
civil society has been strongly engineered by the 
military toward the so-called 'corporatist 
representatives' in which the public interests were 
controlled into various functional groups. In such social 
engineering, the potential transmigrants or the 
transmigrants were formally represented by the Indonesian 
Farmers' Association (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia
236
Time. Was the policy formed in a time of crisis and 
thus formed quickly, or was the policy developed in a 
slow and deliberative process?.
Since the New Order was established, the national 
transmigration policy has been prepared once every five 
years for the National Five-Year Development Plan 
(Repelita). Between 1969 and 1988, however, 
transmigration experienced several major policy changes. 
The first major changes occurred at the beginning of 
Repelita III, in 1978, when the government decided to set 
the program target at 500,000 families for the five 
years. The government also established a Junior Minister 
for Transmigration (Mr. Martono) to assist the Minister 
for Manpower and Transmigration (Professor Harun Zain). 
This change was mainly due to a sharp increase in the 
government budget as a result of increased revenues from 
oil. Another important factor was the commitment from the 
World Bank to assist the transmigration program. A second 
major policy change occurred at the beginning of Repelita 
TV, in 1983. Partly due to the government's claim that 
the target of Repelita III had been achieved, it decided 
to increase the target for Repelita TV to 750,000 
families. It also established a separate ministry to
or HKTI) of which Mr. Martono had been the chairman for 
many years. Looking from this perspective, the 
appointment of Mr. Martono (he is not a technocrat nor a 
military leader) by President Suharto as the Junior 
Minister for Transmigration in 1978 and as the Minister 
for Transmigration in 1983 was not a surprise.
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implement transmigration policy.2 Unfortunately, the 
world oil price collapse in 1985 and 1986 severely 
disrupted the implementation of this plan.
An abrupt policy change took place around 1986, 
mainly as a consequence of the restricted revenues and 
resulting severe financial problems facing the government 
at that time. In 1986/87 the government budget for 
transmigration was drastically reduced by 44 per cent, 
and by a further 65 per cent in the 1987/88 fiscal year. 
As a result, the original target had to be rescheduled. 
The World Bank subsequently pressured the government to 
redirect the policy to one of sustaining existing 
settlements, rather than moving people to new 
settlements. If new settlements were to be opened, the 
World Bank suggested that they should be based on more 
productive farming systems.3 This policy change, using
 ^ The need to establish a separate ministry for 
transmigration, in fact, had been a concern among some 
scholars before the government decision to set up the 
Department of Transmigration in 1983. Hardjono, the most 
informed scholar on transmigration, for example, argued 
in 1980:
Now, is perhaps the time to have a special 
department to implement the transmigration program, 
so that such a national task would receive adequate 
priority. The experiences of previous years have 
shown that it was useless to combine transmigration 
under the same minister with other affairs, such as 
veterans, co-operatives, or even with manpower 
(1982: 172, author's translation).
A similar argument was also stated in one of the UNDP's 
recommendations to the Indonesian government to set up an 
independent Department of Transmigration (PAE/RMI, 1983:
§ > • As shown in the plan document for Repelita V the World 
Bank's suggestion was accepted by the government. The 
Fifth Plan targeted 550,000 families to be moved between
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Smith's terminology, is an outcome of major 'tensions' (a 
soaring budget from 1978 to 1983) and 'transactions' (the 
need to increase the target, the World Bank commitment) 
that occurred during implementation of the plan which, in 
turn, generated and institutionalized feedback to the 
policy making process in the central government.
Source of policy. At the beginning of the New Order, 
transmigration policy was basically a continuation of the 
policies from the previous government. The policy gained 
an important new status in the country's national 
development program mainly because of its strong personal 
support from General Suharto, who assumed the presidency 
in 1967. Presidential support has played a critical role 
in promoting transmigration as a major national priority 
within the economic development framework formulated by 
the economist-technocrats. Since around the mid-'70s 
international agencies, particularly the World Bank, have 
given a commitment to financially assist the program. The 
direction of transmigration policy since then has 
sometimes been influenced by World Bank experts.
The role of the World Bank in transmigration began
1989/90 and 1993/4, of which only 180,000 were to be 
assisted, and the rest would be moving at their own 
expense (swakarsa). According to Booth (1989: 21-3), it
was clear from the plan document that much greater 
emphasis would be given to non-foodcrop agriculture, 
industry and services. Mainly because the government 
budget was far more limited, the private sectors have 
been encouraged to invest their capital in the 
transmigration program, particularly in the tree-crop 
transmigration schemes (Kompas, 28 February 1989),
although it was not mentioned in the Repelita V plan.
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in 1976 when it conducted a pilot project in Batu Raja, 
South Sumatra. The aim of the project was to introduce a 
new type of transmigration scheme based on cash crops. 
The new scheme attempted to provide a new direction for 
transmigration policy, which had previously been 
dominated by food-crop agriculture. Although the World 
Bank's pilot project on tree crops was considered 
successful (World Bank, 1988: 161), such schemes never 
became widely implemented. The second World Bank project, 
started in 1979, surprisingly enough, returned to support 
for the traditional transmigration scheme based on food 
crops. This could be interpreted as failure on the part 
of the World Bank to influence policy makers in directing 
transmigration policy into more market-oriented 
settlements. After 1987, mainly as a result of the 
limited budget to open up new settlements, the World 
Bank's first interest in tree-crop transmigration scheme 
was somewhat revitalized.
Expediency and Analysis (The form of analysis or 
expediency which is used to accomplish and support the 
policy-making process). In transmigration, although 
analyses regarding problem identification and the search 
for alternative strategies and comparisons that are 
considered as part of the policy-making process were 
carried out, they often were ad hoc and fragmented. As a 
result, policy formulation has proceeded without a very 
clear or integrated long-term goal. Between the mid-'70s 
and the mid-'80s, at the time when the budget provision
240
for transmigration was abundant, numerous research 
projects were commissioned by the Ministry of 
Transmigration to various domestic, and international 
research agencies. University research institutes were 
among the most active in conducting transmigration 
research projects, ranging from soil surveys to social 
and cultural impact studies. Some large projects, such as 
aerial-photographic land mapping, funded by the World 
Bank, were conducted by international companies. Although 
some studies have produced policy recommendations, in 
many instances there were few avenues for the 
incorporation of research results into the policy-making 
process. This was partly because the actual policy-making 
process in Indonesia often took place within the elite 
circles beyond the formal structural institutions.
Another problem of the utilisation of research 
findings in the policy making process is also related to 
and conditioned by the role of science in the political 
context of the New Order. The role of science, and the 
social sciences in particular, has been conditioned by 
the fact that research funds were controlled by the 
government, and a large part of these were channelled 
through sectoral ministries. In such conditions, 
researchers or scientists who were commissioned by the 
government to conduct studies were compelled to follow 
the terms of reference formulated by the government 
apparatus. There is little doubt that those terms of 
reference were basically geared to the need of the
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government to collect the primary data for planning 
purposes and more importantly to provide a kind of 
scientific legitimation to justify the existing 
policies.4
Transmigration policy in the New Order period 
essentially represented the views of different interest 
groups within the ruling elite. Two groups were most 
influential: the military elite and the economist- 
technocrats. Transmigration policy was often used by the 
military for strategic-political reasons. For example, 
transmigration was used to strengthen national defense in 
remote places like the Natuna Islands, and to weaken the 
separatist movement in Irian. There are also indications 
that the ruling elites have utilised the policy to 
minimize the possibility of social unrest resulting from 
the growing number of landless and very poor farmers. 
This motive was, for example, stated by the Junior 
Minister for Transmigration, Martono (1978: 74, cited in 
Hardjono, 1982: 170),
...transmigration can reduce the possibility of 
social unrest or social upheaval, which are the 
consequences of low standards of living and 
unemployment in the densely populated regions 
(author's translation).
By sending such poor and unemployed people to other 
islands, the population pressures that could create 
political and social tensions would be reduced.
4For a comprehensive observation on the role and position 
of social science research in the New Order, see Kleden 
(1987), particularly pp. 85-104.
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For the economist-technocrats, transmigration policy 
has been seen as a way to develop remote areas in the 
Outer Islands. Through the transmigration program large 
amounts of capital have been channelled to the regions 
from the central government budget, mainly to open up new 
settlements, construct roads and other infrastructure, 
and to build social facilities. Above those two groups 
was President Suharto himself, who seemed to favour 
transmigration policy as a multi-purpose instrument to 
develop and rule the country.
7.2. The Idealized Policy
The idealized policy is defined as the patterns of 
interaction that the policy-makers are attempting to 
induce. There are four relevant categories of variables 
of the idealised policy: the form of policy, the type of 
policy, the program, and the image of policy. In the case 
of transmigration, the policy takes the form of a formal 
program based on a national law on transmigration 
(National Law No. 2, 1972). Transmigration can be 
classified as a broad and complex policy with a large 
formal structure of organization. Since 1983 it has been
Other groups which benefited from the transmigration 
program and therefore are in favour of the continuation 
of this program are the international lending agencies 
(the World Bank in particular), business groups (domestic 
and international) and the government bureaucracy. For a 
schematic picture of the relationships of various groups 
dealt with transmigration program, see Aditjondro (1986).
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an independent department. As a major part of 
transmigration policy involves the distribution of land, 
shelter and other facilities, it can be described as a 
distributive policy. However, the main characteristics of 
transmigration policy resemble the type of program that 
has been labelled 'ideological'.
According to Quick (1980: 42) , there are three main
characteristics of an ideological program. The first 
characteristic is that the program is expected to realize 
a multitude of goals at the same time. The program 
represents a working model of the new society, and is 
therefore expected to introduce changes in many aspects 
of existing social relationships. In addition to being 
numerous, the goals set for an ideological program are 
also ambiguous in that national elites rarely have a 
clearly worked out view of what is required to move from 
the existing state of affairs to the new one. A second 
characteristic is that the program has no hierarchy of 
goals, that is, no clear statement that goal A is more 
important than goal B, or at least that goal A should be 
achieved before embarking on goal B. The ambiguity of 
goals presents the implementing organization with the 
clear message that everything must be done at once and 
that there are no priorities that can be used to orient 
implementation. A third characteristic of the goal 
structure of ideological programs is the immeasurability 
of many of their objectives. The target population is 
expected to live differently, to act and think
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differently, and to progress toward many of those goals, 
but such objectives cannot be measured with any 
precision. Agencies charged with implementing ideological 
programs thus have a goal structure that consists of a 
few measurable goals and many nonmeasurable ones.
Ideological programs are also affected by the high 
expectations of the national political elite. Such 
programs are endowed with a sense of urgency and vital 
importance, placing the implementing agency under extreme 
political pressure to produce results. So important is 
success in these programs that political appointees are 
selected to head the implementing agency, and resources 
are made available to this agency that are unavailable to 
other programs. The organizations charged with 
implementing ideological programs are also relatively 
immune from criticism, shrouded as they are by the 
national priority of their program. These, then, are the 
basic characteristics that define an 'ideological 
program': multiple, ambiguous, and nonmeasurable goals; 
high expectations; resource availability; politicised 
leadership of the implementing organization; and immunity 
from public criticism.6
The immunity of transmigration policy from 
'independent' evaluation, has been admitted, for 
instance, by a Bappenas official on one occasion where a 
closed meeting was held between Bappenas and the Centre 
for Policy Implementation Studies (CPIS). CPIS is a 
'semi-government' consulting agency, attached to the 
Ministry of Finance, and assisted by Harvard Institute 
for International Development (HIID). A major task of 
CPIS is to advise the Indonesian government, particularly 
through the Minister of Finance, on the implementation of 
various government projects. The advice was sought after 
an evaluation of a certain program was conducted by CPIS.
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Transmigration policy, particularly since the New 
Order, has been given full political and financial 
support and strong commitment from the government, 
especially the President. The policy, however, was 
largely formulated without clear demands or support from 
the society. The scope of transmigration policy is 
national, in which all 27 provinces have participated, 
either as sending or receiving provinces.
In Indonesia, it is not easy to conduct a neutral 
and objective evaluation of the image of transmigration 
policy in society. A thorough investigation of 
transmigration policy is therefore lacking. If there were 
such an evaluation, any critical outcomes would unlikely 
be tolerated by the authorities. As transmigration policy 
has attained a high national priority, any negative 
images of the policy would tend to be restrained.
Several cases provide hints that the transmigration 
program has been only reluctantly accepted by the rural 
people in Java. A micro study by Singarimbun (1980) among 
the villagers in Krasak, Central Java, for example, 
showed that most of the respondents were very reluctant
In the meeting, the official from Bappenas warned the 
CPIS not to be involved in evaluating two government 
programs, transmigration and co-operatives. The reason 
was because, those two programs were considered as 'too 
political', and CPIS would face many problems when they 
attempted to evaluate those two departments. (This 
information was obtained from personal communication from 
a CPIS staff member in January 1988)
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to join the transmigration program, even though their 
villages were considered at high risk of devastation from 
an eruption from the Merapi volcano. Another study by 
Suwarno (1979), showed that various groups of people in 
rural Java had resisted the transmigration program. In 
Surabaya, based on information from interviews with 343 
squatters in several slum areas, Wibowo (1983: 151)
reported that 36 per cent of his respondents 'strongly 
disagreed' and 25 per cent 'disagreed' with the statement 
that the transmigration program was an alternative course 
to obtain employment. Recent events in Kedung Ombo, 
Central Java, where many people who had been affected by 
a dam construction refused to be transmigrated by the 
government, suggest that transmigration was not a very 
attractive program to many rural people in Java (Tempo, 
25 March 1989) .
The image of transmigration among the people who 
have been affected by the policy, both the Javanese 
transmigrants and the local people in the receiving 
areas, has been varied, depending on their previous 
experience. Transmigrants who had been successfully 
settled in their new locations would generally have 
positive images of the transmigration policy, but those 
who were still struggling to survive or who had abandoned 
their settlements would tend to have a negative image. 
The image of transmigration amongst the local people 
whose land had been used for the program also depended on 
their experiences. Many local people in the receiving
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areas, for instance, resented the transmigration because 
the government paid more attention to the transmigrants 
than to them. They also perceived the transmigration 
program in negative terms: for example, that the
transmigrants were mostly poor and unskilled farmers who 
therefore would not bring any benefits to their areas. 
Many educated local people also thought that the
transmigration program would have a negative impact on 
their regions in the long run. Among those people who
implemented the policy, particularly in the receiving 
areas, transmigration was seen as something good. Such
images were influenced by the role of the transmigration 
program in providing them with opportunities to obtain 
additional income through the government budget for 
transmigration projects. This was especially common 
during the boom period (1978-1985).
7.3. The Target Group
The target group is defined as those who are 
required to adapt to the new patterns of interactions 
which are imposed by the policy. Several relevant factors 
are: the degree of organization or institutionalization 
of the target group, the leadership of the target group, 
and the prior policy experience of the target group. As 
most potential transmigrants were rural landless people, 
their social, economic and political status was very low 
compared with other segments of society. For such people,
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joining the transmigration program was perhaps the only 
available strategy to improve their standard of living. 
This had been noted by MacAndrews (1986b: 14):
One of the great attractions of the large and 
often controversial Indonesian transmigration 
program that moves peasant farmers from Java to 
the outer islands where living conditions are 
usually far from attractive is the fact that 
each families receives 2 hectares of land for 
cultivation and thus access to land that is 
denied them in Java.
On the other hand Hardjono (1977: 36) has argued
that:
Too often those who agreed to move were the 
less enterprising and less resourceful people 
in the village.
The degree of organization or institutionalization 
among such people was low. Leadership among the 
transmigrants was also very weak. Their response to the 
transmigration policy was also influenced by their 
experiences, tending to be positive when they had reaped 
benefits from resettlement, or negative when they had not 
benefited. The transmigration program was generally 
supported by the transmigrants, mainly because 
transmigration did distribute many benefits, particularly 
in the form of land and shelter, as well as government 
support for about 18 months in the form of food. However, 
as one long-time observer of transmigration has argued, 
the support and guidance from a large number of 
government agencies usually were not sufficient to 
promote the development of farming agriculture of the
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transmigrants (Sayogyo, 1985: 32-34).
7.4. The Implementing Organization
The organization responsible for the implementation 
of policy is in most instances a unit of the government 
bureaucracy. Smith (c.1987, unpub.) argued that 
bureaucracies are not machine-like entities that 
faithfully and diligently go about their tasks of policy 
implementation in a neutral, programmed, mechanistic 
manner. Bureaucratic agencies are controlled and staffed 
by individuals who have their own feelings, attitudes and 
behaviour patterns. Organizations, themselves, operate in 
an environment of overlapping responsibilities with other 
agencies and have their favoured clients and their 
friends, as well as enemies and adversaries. 
•Bureaucratic politics' is a concept often used to 
describe organizational operations within this highly 
charged bureaucratic context. Three key variables of the 
implementing organization should be considered in the 
implementation of the policy. These are the structure and 
personnel of the organization, the leadership of the 
administrative organization, and the implementing program 
and capacity.
The structure and personnel of the transmigration 
implementing agency has not been very stable, since it 
was constantly shifting from one ministry to another for
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each new Five-Year Development Plan. As a result of its 
changing location within the government bureaucracy, the 
structure of the organization was also subject to almost 
constant change. Although the personnel of the 
transmigration agency were mostly the same people, they 
experienced continual uncertainty as a result of the 
frequent changes of ministry.
Leadership in the agency implementing transmigration 
policy was influenced by the elite background of the 
leader. Under the New Order there were several changes in 
leadership style in transmigration, for example from the 
economist-technocrat, Harun Zain, to the politico- 
bureaucrat, Martono, and then to military leadership 
under Soegiarto.
The capacity of the implementing organization refers 
to the intensity and care taken to organize the 
implementation in meeting the policy objectives. In the 
case of transmigration, the capacity of its implementing 
agency, since the beginning of Repelita III, was quite 
large, particularly in terms of the budget allocated to 
the program. In addition, transmigration was also 
strongly supported by the President and had been 
established as a separate and independent department in 
1983. However, since there are many competing factions 
within the ruling elites as well as among the different 
interests involved within the implementing agency, 
actualization of the capacity of the transmigration
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program was often blocked and distorted. The large number 
of uninhabitable houses for transmigrants as had been 
reported in 1987, as well as the intensified social and 
political problems in Irian Jaya as the result of 
strategic-military considerations dominating the 
transmigration program, were examples of cases where the 
formulated goal had largely failed to be achieved.
7.5. The Environment
Environmental factors are those factors, such as the 
social, political, technological and natural context of 
society, that can influence or be influenced by policy 
implementation. The social and political environments 
during the New Order were relatively stable. However, 
since political stability basically was a result of the 
tight control by the military and bureaucracy over the 
civil society, the extent of genuine acceptance for the 
transmigration program within the society is 
questionable.
A political environment in which policy initiatives 
are dominated by the state apparatus is described by 
Grindle as a 'closed' system:
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When the state apparatus itself monopolizes 
economic and social power in the society and 
retains full discretion over policy 
initiatives, the system can be labelled closed. 
Its policies generally respond to the 
institutional interests of the group that 
dominates the government machinery. Commonly in 
such systems, national elites conclude that 
their goals for the society, such as economic 
development or national security, are 
prejudiced by the social and economic patterns 
characterizing 'marginal populations' (Grindle, 
1980:284).
In Indonesia, since there is no 'democratic' avenue 
for the civil society to express or to articulate its 
views, it is very difficult to judge whether or not a 
government policy is genuinely supported by the majority. 
In such an environment, the real problem is the lack of 
viable control and feedback from society. Transmigration 
implementing agencies and their bureaucrats at the 
operational level were mainly motivated by the urgency to 
achieve the physical and measurable targets, such as the 
number of houses to be built, the length of roads to be 
constructed or the number of families to be moved. In 
addition, the hierarchical structure of the 
transmigration implementing agencies created a 
bureaucratic attitude that is popularly known in 
Indonesia as 'so long as the boss is pleased' (ABS). This 
attitude was adopted by sub-ordinates especially in 
relation to their direct superior in the office, in which 
they would perform or act first and foremost in order to 
fulfil the interests of their superiors. This kind of 
attitude, among others, often resulted at the operational 
level in neglect by the implementing agencies of the
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needs of transmigrants or local people.
Observations and interviews in Riau and South 
Kalimantan suggested a certain level of rejection of the 
program among people in the region, in particular because 
it was strongly imposed by the central government and 
often ignored the real needs of the local people. Again, 
given the weak bargaining power of the local people in 
relation to the central government, their dissatisfaction 
was silently suppressed.
7.6. Conclusion
The transmigration policy-making process has been 
almost totally dominated by the central government and 
allows only a small role for the regional government. 
Within the structural organization of the Indonesian 
government, the role of the provincial level government 
is hierarchically subordinated to the central government. 
In the policy-making process, the regional government's 
primary task is to provide information to the planners 
and decision makers in the central government. In the 
implementation of the plan, the provincial level 
governments have played an important role, particularly 
in implementing the central plan and decisions. However, 
their activities were mostly contained within guide-lines 
determined by the central government.
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The main characteristics of transmigration policy, 
such as its multiple, ambiguous, and non-measurable 
goals, resource availability, immunity from criticism, 
strong political support from the ruling elites, and high 
expectations, suggest that transmigration is an 
ideological policy. As an ideological policy, 
transmigration in itself produces formidable counter­
productive forces. For example, its immunity to public 
criticism has created an implementing agency that lacks 
viable control and feedback. Such counter-productive 
forces have, in turn, hindered the implementation 
process.
The target groups, which consist of potential 
transmigrants, transmigrants and indigenous populations 
in the receiving areas, are people with only limited 
bargaining power and alternatives within the existing 
social, economic and political environment. Their 
powerless position within the implementation process has 
allowed the implementing agency to treat them as mere 
objects rather than subjects.
In the New Order period, one major 'tension* and 
'transaction' that has generated and institutionalized 
feedback to the policy-making process occurred after the 
budget problem emerged in 1986 and 1987. A drastic 
reduction in the level of government funding inevitably 
forced the policy-makers to limit the original plan. 
However, although current trends in transmigration
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policy, such as the new focus on existing settlements, 
and more economical approaches as suggested by the World 
Bank, seem to indicate new directions, it is too early at 
this stage to evaluate the results of this apparent 
policy change.
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Chapter VIII
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT.
This study has pursued three primary objectives: 
first, to explain the demographic and socio-historical 
contexts that have shaped transmigration policy; second, 
to analyse the transmigration policy processes during the 
New Order period, in particular since the beginning of 
Repelita I to the end of Repelita TV; and third, to 
examine transmigration policy implementation in Riau and 
South Kalimantan within the context of centre-regional 
relationships. In this summary and conclusion, the major 
findings of this study will be outlined and the prospects 
for transmigration policy will be considered.
Transmigration, as a government endeavour to 
redistribute the population from Java and Bali to other 
islands, is a policy with a long history. As a policy 
that persisted for many decades, transmigration therefore 
has proved its instrumental value in the perception and 
interest of various government elites. The demographic
reasons behind the program, that is to reduce the
population pressure in Java as well as to balance the
uneven population distribution between Java and other 
islands, undoubtedly have become the primary
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justification for the government in maintaining the 
program. In the course of history, however, the 
transmigration program has always been used by the 
government to achieve several other goals and never 
solely for demographic purposes.
The history of transmigration has shown that this 
policy, which in colonial times was known as 
colonization, besides aiming to solve the population 
problems in Java, was also used to provide cheap labour 
for plantation estates, particularly in Sumatra. After 
independence, especially during and after the PRRI- 
Permesta rebellion in 1956-58, transmigration had 
explicit strategic and military purposes, mainly to 
weaken the separatist movement by resettling the Javanese 
in the troubled areas in Sumatra and Sulawesi. In the New 
Order period, as well as having other goals, 
transmigration has been viewed as an instrument to 
bolster regional development in the remote areas in the 
Outer Islands. Up to the dawn of the New Order period, 
although the total number of people who were moved under 
transmigration programs was not substantial, the enduring 
perception which valued transmigration as a multi-purpose 
instrument had given the program a certain mystique as a 
'panacea', a cure for many problems. Assessing 
transmigration policy during the New Order necessarily 
means to recognize and examine the implementation of an 
'old' assumption, and perhaps its myths and fallacies 
within the changed political setting.
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While this study is mainly concerned with the post- 
1965 period, some of the roots of current policy are to 
be found in the earlier years, even in the colonial 
period. Since the beginning of the New Order, the 
economist-technocrat group has played a significant role 
in rationalising the process of national development. 
However, given that actual political power is largely 
controlled by the President and his military elite, the 
policy outcomes have suffered from many inefficiencies 
and irrationalities. In these circumstances, 
transmigration policy has become a target for various 
interest groups, particularly the military and the 
economist-technocrats. The military basically perceived 
transmigration policy as a tool for strategic goals, such 
as national defense and security. The economist- 
technocrats, on the other hand, considered transmigration 
as a vehicle to promote regional development, especially 
in the Outer Islands. The principal actor in these 
competing interests in transmigration policy, though, 
appears to have been President Suharto himself. It was 
Suharto who revitalised transmigration policy and in the 
early years of the New Order saw transmigration as an 
important policy to solve the population problems of Java 
as well as for other development and security purposes.
The transmigration program as a public policy is 
mainly determined by the government or by the state. The 
input from the society, particularly during the
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formulation of the policy, is almost negligible. The 
government agencies, particularly the Department of 
Transmigration and its regional offices, dominated the 
whole process of implementation. As the entire policy 
making process has been dominated by the central 
government, the implementing agencies at the regional 
level have not been able to make any changes or 
alterations in whatever has been decided by the central 
government. As a result, the problem of implementation, 
such as lack of coordination between agencies during the 
policy implementation, was unavoidable partly due to the 
rigid and top-down hierarchical relationship between the 
centre and the regional agencies.
In the New Order period, beginning in 1969, the 
development plans have been regularly formulated every 
five years. The primary indicator of the development goal 
was the annual economic growth rate. This is no surprise, 
given the dominant role of economist-technocrats in 
formulating the plan. Another important feature of Five- 
Year Development Plans was the use of a sectoral 
framework as the basis for the national development 
program. The primacy of the economist-technocrats in 
formulating the development plan has resulted in a 
condition where other goals have to be subordinated to 
the achievement of economic growth. In the 
implementation, however, there were occasions when 
secondary or tertiary goals have been given national 
priority, although from the economic point of view this
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was not always justifiable. The transmigration program is 
an example of such an occasion. A plausible explanation 
of this 'irrational' situation is that transmigration in 
itself posits the characteristics of a so-called 
'ideological' policy. Those characteristics are: strong 
political support from the president and the military 
leaders; resource availability; immunity from public 
criticism; high national priority; and multiple, 
ambiguous, and non measurable goals. President Suharto's 
strong support for transmigration was perhaps the most 
critical factor which institutionalized transmigration as 
an ideological policy. In Indonesia's New Order, the 
political environment that formed a pyramid of power with 
the President at the top became the basic explanation of 
the whole question of transmigration policy 
implementation.
The evidence from Riau and South Kalimantan suggests 
that the context of centre and regional relationships has 
played a crucial role in the implementation of 
transmigration policy. The position of the provincial- 
level government, as well as of the local society at 
large, were subordinated to the interests of the central 
government. They were thus structurally weak in relation 
to the central government. As a consequence of this 
unequal relationship, the implementation of 
transmigration policy has suffered from the lack of 
important controls and feedback mechanisms that could 
transform it into a viable and implementable policy.
261
Analysing transmigration policy within the wider context 
of centre and regional relationships indicates that 
transmigration policy clearly reflects the strength of 
centralisation in Indonesia's development.
The transmigrants, of whom the majority were 
Javanese, have been resettled and formed new communities 
in the lands of the Banjarese in South Kalimantan and the 
Malay in Riau. As transmigration is a national policy
with strong political and economic support from the
central government, any opposition , resentment or
objections, however small, from the regions are not
tolerable and could be easily labelled as provincialist, 
regionalist, or against the national interest. Within 
such unequal centre-regional relationships and 
hierarchical bureaucratic environments, the 
implementation of transmigration policy at the 
operational level becomes target oriented, and a 'so long 
as the boss is pleased' attitude is adopted.
At the operational level, as the case of 
implementation in Riau and South Kalimantan has shown, 
the ambiguous national goals of transmigration policy 
have been simply translated into physical and 
quantifiable targets, such as the number of families 
moved or the number of houses built. The preoccupation of 
the different sectors of implementing agencies with 
pursuing such physical and quantifiable targets has 
resulted in a failure to implement transmigration policy
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as an integrated and complementary effort between the 
various sectors and ministries. The prevailing problems
of implementation at the operational level - such as the 
unsuitability of land for agricultural settlements, the 
various forms of mismanagement within the implementing 
agencies, and the hidden conflicts with the local
population - apparently have only limited effect on the 
policy-making process in the central government. This 
unhealthy situation has been tolerated mainly because 
financial resources have been abundant enough to cover-up 
the escalation of such problems. However, after the 
budget was drastically cut back as the revenue from oil 
collapsed, transmigration policy has started to confront 
new dimensions of these problems.
The period after 1986 has indicated that
transmigration policy no longer enjoys the luxury of the 
previous boom period. After considering the limited 
financial resources for Repelita V (1989/90-1993/94) the 
government projected to move 550,000 families, of which 
only 180,000 are fully supported and the rest will be 
spontaneous transmigrants. The Repelita V plan document 
also showed the government to be in agreement with 
suggestions proposed by the World Bank, such as in 
bolstering cash-crop transmigration schemes and up­
grading existing settlements. Only a few new 
transmigration settlements will be opened in the next 
five years. The new Minister for Transmigration, Major 
General Soegiarto, as far as can be observed from press
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reports, has shown his awareness of the current problems 
and appears to be realistically directing the program 
towards more feasible goals.
At this stage there are two important factors that 
should be considered, particularly by planners and policy 
makers, to reevaluate the effectiveness of various 
government agencies responsible for implementing 
different aspects of transmigration policy. The first 
factor is the reality that the full political support 
and abundant financial resources enjoyed by the
transmigration program in the last two Repel it a were no
guarantee of the satisfactory implementation of
transmigration policy. The second factor concerns the
financial crisis currently faced in implementing the
policy, enabling only a limited number of transmigrants 
to be resettled with full government support. In such a 
situation, having a separate department responsible for 
implementing the transmigration program is wasteful. The 
amount of work that is currently carried out under the 
program could perhaps be more effectively conducted by an 
implementing agency at the level of Directorate General. 
Transmigration as basically a policy of moving people 
from provinces in Java and Bali to other islands would be 
more appropriately implemented under the Department of 
Home Affairs, which has relevant powers and experience to 
orchestrate the required activities between sending and 
receiving provincial governments. Yet, at present, a 
reorganisation of transmigration implementing agencies as
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has been outlined above would confront the strong 
interests of the bureaucracy, particularly within the 
Department of Transmigration, to maintain control of the 
resources for transmigration program.
At the conceptual level a redefinition of the place 
and role of transmigration in national development should 
be initiated to provide a reasonable perception which can 
be used to formulate an adequate and sustainable policy 
in the future. Preceding a new definition, an updated 
national law on transmigration whereby transmigration 
policy would be given a proper function needs to be 
formulated. The existing national law on which 
transmigration policy is based (U.U. No. 2, 1972) has 
outlined very complex and ambitious functions and for 
that reason needs to be revised. Based on the existing 
national law, various aims of transmigration policy are 
not only complex and unmeasurable but often mutually 
contradictory. Furthermore, within the current framework, 
the program has been easily used to serve various 
interest groups within the ruling elite, and this has led 
to an unmanageable program. The setting of an ambitious 
target number in Repelita TV, for instance, reflected the 
balancing of various interests to obtain consensus. Such 
an ambitious target, however, led implementing agencies 
into immense problems and difficulties.
Unspecified goals under the current law have also 
been easily used to justify elusive motives, such as
regional development 
results of which are
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and national integration, the 
very difficult to measure. It is 
therefore urgent to revise the existing national law on 
transmigration to remove fallacies and misleading 
assumptions. A total review should be conducted to 
specify the function of transmigration policy in an 
appropriate way. In this new form, transmigration policy 
should be directed towards:
-more realistic assessment of those areas in Java 
that are considered to be experiencing acute 
population pressure. If transmigration from such 
areas is considered necessary then destination 
areas should be carefully selected in terms of 
whether or not they have the potential for such 
development.
-solving the problems created by natural 
catastrophes (erosion, drought, volcanic 
eruptions) or the need to evacuate population from 
areas being developed as artificial lakes, dams, 
reforestation areas, etc.
-in the Outer-Islands, transmigration should only 
be presented as one of the possibilities for 
regional development. In this case, however, the 
potentials of the region should be the 
measure used and not some abstract target-figure 
determined behind the desk with some other 
(disguised) motivations.
However, expecting that the current government will 
undertake the above suggestions in the near future is 
perhaps premature and overlooks the persistent interests 
of the present ruling elite in respect of the old 
assumptions. These persistent interests are in fact the 
most crucial factors in the process of redefining 
transmigration and the attainment of an adequate policy
in the future.
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This study has basically argued that there is a 
significant relationship between the current socio­
political structure and the adoption of assumptions that 
perceive transmigration policy as a quick cure for many 
social problems. Within the existing social, economic and 
political structures the main factors and forces of the 
society have been formed and it has become the context 
within which current transmigration policy is justified. 
As far as the social and political structures are 
concerned, there are at least three important factors 
that can be identified which will significantly influence 
the course of transmigration policy in the near future.
The first factor is associated with the problem of 
"national integration" and centre-regional relationships. 
This problem has existed since the proclamation of 
independence, and remains as one of the major issues in 
the coming years. "National integration" has not only 
become the goal of the present government but also 
provides legitimation for other purposes. For example, 
the fact that in some places various groups of local 
people are still demanding autonomy or separation from 
the national government, such as in Irian Jaya, East 
Timor and Aceh, has justified the government view that 
national integration is still not fully achieved. In 
these cases, however, such centre-regional conflict has 
also reflected the deep resentment of the local people to 
the injustices performed by the national or central 
government. The current ruling elite, specifically the
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military, have tended to hastily interpret such problems 
as threatening national integration and hence requiring 
efforts to prevent further problems. Among various ways 
of strengthening national integration, resettlement of 
Javanese into such areas under the guise of the 
transmigration program is likely to be one policy option.
The second important factor is the perception and 
belief among the authorities that economic and political 
problems are increasing as a consequence of population 
growth and population pressure in Java. Several critical 
consequences of such pressure as perceived by the 
authorities, such as poverty, landlessness, unemployment 
and social unrest, will obviously become the focus of 
government attention in the near future. The fact that 
such perceptions and beliefs are often not based on an 
accurate evaluation of the interlinking between social, 
economic and demographic changes in Java reflects the 
fallacies and misleading assumptions embraced by the 
ruling elites. In their view, there are not many policy 
options available to solve these problems; moving people 
to other islands therefore becomes a "rational" policy 
for the government. In such circumstances, for example, 
the relative success of the family planning program in 
lessening demographic pressures, particularly in 
levelling off the numbers of young people entering Java's 
labour force in the 1990s, is surprisingly not given much 
attention by the authorities. History has shown that some 
type of transmigration policy repeatedly crops up
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whenever the authorities become nervous about Java's 
population problem. Another oil boom in the future would 
be a strong catalyst for a revival of this kind of 
policy.
The third major factor, which to some extent is 
linked with the second factor, is the preoccupation of 
economist-technocrats (supported by the World Bank) with 
a national macro-economic policy geared towards the 
attainment of economic growth. A logical consequence of 
"growth policy" is the tendency for the central 
government to concentrate on various industrial projects 
that are more capital intensive than on projects which 
could generate wide employment. As a result, economic 
policy needs to be adjusted to give greater emphasis to 
more labour intensive projects. Under the vague idea of 
regional development, transmigration is apparently
considered a neat solution to the problem. This is 
evidently the case; even though the plan document for 
Repelita V has shown some changes in the direction of 
transmigration policy, the basic assumptions seem to be 
retained. Further government emphasis on PIR-
Transmigration projects, as well as the plan to build a 
giant pulp mill in Irian Jaya in which the labour will be 
recruited from Java, could be seen in the light of this 
macro-economic scenario.
The emphasis of present transmigration policy is 
still essentially to reduce population problems in Java
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through the movement, with or without government 
assistance, of poor, less educated, and unskilled rural 
Javanese to other islands. The central government, which 
formulated the transmigration policy, obviously ignored 
the already apparent facts that, while Java has developed 
into a 'modern industrial economy' and therefore has 
attracted more educated and skilled migrants from other 
places, many of the Outer Islands have been structured 
into stagnant or even regressing economies as 
transmigrants are settled in areas of relatively poor 
soils and natural resources are exhausted.1
Viewed from this perspective, the prospect for 
transmigration policy, at least for the near future, does 
not seem very bright. Certain obvious factors, such as 
the limited areas in the Outer Islands suitable for 
agricultural settlements, will become major constraints 
for planners seeking to rebuild a large transmigration 
program, but, as demonstrated above, several other 
factors which currently dominate central government 
thinking will continue to underwrite the broad goals of 
transmigration policy. In the future, unless a
1 After plummeting oil prices in the mid-'80s, the 
central government began to emphasize non-oil exports in 
national economic policy. Since then many regulations 
have been promulgated to create a more attractive climate 
and preconditions for foreign investment in Indonesia. 
The most recent regulation (Presidential Instruction No. 
53/89) showed clearly that the government intended to 
develop many new industrial estates in Java rather than 
in the Outer Islands. The reasons, according to the 
Junior Minister for Industry, Tungky Aribowo, were mainly 
because infrastructure and labour are more readily 
accessible in Java than elsewhere (Tempo, 11 November 
1989) .
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substantial change in the nature of the current military- 
technocrats coalition occurs in which a more open and
democratic decision-making process is allowed, 
transmigration policy is unlikely to move from its 
current basic assumptions.
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APPENDICES:
Appendix 1, Riau: Transmigration Target and Realization (1961-1987)
Realization Realized
Year Arrival Location (Regency) Target
(families) Families Persons
Target 
(Per Cent)
Year Transfer
1961-1962 Siabu (Kampar) 100 100 489 100 1976
1969-1970 Simandolak (Indragiri-
Hulu) 300 298 1,325 99 1977
1971-1972 Teluk Kiambang I 150 150 735 100 1979
1972-1973 Teluk Kiambang II 150 150 732 100 1979
1974-1975 Teluk Kiambang III 200 200 831 100 1979
1977-1978 Reteh I 500 500 2,303 100 1982
1978-1979 Reteh II 400 400 1.821 100 1985
Siak I 2, 000 2,000 8,440 100 1987
1979-1980 Siak II 1,550 1,550 6, 633 100
Rokan I 1,071 1,071 4,502 100
Kuala Cinaku 1,700 1.700 7,045 100
Tempuling 700 700 3,039 100
Pasir Pangarayan I 2,000 2,000 8,424 100
Teluk Kuantan I 2.000 2,000 8,148 100
1980-1981 Rokan II 1,396 1.396 5. 850 100
Pasir Pangarayan II 5,700 5.700 24,587 100
Teluk Kuantan II 1,300 1,300 5,575 100
Rengat I 2,000 2,000 8,415 100
1981-1982 Pasir Pangarayan III 3.585 3.585 15.591 100
Teluk Kuantan III 700 408 1, 798 59
Rengat II 2,100 790 3,290 38
Siak III 898 898 3, 961 100
Rokan III 685 652 2.768 95
Natuna I 350 350 1. 627 100
Rokan IV - Koto 750 750 2, 901 100
1982-1983 Lipat Kaln 1,335 1.332 5, 408 100
Bangkinang 600 600 2,527 100
Kota Tengah 1,300 1.300 5,473 100
Langgam 200 200 1,014 100
Tanjung Medan 415 415 1,787 100
Tandun 1,500 1,293 4, 939 86
Pangkalan Kasai 2,350 1, 695 7,209 72
Siak IV 800 787 3,416 98
Rokan Kubu 184 154 671 84
Natuna II 600 563 2, 425 94
1983-1984 Lipat Kain 1,100 1,000 5,007 91
Sungai Pagar 924 924 4,352 100
Bangkinang 1, 100 1,012 4,175 92
Langgam 300
Natuna 400
Air Molek 475 475 2,234 100
Pangkalan Kasai 350 332 1,287 95
1984-1985 Sri Indrapura 3, 750 1, 823 6,553 49
Bagan Sinembah 1,500
Tanjung Madan 400 400 1,735 100
Sungai Murai 400
Kota Lama 3,200
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1985-1986
1986-1987
Tandun 250
Bangkinang 1,135 67 242 6
Tebing Tinggi 825 504 1.824 61
Langgam I 300
Lipat Kain 1, 900 403 1,583 61
Lubuk Sakai 525 466 1,869 89
Air Molek 300 130 599 43
Air Molek Timur 3,100 2,480 10,989 80
Kota Tengah - Sungai Murai 1,200
Kota Lama 1,055
Bangkinang 400
Tebing Tinggi 1,085
Langgam I 500
Lipat Kain 600
Sungai Pagar 400
Sri Indrapura 1,500
Bagan Sinembah 725
Rawa Sekip 1,300
Transmigrasi - Sisipan 1,000
Bangkinang A. SP III 544 177 659 33
Bangkinang X/A 544
Bangkinang C. SP II 200
Lipat Kain F. SP II 464 120 457 26
Lipat Kain XI/C 200 116 461 58
Lipat Kain XI/D 50 50 180 100
Lipat Kain XI/F 464 410 1.077 88
Koto Tengah B.
Bangkinang A. SP III 300 275 986 92
Koto Tengah G.
Bangkinang A. SP III 34
Tebing Tinggi SP III, IV 266 220 875 83
Lubuk Sakai SP II 112 84 300 75
112 89 330 79
Lubuk Sakai SP III 171 152 662 89
171 167 741 98
Tebing Tinggi 400 172 572 43
Tebing Tinggi E I SP IV 400 358 1,380 89
Tebing Tinggi E II SP I 50 48 202 96
Rengat II 193 174 782 90
Lubuk Dalam 1,538 378 1,545 25
Sri Siasam 1,538 1.354 5.593 88
179 108 589 60
Air Molek 283 283 1.587 100
Lingga 300 212 952 71
Sei Tapung 650 581 2,378 89
Sei Siasam 500 399 1,596 80
Bagan Sinembah 811 806 3.545 99
Ukui II 1.400
Bagan Sinembah 892 584 2,404 65
Sei Buatan 176 176 698 100
Sei Garo - Galuh 1.250
Sei Buatan 1,000
Note: In February 1988 (at the time of field work) moat of the settlements opened after 1978 
were still under the Department of Transmigration.
Source: Kanwil Transmigrasi Riau, 1987.
Appendix 2, South Kalimantan: Transmigration (and Colonisation) Target and Realisation 1938-1988
Realization Realized
Year Arrival Location (Regency) Target (families -----------------  Target Year Transfer
Families Persons (Per Cent)
1938 Purwosari 95 374 1950a
Madurejo 100 7
1939 Purwosari 106 411
Madurejo 194 626
1940 Purwosari 198 862
Madurejo 116 381
1953 Takisung(Tanah Laut) 724 2,595 1970s
1957 Tamban
1959 Marabahan
1961 Balandean
1960 Beranges
1961 Sebelumbingan
1969-1970 Barambai (Barito Kuala) 140 638
1970-1971 idem 150 726
1971-1972 idem 400 1. 871
1972-1973 idem 200 1.034
1973-1974 Tambarangan (Tapin) 500 2.331
Hatungun (Tapin) 100 457
Parandakan (Tapin) 100 449
Miawa (Tapin) 100 435
Ayunan Papan (Tapin) 69 351
Sidodadi (Tapin) 100 414
1974-1975 Hatungun (Tapin) 331 1,446 1980s
Suato (Tapin) 300 1.262
1975-1976 Tajau Pecah I (Tanah Laut) 1.000 4,341
1976-1977 Tajau Pecah II (Tanah Laut) 1,000 4,208
1977-1978 Batutungku (Tanah Laut) 750 3,190
Masingai (Tabalong) 500 2,332
Belawang (Barito Kuala) 750 3,242 1980s
1978-1979 Sebamban I (Kotabaru) 2,000 8,568
1979-1980 Sebamban II (Kotabaru) 2,000 8,225
Batulicin I (Kotabaru) 2,000 8,852
Tabunangen (Barito Kuala) 475 1. 980
Sakalagun I (Barito Kuala) 550 2,235
Sei-Mahur (Barito Kuala) 200 910
1980-1981 Sebamban III (Kotabaru) 1, 650 6, 940
Sebamban IV (Kotabaru) 496 2,155
Sebamban V (Kotabaru) 1,411 5,797
Batulicin II (Kotabaru) 1,510 6,037
Sei-Seluang (Barito Kuala) 500 2,263
1981-1982 P. I. R. Batulicin (Kotabaru) 304 1,215
296
1984-1985
4
Klumpang IV/E (Kotabaru) 100 74 265 74
Berangas (Kotabaru) 600 183 848 30
Sebamban Lasung (Kotabaru) 600 526 1, 972 88
P. I. R. Pelaihari 300 299 1,082 99
P. I. R. Muara Uya 1.000 500 1, 922 50
Kambitin (Tabalong) 650 497 1.913 76
1985-1986 P. I. R. Pelaihari 700 397 1,653 57
1986-1987 Klumpang IV/A,C 100 100 337 100
Klumpang IV/F 234 234 911 100
P. I. R. Pamukan 250 250 995 100
Jorong (Tanah Laut) 300 300 1,066 100
P. I. R. Pelaihari 500 500 1, 948 100
P. I. R. Paringin (Hulu 
Sungai Utara) 250 250 1,042 100
Kambitin (Tabalong) 66 66 234 100
P. I. R. Muara Uya 250 250 1,844 100
idem 255 255 1,086 100
1987-1988 idem 300 240 955 80
P. I. R. Pelaihari 200 160 668 80
Notes; 1. P. I. R. - Perkebunan Inti Rakyat (Nucleus Estate Holder).
2. In February 1988 (at the time of field work) most of the settlements opened after 1978 
were still under the Department of Transmigration.
Sources: Pelzer (1945; 224, 225, 264)
Bappeda Kalimantan Selatan (1985:2)
Djohansyah (1986: 11-13)
Kanwil Transmigrasi Kalimantan Selatan (1987:15)
